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ABSTRACT

In the decade following the Mexican War, Nicaragua
became one of the focal points for American expansion.

Mani

fest Destiny, commercial interests, the spirit of adventure,
and the desire for a transit route--preferably a canal-
across the Central American Isthmus all contributed to the
attraction this small Central American state had for official
and unofficial American expansionist sentiment.
The first efforts to establish a viable transit route
through Nicaragua were made by Cornelius Vanderbilt who
signed a treaty with the Nicaraguan government in 1849 calling
for both the establishment of a land crossing and the con
struction of a canal.

Later Vanderbilt reorganized his enter

prise into three separate companies:

the Vanderbilt Steam

ship Line to carry passengers from American ports to those in

Nicaragua, the Accessory Transit Company to transport passen

gers across the Isthmus, and the American Atlantic and Pacific
Ship Canal Company to build the canal.

For financial and tech

nical reasons, the canal construction was never undertaken.
Nonetheless, a land and water transit across Nicaragua was

functioning smoothly by 1855.

Before that time, however,

Vanderbilt's control of the transit company had been· chal
lenged by former colleagues, and this dispute was never de
finitively resolved.
A soldier of fortune, William Walker of Tennessee, took
advantage of the Liberal-Conservative civil war raging in
ii
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Nicaragua in 1855 to make himself temporary master of that na
tion.

He was finally dislodged i� 1857 by Nicaraguan dissi

dents and the combined forces of the other four Central Ameri
cen republics, along with the intervention of the United States
Navy.
Also in 1855, Henry L. Kinney of Texas took a group of

American colonists to Nicaragua to settle a portion of the
Caribbean coast which he purportedly had purchased.

En

countering the enmity of Walker, Nicaragua, Great Britain,
and the United States Department of State, the colony foun
dered and died within a few months.
Throughout the period, the United States government
attempted to maintain a correct diplomatic posture toward
Nicaragua and the other Central American states, blunt British
conunercial and imperialistic thrusts in the region, and re
strict illegal activities of its own citizens while trying
to protect their legitimate rights and interests.

The State

Department underwent severe frustration, having been unable

to conclude a satisfactory treaty of friendship and commerce
with Nicaragua during the entire decade.

With the onset of

the Civil War in 1861, American attention was diverted from

the Isthmus, not to be renewed ·until the end of the century.

For its part, Nicaragua emerged from the period with an in

crea�ed sensitivity toward foreign intervention or entangle
ments, and with a heightened xenophobia directed at the

United States.
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The most valuable sources for this study were the New
York newspapers, the State Department Archives, and the col
lected papers and published accounts of some of the partici
pants.

Unfortunately, Nicaraguan sources are sparse:

the in

stability of the period, subsequent changes in archival loca
tions, and finally, the 1972 earthquake have combined to make
documentary material on the period negligible.

PREFACE
Americans intervening in Nicaraguan affairs during the
decade between the Mexican War and the Civil War seldom thought
in terms of Nicaragua alone, but rather in the broade� sphere
of Middle America--that area between the Rio Grande River and
the Panama Canal, including Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean.

Virtually all these Yankee intruders, whether of

ficial or unofficial, regarded Nicaragua as a steppingstone
to greater achievements.

Their activities were of such a di

verse nature that I have chosen to write· their stories em

ploying a topics approach, following each person or activity
from beginning to end before turning my attention to another
facet of the story.

As a result, the reader may encounter

something akin to flashbacks, or even an occasional sense of
/ ., vu. Nonetheless, I feel that the various threads will be
deJa
more recognizable than in a straightforward chronological ac
count.
A major portion of the story deals with the activities

of the so-called "filibusters. "

The word is an English cor

ruption of the Dutch Vrijbuiter (freebooter) and was first

applied to seventeenth century English buccaneers, who spent

their time preying on Spanish shipping and Spanish colonies in

the Caribbean.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the

term was applied to American adventurers engaged in armed ex
peditions against countries with which the United States was
V

at p eace.

It was also pejoratively applied to many Ameri

vi

cans whose intentions were essentially peaceful.

The story of William Walker, the most famous--and tem

porarily the most successful--of the filibusters, has been

told many times, but not in the context of the whole spectrum
of American intervention.

The same observation would apply

to the efforts of Cornelius Vanderbilt and other entrepreneurs
of Isthmian transit.

The diplomacy of the period heretofore

has not been dealt with as an integrated whole, and the unsuc
cessful colonist, Henry L. Kinney, has remained virtually un
noticed by historians.

Altogether, this study represents a

synthesis of previous accounts, though portions of the infor
mation have not been published previously.

The latter would

include some details of the Kinney expedition and of the role
the United States played in an effort to resolve the Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan boundary dispute.
The reason for the time frame used in the study will be
obvious.

When the Mexican War ended� there was an enormous

reservoir in the United States of unsatiated desire for ful
fillment of this country's "Manifest Destiny. "

Given the

strategic location of Nicaragua, much of the attention was

directed at that small Central American state.

With the coming

of the Civil War, America turned inward, addressing itself to

the life and death struggle of the nation.

As an example of

the interest in Nicaragua during the decade, one can cite the
New York Times: . between 1851 and 1860 hundreds of articles
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appeared; in 1861, there was a mere handful and, in 1862,
none at all.
A major source for this study was the archives of the

Department of State.

Ministers were sometimes appointed to

a specific country or countries and at other times to Central

America as a whole, but during the period, they usually resided
in Nicaragua and reported on that country because of the events
occurring there.

Consular reports add local flavor to the na

tional picture and directives from the Department of State
attempt to clarify for the diplomatic and consular agents
United States policy in the area.
Because much of the activity directed at Nicaragua ori
ginated in the port cities of New York, San Francisco, New
Orleans, and Mobile, the newspapers of those places provide
interesting background for the Isthmian ·events.

In addition,

the New York papers often employed journalists who filed their
reports from Nicaragua itself.
Among collections of personal papers, those of William
L. Marcy, Secretary of State, William Sidney Thayer, a com

panion of Henry L. Kinney, and John H. Wheeler, minister to

Nicaragua during the Walker era, were the most useful.

Whee

ler's papers include twenty scrapbooks of items such as letters
and newspaper clippings, with four scrapbooks pertaining to
his sojourn in Central America.
A few participants in the events of the decade published
personal accounts.

The most complete with respect to William
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Walker's activities is that of Walker himself.

It is a dis

passionate and surprisingly objective recounting of his ef
forts to establish and maintain himself as master of Nicaragua,

written shortly before his fifth and fatal endeavor.
true "Walker scholar" to emerge has been William

The only

o. Scroggs of

Louisiana State University, who wrote early in this century.

Scroggs authored one book and several articles on the subject,
relying substantially on the papers of Wheeler and John P.
Heiss.

The best study of the financiers who were attempting

to establish a transit route across Nicaragua is David I. Folk
man's The Nicaragua Route, published in 197 2.

There are no

serious Central American studies of the events of the period,
and Nicaraguan archives are at best fragmentary.
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CHAPTER I
MANIFEST DESTINY AND M IDDLE AMERICA
We have a destiny to perform, a 'manifest destiny'
over all Mexico, over South America, over the West
Indies and Canada. 1
This grandiose sentiment expressed by a New Orleans edi
tor in 1850 reflected the attitude of a large portion of
public opinion in the United States between the end of the
Mexican War and the beginning of the Civil War.

It was a

crucial period in American history, not only domestically
because of the extension of slavery to territories anticipated
for admission as states, but also diplomatically with respect
to further enlargement of the American empire, and these two
issues were inextricably woven together.

A major area of

focus for these broader issues was Middle America, and a
significant key to Middle America was the state of Nicaragua.
The thoughts and actions of �..merican citizens and the American
government with respect to that country were, in many ways,
pivotal for United States relations with Central America as a
whole during the nineteenth century.

A British magazine in 1856 referred to the role of

Nicaragua in an editorial about the belief of the American
1James D. B. DeBow, quoted in William H. Goetzmann, When
the Ea le Screamed, The Rornanti� Horizon in American Di lornacy,
800-1860 New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1966 , 75.
1

2
people in their "manifest destiny" that they should "have the
control of all the North American continent":
The manner in which the State of Nicaragua has been
reduced, or, it should rather be said, raised to her
present position, by being occupied and governed by a
large body of Americans, affords an instance of the
truth of this statement • • . • Should the Americans
in that country be able to maintain· their position, of
which, at present, there seems to be every probability,
the successful filibustering of Nicaragua will be but
the beginning; the end will be the occupation, by
Americans, of all the Central American �tates, and, in
due course of time, of Mexico and Cuba.
The term "manifest destiny" was coined by John L. O'Sullivan
who wrote in 1845 that "our manifest destiny [is] to over
spread the continent allotted by Providence for the free

development of our yearly multiplying millions. 11 3

The attitude

itself which the term characterized was a long-standing tradi
tion in American history.

This self-acknowleged right of

continual expansion began as early as 1763, when loyal British
subjects in America chafed at the Proclamation Line running
along the crest of the Appalachians, beyond which the colonists
were forbidden to venture.

The subsequent surge. to occupy and

cultivate the Northwest and Louisiana territories was evidence
of that sense of destiny.

Finally, the acquisition of the

2 11 Nicaragua and the Filibusters, " Blackwood's Magazine�
March, 1856, reprinted in Littell's Living Age, XIII, No. 62 1,
April 19, 1856.

3John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation, " The United States
Magazine and Democratic Review, July, 1845. O'Sullivan was
more modest in his anticipation of the extension of our national
patrimony than DeBow was five years later. His editorial had
reference primarily to North America above the Rio Grande, but
he envisioned this domain would encompass 250-30 0 million
Americans by 1945.
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whole of the Mexican territory north of the Rio Grande and
Gila rivers put America on the Pacific shore facing the
Orient.

At this juncture, still-restless Americans found

themselves perplexed as to which direction they should next
choose in order to expend their bursting energies.
The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which formally ended
the Mexican War, was a compromise.

While Nicholas P. Trist,

the Chief Clerk of the State Department and President Polk's
agent for securing the peace treaty, feverishly negotiated

with the remnants of the Mexican government, .two contending
forces in the United States pressured the President to alter

the terms of Trist's instructions. 4

On the one hand, Whigs

in Congress threatened to cut off appropriations for the
prosecution of the war, and thereby forfeit the opportunity
to seize part or all of the Mexican territory subsequently
acquired.

On the other hand, a growing group of American

expansionists demanded that all of Mexico should be annexed,
perhaps as a preparatory step to expansion through Central
America to the Gulf of Darien.

The terms of the treaty, signed on February 2 , 1848, pro

vided that Mexico cede to the United States the territory that
includes the present-day states of New Mexico, California,

Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and part of Colorado, and confirmed
4Polk's displeasure with Trist's apparent inab�lity to
expedite the negotiations induced the President to reca�l his
envoy; Trist ignored the summons, and concluded the negotiations.

4
American title to Texas as far as the Rio Grande, in return
for the payment of $15,000,000.

The United States also

assumed the claims of its citizens against the Mexican govern
ment to the value of $3,250,000.

The acquisition of this new

area served to inflame a smoldering social and political
problem in the United States: the question of the extension of
The

slavery to territories with aspirations toward statehood.

pattern had been established in 1820 that a "solution" to the
problem would be worked out in Congress with each new incorpo
ration.

Thus, the Missouri Compromise of th�t year admitted

Missouri as a slave state while free-soil Maine, formerly a
part of Massachusetts, was admitted as a separate state.

In

addition, in the future slavery would be prohibited north of
the line of 36 ° 30', the southern boundary of Missouri, in the
area comprising the remainder of the Louisiana Territory.
Many anti-slavery Whigs in Congress had opposed the war
against Mexico because a victory would ensure the admission
of Texas as a slave state.

Subsequently, the delicate balance

between slave and free states was maintained, but the additional
territories in the Southwest added a new dimension to the
problem, and one that particularly concerned the South.
California clamored for admission as a free state, and the

popularity of the institution of slavery in the remaining area
was dubious.

Between 1848 and 1850, the South became increas

ingly disillusioned over the prospects qf the fate of the South
west, an area that southerners regarded as their heritage since
the effort and the blood expended to acquire it had been

largely southern.

A new compromise was reached in 1850,

which provided for the admission of California as a free
state with the remaining area--the territories of Utah and
New Mexico--left open to "popular sovereignty, " i. e. , a
territorial referendum.

Perhaps some southerners felt that

an expected migration of slaveholders from Texas into the
contiguous areas would assure the slavery-oriented future of
the territories when time for admission arrived.

Other south

erners had witnessed the handwriting on the wall.

Given the

nature of the anticipated agricultural and �ornmercial uses
of the remaining territory within the Union, there seemed
little hope that either popular sovereignty or Congress
would concede these areas to the embattled institution.

As a

result, eyes were cast toward the tropics, where a type of
plantation economy was already in existence, for land which
could be annexed as territories and conditioned for statehood
with slavery.

This reorientation brought Central America and

the Caribbean into the vortex of American domestic politics,
and into the arena of projected American expansion.

Aside from those who were interested in the tangible

practice of counting states, there was a large body of public

opinion in the United States that believed the ultimate destiny
of the nation was continued expansion.

Some of these limited

their designs to specific targets such as Cuba.

At the other

end of the spectrum were those who dreamed of an American
empire that stretched from the Arctic Circle to the Gulf of
Panama, and perhaps even beyond.

Many of these felt that it

6

was America's manifest destiny and duty to carry the fruits
of our civilization

to the benighted inhabitants'living

beyond our borders.

This attitude did not base itself in such

mundane issues as slavery, commerce, or agriculture; rather it
soared with such grandiose concepts as liberty, justice, and
equality, all of which the United States was destined to
purvey.

Expansion to the north had been sealed off by the

1846 treaty with Great Britain which had divided the Oregon
country between the two nations.

Despite the cries in the

Pacific Northwest, a hotbed of manifest destiny, for "Fifty
four forty or fight! ", the existing demarcation line of 49 °
was extended westward to Puget Sound.

In the south, Mexican

territory had become diplomatically inviolable with the
Guadalupe-Hidalgo line.

All this meant that manifest destiny

now had to address itself elsewhere, and again Central America
and the Carribean came into the picture.
A third group of expansionists viewed intrusion into
Central America as a necessity for reasons of communication
and transportation.

By 1849, gold had been discovered in

California, and waves of Americans including prospectors,
merchants, and general opportunists were seeking ways of going
from one coast to the other without having to cross the almost
trackless wilderness of the American interior.

An alternative

was to sail around Cape Horn at the tip of South America, but
this was a long, arduous, and expensive passage.

More to their

liking was sailing from ports such as New York or New Orleans,
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crossing the Isthmus of Central America, and connecting with
sailing ships or steamers which would carry them to San
Franciso.

A major problem was that the only reliable route

across the Isthmus was a mule trail across Panama.
The ideal solution was a ship canal across the Isthmus,
by which travelers and cargo could avoid the cost and incon
venience of debarkation or transshipment.
oceanic canal was not a new one.

The idea of a trans

It had been dreamed of as

early as the reign of the Emperor Charles V in the first half
of the sixteenth century.

Spain, for reasons ranging from

technological to zenophobic, had never undertaken the massive
project.

The time seemed appropriate to rectify that over

sight, and possible routes were actively scouted by both
American and European entrepreneurs.

One possibility was

Panama, then a part of Colombia, but a more attractive site
at the time was Nicaragua.

Engin�ers and investors thought it

possible to construct a route utilizing the San Juan River
which flowed from Lake Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea, cross

over the upland lake, then dig a canal the rest of the way to
the Pacific, a distance of less than twenty five miles.

The

most aggressive of the American entrepreneurs was transporta

tion magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt, who signed a contract with
Nicaragua which provided for an interim land-water route across
the Isthmus within the borders of that country, and ultimately

for the construction of a ship canal.

Although Vanderbilt was

subsequently frustrated in his efforts to build the canal, his

8

transit route employing river .steamers, lake steamers, and
carriages was the most popular route for crossing until

closed in 1856 after being embroiled in the power struggle
in Nicaragua.

Nevertheless, other Americans continued to

maintain--both before and after the Vanderbilt debacle--that
ultimate American control of the country, whether by subter
fuge or annexation, was the only viable hope for security
for American capital.
At the same time, the United States government wanted to
make sure that American capital was protected in the region
generally, and with respect-to transit and canal routes in
particular.

But Washington found itself in an awkward
Although bound by the Neutrality Law of 1818 to

position.

prevent its citizens from making armed incursions into the
sovereign domain of other nations, 5 the government could not
turn a deaf ear to demands of its citizens for protection of
their traditional rights to "colonize" if this colonization
conformed to the laws of the recipient states.

Therein lay

the dilemma: with the introduction o f filibusterism from the

United States into Central America, adequately and definitively
labeling these efforts was often difficult and sometimes impos
sible.

In addition, the larger question of the "enforcement"

of the Monroe Doctrine was inextricably interwoven with all
the other problems facing the United States government with
5u.

s.

Statutes, III, Chap. LXXXVIII, 447-50.

9

respect to Central America.
The Monroe Doctrine was initially a statement of United
States policy made by President James Monroe in his message
to Congress on December 2, 1823.

At that time, the United

States was alarmed by the threat of French intervention,
supported by the powers of the Holy Alliance, with the purpose
either of restoring Spanish rule over the newly-liberated
Spanish-American republics or of imposing some form of
monarchical government.

The original suggestion .came from

British Foreign Secreta�y George Canning, and was intended
to be a joint British-American statement.

Prophetically,

Secretary of State John Quincy Adams persuaded the president
to make the unilateral declaration with the thought that it
might, some time in the future, be necessary to employ it
against the encroachments of Great Britain.
Its initial impact in Europe prompted some resentment,
and not a little amused disdain, and its "enforcement, " if
such it can be called, was probably a result of the superior
British navy in the Atlantic and Caribbean protecting that

nation's own commercial interests.

The Doctrine was restated

in 1845 by President Polk because of his concern about English

and French diplomatic activities in Texas and British interest

in Oregon and California, and became a recognized principle of
American foreign policy.

With those issues settled·either

amicably or by force of arms, the United States turned its
attention to the problem of apparent British expansion in

Central America.

10
It was clear to many, given the new American

interest in this area, that the two nations were on a colli
sion course over hegemony in the Isthmus.
The position of the United States in the Isthmus was not
an enviable one.

Despite repeated efforts, it had never

really "normalized" relations with either the Central American
federation or its successors, the five Central American
nations.

State Department envoys floundered around seeking

out governments to which they ·could present their credentials.
Transportation from the east coast of the United States to
Central American capitals was always inconvenient and some
times virtually non-existent.

Somber instructions from the

Department of State to its envoys often revealed an appalling
ignorance of the geography of the area to which the diplomats
were dispatched.

One writer later characterized the situa

tion in 1849 in almost dyspeptic terms:
In the best of circumstances, there was little that any
United States agent could do; for Central America had
fallen under the dominion of Britain. Though it was
almost at our doors, its approaches were guarded by the
British outposts of Jamaica and Belize. Its flanks-
Guatemala and Costa Rica--while American forces slept,
had surrendered to British direction and control. Its
Atlantic shore line, embracing the eastern terminus of
the Nicaragua Canal route, had become in effect British
territory under a thin Mosquito mask. Its Bay of Fonseca,
dominating the western terminus of the route, lay under
the guns of British warships. Its whole extent of land
and waters was under the observation of British officials.
Its very existence as a single state was subject to
British whim • • . •
Such was the Central American situation in 1849; such the
result of a quarter of a century of diplomatiq prepara-

11
tion on the part of Great Britain; such the result of
a quarter of a century of diplomatic futility on the
part of the United States. 6
Although the situation was probably not as desperate as
thus characterized, there was no question but that the
British had a head start on the United States in this strate
gic area.

British businessmen had been for years systemat

ically deputized as consuls and commercial agents, and many
had spent their entire adult lives_in the region, marrying
into local families and acquiring the confidence of native
Their reports to the Foreign

businessmen and politicians.

Office were invaluable aids to the calculation of British
policy in Central America.

The British navy did roam the

shores nearest the Pacific and Caribbean coastlines, and were
ever

ready to show the flag in protection of British commer

cial and diplomatic interests.

But perhaps the most serious

threat with respect to violation of the Monroe Doctrine were
neo-British colonies on the Isthmus and the adjacent islands.

Belize· or British Honduras, had been seized by the British at

the end of the eighteenth century and it had remained under

their rule, although the surrounding areas were fighting for
their independence from Spain.

Guatemala claimed the terri

tory _in vain, and in 1859 finally ceded the disputed area to
Great Britain, with a number of conditions attached to the
agreement.
6 Joseph

B. Lockey, "Diplomatic Futility, " Hispanic
American Historical Review, X (1930), 294.

12

The history of the Mosquito Coast of Honduras and
Nicaragua is even more complex.

The basis for the earliest

British claim was that English freebooters had utilized the
shoreline of Cape Gracias a Dies on the frontier between
Honduras and Nicaragua as a haven, and during the recurring
colonial wars between Spain and England they had been
conunissioned as privateers by the Jamaican governors.

Because

the area did not fit into the scheme of Spanish colonial

development, the Spanish had neglected it and had left its

fortunes to the aboriginal Mosquito �ndians.

The British

recorded a pseudo-protectorate status for the region with the
"voluntary" submission in 1740 of the Mosquito king to the
British crown.

The Spanish attempted to recover the area in

the 1763 Treaty of Paris, in which Great Britain agreed to
demolish all its fortifications on the "Spanish continent. "
The British, employing a pattern of diplomatic deviousness,
interpreted this to mean South America, with, concomitantly,
North America being the American continent.

The Spanish tried

again in a supplementary treaty of 1786, but the British still

retained the right to cut logwood, and thus preserved their
foothold.

After the decline of Spanish power in America, the

British resumed transporting Mosquito "kings" to Belize for
solemn but contrived coronation ceremonies.

The British

returned in force in 1848, seizing the mouth of the San Juan
River under the guise of preserving it for the Mosquito king,
even though a Mosquito Indian had never dwelt within fifty
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miles of the river in any direction.

Even so, the British·

claimed that it constituted "part of the proper dominions

of his Mosquito·Majesty of whom Great Britain was the law-.
ful protector. "

In reality, British Foreign Secreatary Lord

Palmerston felt he had grasped "the key to the Central

American Isthmus • • • the only feasible rreans of
communication between the two seas. 117

Far from retrenching or maintaining the status quo
during the period, the British continued to press other
claims.

Shortly after occupying the mouth of the San Juan,

Lord Palmerston attempted to seize the island of Tigre in the
Bay of Fonseca, which he judged would be the western terminus

of a canal route. 8

The British were also charged with

quietly annexing Roatan Island and other nearby islands in

the Gulf of Honduras. 9

It was clear to many in Washington

7 Ephraim G. Squier, Adventures on the Mosquito Shore
(Gainesville, 1965, orig. pub. 1855), 337 -351. In an intro
duc·tion, Daniel F • . Alleger states that Squier had been sent
in 1849 by President Zachary Taylor to Nicaragua as charge'
d'affaires as ."one move in an effort to forestall a British
dream of a Nicaragua canal up the San Juan River from the
Caribbean to the Pacific. " Ibid., ix.

8Ibid. , 352.
9El Nicarguense (Granada), July 12, 1856. John P. Heiss,
who had been a�pointed by William Walker's Nicaraguan govern
ment as charge d'affaires in Washington, made the charge in an
open letter to be read at a rally held in New York on May 24,
1856, in support of American filibusters in Nicaragua. Heiss
also called on the United States government to revoke its
"odious" neutrality laws and allow its citizens to aid anybody
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that the pious platitudes of the Monroe Doctrine were not
going to retain America for the Americans, and that positive
and vigorous action was called for by the United States govern
ment.

In spirit, and with the legacy

of the expansionist

Polk administration as a precedent, some of the succeeding
administrations on the Potomac were not unwilling to act.

After his inauguration on March 4, 1849, Zachary Taylor,

the Mexican War hero and political neophyte, had hoped to
conduct a non-partisan administration.

This non-partisan

ship would extend not only to patronage politics but to
critical national issues as well.

He would leave these issues

to Congress to settle, and would content himself merely with
implementation of the legislature's collective judgments.
Unfortunately� he was unable to keep the office of the presi
dent above the battle that continued to rage over the question
of the extension of slavery into the newly-acquired south
western domain.

When the territory of California petitioned

for statehood, and indicated that it would enter� slavery,
a great hue and cry was raised in the South.

Taylor adopted

a stance of righteous indignation, feeling that sectional pres
sure was attempting to surrogate national law.

His death in

July, 1850, ended his opposition to the last compromise
anywhere in obtaining a more liberal form of government. He
charged that while the United States had interfered with
"immigration" to Nicaragua, the British had aided the fili
busters; opponents with arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, he
maintained, Central America, along with Yucatan and the Bay
Islands, would become Americanized and formed into one great
republic.

15
carefully pieced together by Henry Clay.
Taylor's successor and the last of the Whigs, Millard
Fillmore, was, if anything, even more passionately opposed
to the institution of slavery.

He was more concerned with

the preservation of the Union, and, rather than threatening
to hang those who interfered with California's "popular
sovereignty" as Taylor had done, he concurred with the
Compromise of 1850.

His acquiescence may have spelled doom

for his own political career, and also that of his party, but
it did allay the issue for the remainder of his term.

It

was the Pierce administration, taking over in March, 1853,
that raised the spectre of new acquisitions and their
c�rollary, new slavery extensions.

The Pierce administration,

with its general program of southward expansion, was heir to
the "Polk Doctrine" in both spirit and personnel.

Pierce

pimself had been appointed to the rank of general by Polk in
the Mexican War and his cabinet included Secretary of State
William L. Marcy, who had been Polk's secretary of war.

Key

representatives abroad were also a heritage from the Polk
administration.

Polk's secretary of state, James Buchanan,

was minister to London, and Polk's second secretary of the

navy, John Y. Mason, was minister to Paris.

Perhaps the most

curious appointment was Pierre Soul�, a naturalized Frenchman
and former Louisiana senator, as minister to Madrid.
In rising to eminence in New Orleans [Soule] had fervently
defended states' rights, the institution of slavery,
/
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Manifest Destiny, and especially the acquisition of
Cuba. He had campaigned for Cass in 1848 on the
ground that Cass would annex Cuba. His appointment
to the Madrid post, in view of this record, was near
to being insulting. 10
Pierce made his position clear in his inaugural speech,
as previewed during the campaign, with reference to Middle
America in general and Cuba in particular:
The policy of my administration will not be controlled
by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion. Indeed,
it is not to be disguised that our attitude as a nation,
and our position on the globe, render the acquisition of
certain possessions, not within our jurisdiction,
eminently important for our protection, if not, in the
future, essential for the _preservation of �he rights of
commerce and the peace of the world. 11
The president also addressed himself to the problem of
British--and perhaps other European states'--encroachment in
Middle America and the concomitant challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine.

European colonization upon "this side of the ocean, "

indeed any "idea" of interference or colonization, would be

rejected as "ut"terly inadmissable. 11 1 2

The most active foreign policy objective of the early
Pierce administration was the acquisition of Cuba.

Aside from

its proximity to the United States mainland, other reasons

attracted adherents to its incorporation into the American
Union.

First and foremost for many was the plantation economy

lOFrederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American
Expansionism, 1843-1849 (New York, 19 66), 27 1.
llNew York Evening Mirror, March S,
1 2rbid.

1853.
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which was well-suited to the employment of black slaves.
Southerners concerned about the precarious balance in the
Senate were heartened by the prospect of possibly carvingup the island into two or more states.

Others were interested

in the strategic location of the island in terms of both naval
and merchant marine activity.

It was pointed out that Cuba

commanded access to the mouth of the Mississippi River, the
Gulf of Mexico, and future trans-Isthmian passages.
there was the intriguing character of its ownership.

Finally,
The

last great bastion of Sp�in's former empire in America, it
was an anachronism, secured by the unsteady hand of a depressed
European state, its citizens anxious to throw off the yoke of
colonialism and to rise with the fortunes of the colossus to
the north.

The last two points--that Spain because of her

weakness had forfeited the privilege of holding the colony,
and that there was overwhelming support within the island for
independence, were not universally accepted.

Senator John P.

Hale of New Hampshire spoke for those who felt there was some

thing immoral about taking advantage of Spain's decrepitude.

He wryly pointed out that if the administration was so concerned
about the s_trategic position of Cuba that it was willing to
attempt to bully Spain, then what about Canada, a British
possession?

18
I suppose that this country is not so low; or its
patriotism is not of that doubtful character • • • •
that it will take a position before a weak nation
which it will not assume before a strong one • • • •
I ask if the local position of Canada, in any aspect
in which you may view it, whether in relation to the
interests of peace or war, is not a thousand fold of
more consequence than Cuba • • • , 1 3
This was logic, not realism, and the Pierce administration
was early committed to southern expansion.

In addition,

Manifest Destiny tended to lose some of its fervor when

directed at Anglo-Saxon land s and institutions, as in the case
of Oregon.

With respect to the anticipated help from native Cubans,
America was disabused of this expectation during the Taylor
Filmore years.

A number of filibustering expeditions to Cuba

sailed from American ports during this period, i� spite of
official efforts to discourage them.

Their leader was

Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan who had long been resident in
Cuba.

In 1848 he formed a revolutionary group on the island,

but was defeated and fled to the United States the following
year.

In this country, he organized a group of North Americans

dence.

In the course of these activities, he was arrested and

and mounted other expeditions to Cuba to fight for indepen

prosecuted in the United States, but public sentiment was so

much in his favor that a conviction could not be obtained and
he sailed again with another force.

He was captured and

1 3 congressional Globe, 32 Cong. , 2 Sess. , App. 97.

executed in Havana in 1851. 14
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The expected uprising in the

island never occured, and the Pierce administration determined
to address itself to alternative means of acquisition, either
by purchase or by some ill-defined method of "detachment "
from Spain.
This new orientation led to the ill-fated "Ostend
Manifesto, " drafted by Buchanan, Mason, and Soul,.

The project

was one that was conceived by James Buchanan within days after
Pierce took office.

In a letter to Secretary Marcy, Buchanan

.advised, "If you desire to acquire Cuba in a peaceful manner,
the President ought to select able and accomplished ministers
to Naples, Spain, England, and France who would cordially

work together. "15 Marcy acted on this suggestion, and

appointed the expansionist trio to the operative posts.
Marcy's instructions to Soul� were revealing.

He expressed

concern over the possibility of aid by France or Great Britain
to Spain to protect Spain's sovereignty in Cuba, thereby
.creating a virtual protectorate.

We have recently learned in the instance of Central America
what a protectorate means, and to what use it may be
devoted. There is not a very great difference between the
protector and the possessor of a territory, and when the
possessor is weak and the protector strong, the distinction
we apprehend would in effect be annihilated. 16

14Robert G. Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba,
1848-51 (Princeton, 1915), passim.

lSBuchanan to Marcy, March 8, 1853, William L. Marcy Papers
(Library of Congress).
16Marcy to Soule, July 23, 1853,· ibid.
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Marcy observed that the minister to Madrid during the
Polk administration had approached the Spanish government
about purchase of the island.

The secretary further pointed

out that it had not been the policy of the American govern
ment to seek transfer of the island without the concurrence
of the Cuban people.

The United States might still be

willing to purchase Cuba under certain conditions, but it was
unlikely that the Spanish would be interested.

Marcy believed

that the Spanish government was under obligation to Great
Britain and France

not to transfer this island to the United States • • • •
[most likely] Spain wili pertinaciously hold onto Cuba,
and the separation, whenever it takes place, will be
the work of violence. In the present aspect of the case
the President does not deem it proper to authorize-you
to make any propositions for the purchase of that island. 17

Marcy added that the United States would favor a "voluntary
separation" of Cuba from Spain, with Spain perhaps retaining
a principal commercial interest.

Thus Cuba would fall into

the "American Continental System and contribute to its stabil
ity instead of exposing it to danger. "

The United States would

contribute more than just good will, Marcy intimated, but

couldn't elaborate until the situation with respect to Spain's

attitude was better understood in Washington. 18

Despite Marcy's admonition against purchase, hope of a
spontaneous uprising on the island waned, and the secretary.'s
subsequent instructions returned to the Polk-Buchanan procedure
17 rbid.

18rbid.
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of trying to buy Cuba in the face of Spanish intransigence.
Marcy directed his envoys to persuade financial interests
in the European capitals to bring pressure on Spain for the
sale so that Spain would have the money to pay some of its
debts long due these financiers.

The ministers held a

series of meetings in the autumn of 1854 in Ostend, Belgium,
and Aix-la- Chapel_le, France, and forwarded their report to
the Department of State on October 18. The report brought
intimately into association the related ideas of American
security, the importance of the Gulf of Mexico, the Isthmian
routes, and the acquisition of Cuba in order to protect them.
They also expressed concern about the "Africanization" of
Cuba, fearing that a Haitian-type revolution and black seizure

might encourage a similar. movement in America's southern states.

After again recommending purchase of the island, the ministers
observed that should Spain refuse, "then, by every law, human
and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain,
if we possess the power"; and the trio left no doubt they

believed the United States possessed that power.

Although the report was confidential, and accurately

reflected the attitude of the administration, Pierce and

Marcy disavowed it when newspapers in both the United States
and Europe ferreted out the story.

The vociferous and

increasingly influential Republican press in the United States
was especially critical, attaching the epithet "manifesto" to
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the report , and claiming that it was a pistol held to the head
of Spain--a demand that Cuba be "sold or seized. "

After this

disclosure , the Pierce administration was reluctant to press
the case for acquisition.

Ironically , Buchanan won the Demo

cratic nomination and the presidential election in 1856 partly
because he was not involved in the Kansas-Nebraska issue , hav

ing been out of the co?ntry , and because he was involved in
.
the Ostend Manifesto. 19 Nonetheless , persistent efforts to ac-

quire Cuba during his administration were not only unsuccessful

but added to sectional bitterness over the issue of slavery ex
tension · and probably hastened the coming of the Civil War. 2 0
With the hopelessness of a spontaneous uprising , the
failure of purchase efforts , and the discrediting of official
government efforts to detach Cuba , the field was open to private
adventurers.

One of these was William Walker , whose primary

interest seemed to be Nicaragua , but whose grand design probably
envisioned a Middle American superstate under his direction.
With a small band of filibusters from California , Walker inter

vened in Nicaraguan civil strife in 1855 , an4 was successful in
making himself master of that state for over a year.

Though his

motives and aspirations were never entirely clear to anyone but
himself , many regarded his efforts as forerunners to the ex

tension of American control over Central America and the Carib1 9 Roy F. ·.Nichols , "James Buchanan , " Encyclopedia Britannica

( 1 9 7 0 ) , IV , 3 4 1 .

2 0Merk , Monroe Doctrine , 2 75.
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bean.

One of those interested in Walker's success was domingo

de _ Goicouria, a cultured and highly regarded Cuban revolution
ist.

Goicouria's revolutionary credentials were respectable,

as he had worked with Lopez in Mississippi on the 1849-51
Cuban invasions.

Early in 1856, Goicouria was living in New

York, and he sent an emissary to Walker in Nicaragua to vali
date reports that the latter was preparing to use the Isthmus
as a launching base for a Cuban invasion.

Walker and the agent

reached an agreement to pool th�ir interests, first Nicaragua
and then Cuba.

Walker subsequently received aid from Cuban

revolutionists, but it became increasingly clear to them that
Walker's ambitions were not parallel to their interests.

The

break betweetl the Nicaraguan filibusters and the Cuban revo
lutionists resulted in Goicouria's publication of Walker's
letters indicating the filibuster's intent to annex Cuba in

order to preclude the same action by the "barbarous Yankees. " 2 1
Walker's ultimate intentions were never disclosed because

they were never realized, as his short-lived regime in Nicaragua
was wnded by armies from a coalition of Central American states.
Speculation , then and subsequently, was rampant , and sectional

interests in the United States tended to identify his plans with
their aspirations.

There seems to be little question with re

spect to Walker's attitude toward slavery, for one of his first
decrees after assuming power in Nicaragua was the repeal of
the anti-slavery laws.

Walker was from Nashville, Tennessee

21william O. Scroggs, "William Walker's Designs on Cuba, "
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I (September 19 14) , 2 0 1-208.
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but it appears he became a partisan of slavery during a
sojourn i n New Orleans and was obsessed with the idea of
finding a territory for slavery expansion outside the reach
of northern abolitionists.

The Mexican War had proved the

weakness of that country, and he determined to make it the

"nucleus of a new slavery propaganda. 1 2 2

When his efforts in 1853 to detach Baja California and
Sonora from Mexico and to establish an independent "Republic
of Sonora" proved unsuccessful, Walker returned to San
Francisco to �wait another opportunity to fulfill his ambition.
The chance came with the offer by the Nicaraguan Liberals to
hire a mercenary force led by Walker to aid them in their
battle with the Nicaraguan Conservaties.

Walker's subse

quent meteori c rise to Commander-in-Chief of all Nicaraguan
forces, and then Presi dent of Nicaragua, both startled and
confused the Department of State, as well as those Americans
who followed his fortunes .

Some felt he was the emulator of

Sam Houston, that he would Americanize Nicaragua, and then

secure its admission to the American Union.

Because of his

identifi cation with one side in the power struggle for control
of the Isthmi an transit , Walker · was regarded as an agent of

a coterie of American capitalists. 23

It seems probable,

2 �ore H. Hittell, "History of the Filibuster, William Walker,"
unpublishe1 ms., ca. 1915, Su-tro Library, San Francisco, 12.
2 � York Herald, November 29, 1856.
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however, that his aims went beyond Ni caragua.

He apparently

planned to create a strong federated state out of the five
Central American republi cs, organized and governed on mili
tary principles, and then to effect the conquest of Cuba.
The introduction of an American population would serve to
secure and regenerate the entire area.

An interoceanic

canal through Nicaragua would give the region an even greater

strategic importance. 24

In other words, Walker was bent on establishing a mili
tary slaveocracy in Middle America, with himself as its
dictator.
was mi xed.

Reaction in the United States to this possibility
Some southerners were delighted, and hoped an

alliance with Walker's "empire" might check northern opposi
tion in the event of secession; some northern proponents of
Mani fest Destiny were alienated.

Though they had taken

slavery i n the tropi cs for granted, they anti cipated that
action by Walker or the United States government would lead
to opening up the area to trade or perhaps to annexation.

They had not been expecting a competitive superstate with
opposing ideas and institutions. 25

Initi ally, the ambivalence

in the United States di d not trouble Walker.

His maj or

concern was that equi pment, supplies, and reinforcements arrive
2 � scroggs, "Walker's Designs on Cuba, " 19 9.
25Ibid. 2 10.
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unimpeded from the northern repub lic , and for a time they
continued to pour in without interruption.

Ultimately , the

pressure on the Pierce administration corning from opposition
to official expansion and to the adventures of American
citizens began to impinge.

The government wavered , never

entirely aware of the true situation in Nicaragua , and unable
to decide whether to assign its imprimatur or employ its
naval forces to assure the failure of the filibusters.

A

contemporary editorial took the administration to task over
its indecision.
The general policy , aside from mere legal questions
involved in this whole series of blunders of the Marcy-·
Pierce rule would seem to point to the encouragement ,
by every proper means , of the movement in Nicaragua. .
It is a mode of foreclosing the Central American contro
versy with England. It assures stability of government
over the Transit route. It promises vastly increased
growth in sugar , coffee and other tropical products.
It binds California to the policy of the American Union .
It stations a power to the southward of Mexico , and
opens to that dissolving republic a mean_s of renovation.
It is an expression of American enterprise , precisely
at the right point--indicative of the future of the
whole of the North and Central American States. It
raises up a rival i� Cuba , where labor in freedom will
be found vastly superior to that which is bound in the
iron clamps of a military despotism . In short , the
Nicaragua movement is wholly Anglo-American in character ,
orderly in administration , just in principle , and
beneficial in results; and the sooner the government
rectifies its mistakes the sooner will its errors be
forgotten. 25
If the administration's policy toward Walker , Vanderbilt ,
et al , seemed to lack continuity , there was even more confusion
25Blackwood'� Magazine , March , 1856.
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with respect to the confrontation with Great Britain over the
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and hegemony in Central
America.

President Polk, in his 1845 addres s which renewed

the tenets of the Doctrine, had broadened the definition of
"security" for this country, transforming the doctrine from
a defensive statement to an expansionist statement.

At the

time, there seemed to be a contraction in the zone of appli
cation.

I n 182 3, the zone had embraced two continents --it

was hemis pheric; in 1845 it compris ed only one continent-

North America_. 26

Taking the two together, the implication

was either that the United States intended to make a more
intensive effort to establish its fiat over Middle America
or that this area was most vulnerable to British encroach
ment. · State Department policy, however, was clouded by the
fact that every British move seemed to be accompanied by
diplomatic smoke s creens and faits accomplis.

With the

acquisition of California and the gold rush, the concomitant
renewed interest in a transoceanic canal, and the British head
start toward excl usive influence in Central America, the

Department initially s trove to establish s ome degree of
equality with the Britis h.

This effort resulted in a treaty

between the United States and Great Britain signed in 1850 by
the American secretary of state, John M . Clayton, and the
English ambas sador to Washington, Sir Henry Lytton Buh1er.
2 6 Merk,

Monroe Doctrine, 2 81.
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It guaranteed the strict neutrality of any interoceanic

canal opened across Central America.

The countries agreed

that neither would seek to control any canal that might be
built, nor to occupy or plant colonies in or exercise
dominion over the part of Central America.
The ink was hardly dry on the agreement before the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty became the subject of conflicting
interpretations �

The United States government understood it

to mean that the British process of establishing new colo
nies in Central America would now be reversed and, at the
very least, they would withdraw from their occupation of the
Mosquito Territory.

The British foreign office pointed out

that the treaty did not apply to that portion of Nicaragua's
coast as it was not a colony but a protectorate, therefore
not included in the agreement, and that the treaty was not

retroactive.

British intransigence complicated Washington's

diplomacy with respect to Nicaragua and Central America.
Fully confident that American capital would build the canal,
thereby enhancing American prestige, security, and commerce,

the State Department attempted to establish the proper milieu
for such an eventuality.

The task included providing its

good offices in settling the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border
dispute, for the canal route would pass through part of the

contested area. and hostilities might seriously impair transit

operations.

In addition, the Department also wanted to make

it possible for the operating company to contract

29
with only one sovereign state, rather than risk the confusion
of having to deal with two.

A basic problem was the negotiation

of a treaty of peace, amity, and conunerce with Nicaragua ; the
treaty would be necessary to ensure the safety of United States
citizens and their investments.

Due to British interference

and the actions of its own private citizens, the United States
failed to exchange treaty ratifications with Nicaragua during
the entire period .

The border dispute was finally settled,

but without United States help or arbitration.
The advent of the Civil War curtailed American interest
in southward expansion until the close of the century.

When

Confederate guns fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, all
eyes turned inward at the coming holocaust.

Little thought

and less attention was given to what had recently been a
pressing and formidable issue .
era had passed:

In many ways, a short-lived

an era in which there was much agreement in

the United States on something called Manifest Destiny, but
much disagreement on its implementation and its implications.
The nation ' s leaders at times seemed to be committed to ex

pansion ; indeed, many were elected on expansionist platforms,

but their erratic courses left little in concrete achievement .

A few intrepid individuals launched expansionist programs of

their own, but by the end of the decade, these had borne little
fruit.

Nevertheless, governmental, entrepreneurial, and

filibuster efforts in Nicaragua during the era provided an

30
insight into United States relations with Central America
during the nineteenth century.

The first issue lay in the

realm of diplomacy, with the battleground being Central

America (Figure 1) and more specifically the middle states
of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Figures
2 and 3).
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Figure 3 .

Nicaragtla .

CHAPTER II
THE NICARAGUAN NON-TREATY

The United States goverment's interest is in keeping
the transit route under one authority (i. e. : Nicaragua) ,
and that conflicts arising from grants should be ad
judicated by the judicial 1authorities, that all parties
should act in good faith.
These instructions from the Secretary of State to his
representative in Nicaragua highlight the area of overriding
concern in trying to negotiate a satisfactory treaty with
Nicaragua during the decade of the 1850's.

Nicaragua had re

cently emerged into separate nationhood and, aside from other
considerations, the United States was anxious to "normalize"
relations with that state and the other new republics in
Central America.

Nicaragua, however, was the point of pressure

because its natural geographical and topographical advantages
made it a likely site for an interoceanic canal or
isthmian transit route.

a

trans

A further concern of the united concern

of the United States was that Nicaragua was one of the areas

where the British were making not only commercial, but apparent
ly nee-colonial inroads.

The Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua had

been occupied by the British since January 1, 1848, and this
area included San Juan del Norte which was expected to be

1Lewis Cass to Mirabeau B. Lamar, January 2, 1858,
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 180 1-19 06,
Nati6nal Archives Microfilm Publication M9 9, roll 27, frame
288.
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the eastern terminus for either a canal or a transit route.
In addition, the British were giving evidence of coveting
naval bases in the Bay of Fonseca, shared by Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Honduras, and of establishing a pre-eminent
sphere of influence in Central America as a whole.
Early United States efforts to negotiate a bilateral
treaty were frustrated by a number of events and circum
stances.

One problem was identifying a legitimate govern

ment with which to do business.

Even after the breakup of

the Confederation _of Central America, numerous efforts were
made in various states to put the federation back together
again .

On occasion, these efforts were nominally successful,

but more often they resulted in temporary arrangements made
by caudillo leaders of similar ideological proclivites.

But

the problem was not limited to the international level.
Internai"ly in Nicaragua there were two principal parties , the
conservatives (Legitimists or Serviles) and the liberals
(Democrats) .

Actually, this ideological demaraction was a

legacy from the era of the federation, and continued well into
Nicaragua's national period, being in many cases more important

than the issue of international frontiers.

As a result, civil

war was endemic in that Isthmian country, causing precipitous

changes in government and shifts in the location of the capital,

with Ledn, Massaya, Managua, and Granada all vying for the
distinction at one time or another.

British efforts to frustrate American diplomacy in order

�6

to enhance their own commercial and strategic interests were
largely in the domain of Frederick Chatfield, the consul
general to Central America.

During Chatfield's seventeen

years on the Isthmus, . from 1834 until 1851, he was idefati
gable in his efforts to establish British predominance there,
even if it meant a rather undiplomatic subersion of American
attempts to negotiate satisfactory international accords with
the Central American republics.

The first consequential

American representative to feel the sting of Chatfield's
interference was Elijah Hise, named by Polk as United States

charge d'affaires to Central America in October, 1848. 2

Hise's primary mission was to negotiate treaties of friendship
and commerce with Guatemala and El Salvador, but a secondary
responsibility was to keep an eye on Chatfield and report the
British agent's activities.

Hise was also assigned the task

of urging a reunification of the replublics of Central
America.

It was felt in Washington that a renewed federation,

or even a confederation, would be strong enough to blunt
effectively British _imperial encroachments upon the Isthmus.
There was a certain contradiction in Hise's instructions. ·

2 Before his appointment, Hise, 47, had a large and lucra
tive law practice in his native Russellville, Kentucky,· and
had served in the Kentucky legislature. Subsequent to his
diplomatic mission, he was twice elected to Congress . Hise
committed suicide in 1867 because of despondency over post
Civil War conditions. National Cyclopedia of American
Bio·graphy (New York: James T. White & Company, 1904), VII, 55.

·3 7

Separate treaties negotiated with the various Central American
states would imply recognition and encouragement by the United
States of the individual character of each republic, and would
undermine
reunion.

the secondary goal of aiding in the achievement of
Inasmuch as part of Chatfield's overall plan was to

prevent a resumption of the federation, the British agent was

pleased with Hise's progress in formulating separate accords_. 3
Although no match for the intriguing Briton, Hise did
recognize the importance of the projected canal and felt a
special sense of urgency about coming to terms with the
Nicaraguans on this crucial issue.

Ac�ordingly, he signed

a treaty with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Buenaventura Selva
on May 31, 1849 , even though the administration which had

'

appointed him was now out of office and a new charge had
already been appointed. 4

The treaty provided for a right of

way for a canal, road, or railroad, in perpetuity and under
American auspices, permitted fortifications if necessary, and
guaranteed the territorial integrity of Nicaragua by the
United States.

The provisions giving the American government,

or a company endorsed by it, an exclusive franchise, and- making
Nicaragua a virtual protectorate of the United States, were
3Mario Rodriguez, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central
America (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1964), 30 0.
4Miles P. DuVal, Jr. , Cadiz to Cathay (Stanford University
Press, 1940), 52. Rodriguez fixes the date of the treaty as
June 21.
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greater commitments than those in any subsequent treaty which
came under consideration.
The Hise-Selva Treaty was hardly written when Hise's
replacement, Ephraim George Squier, arrived at San Juan del
Norte. 5 The treaty was rejected by the new administration
of Zachary Taylor on three counts:

Hise had never been

authorized to negotiate a treaty with Nicaragua (though he had
requested permission and had received no response from the
Department of State), his commission had expired and he had
already been replaced by Squier, and the administration had
no intention of assuming a protectorate over Nicaragua.

When

Squier arrived, American financiers were already engaged in
tryping to secure a franchise for either a canal or a transit
route.

Consequently, his instructions were to make a treaty

of commerce in the interests of the American Atlantic and
Pacific Ship Canal Company and to secure a right of way for a
canal open to all nations.

Squier could assure the Nicaraguans

5squier had been a precocious youth who taught school in
his native New York State while still a teenager and despite
limited formal education . Early efforts at journalism brought
mixed success, but his published works on the archeology of
New York and Ohio were regarded as authoritative. In 1848 he ·
served as clerk of the Ohio House of Representatives. Squier's
appointment as charg� when he was only 28 was largely through
the influence of W. H. Prescott. After his stint in Nicaragua,
he returned to Central America in behalf of the unsuccessful
Honduras Interoceanic Railway Company. Later he served as
United States commissioner to Peru and Honduran consul-general
in New York City. He capitalized on his residence in Latin
America by publishing a number of archeological works on the
area. Squier died in Brooklyn in 1888 after a long illness.
Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 19 3 5), IX, 488-9.
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of moral support in their struggle to recover the alienated
Mosquito Territory, but under no circumstances was he to
guarantee the territorial integrity of Nicaragua, or to
commit the United States government to any alliances, contro

versies, or speculative schemes. 6

On September 3, 1849, within a week after the Ship Canal
Company headed by Cornelius Vanderbilt had signed a contract
with the government of Nicaragua for canal and transit
rights, Squier reached an accord with the Nicaraguan foreign
ministry.

Sensitive to Chatfield's intrigues and diplomatic

maneuvering, the American minister went beyond his instruc
tions, conceding a limited guarantee of Nicaragua's terri
tory.

Articles 35 of the treaty reaffirmed the Vanderbilt

company's transit franchise secured in a commercial contract
of August 27.

It required, however, that the United States

recognize the rights of sovereignty and property which
Nicaragua possessed over the line of the canal and guaranteed
the neutrality of the strip as long as it remained under the
control of American citizens. 7 Perhaps at the behest of the

company, Secretary of State Clayton indicated that if the

United States were committed to undertaking the defense of
the canal, some extra-territorial provision or at least a

provision for exclusivity should be included.
6House E>c . Doc. No. 75, 119-130.

In addition,

7 oaniel Webster (Secretary of State) to J. Bozman Kerr
(Charge d'Affaires to Central America), June 6, 1851, Diplo
matic Instructions, National Archives, M77, 27/113.
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Clayton pointed out to Squier that the treaty had only a
twenty-year duration, with a provision for annulment on
twelve-months' notice, whereas the franchise contract had a
life of eighty-five years.

Clayton did not feel that this

gave the entrepreneurs s ufficient protection, so he advised
Squier to refrain from further bargaining pending an antici
pated treaty with Great Britain encompas sing the whole
Isthmian is sue. 8

The result of these latter negotiations

was the Clayton-Buh,er Treaty, signed on April 19, 1850, in
which the United States and Great Britain agreed that neither
would obtain or maintain any exclusive control over a canal

nor erect or maintain any fortifications commanding a canal. 9
In the meantime, at the urging of Nicaraguan Charg� d'

Affaires Eduardo Carcache, Clayton agreed to submit the Squier
treaty to the Senate.

The Secretary advised earache, however,

that even if the Senate approved it, the President would sign
only with the understanding that other provisions might be
agreed upon later between the two governments for " more

ef fectually securing the obj ects contemplated by the 3 5 th
article. "

Apparently the canal company had requested the delay

in submis sion of the treaty until it could s end agents to
Nicaragua to discus s the import of Article 35.

Clayton also

thought that the article "might be changed so as to inspire
8c 1ayton to Squier, Novemher 20, 184 9 , ibid., 27/101.
9 Ibid. , May 7, 1850, 27/104.
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greater confidence in capitalists who might be disposed to
invest their funds in the construction of the ship canal and
at the same time, extend the benefits of protection to the
canal. "

To facilitate this modification, Clayton recomI

mended that Squier return to Leon and get full powers to
10
negotiate a new treaty.
Aside from the canal company's interests, other sub
stantial reasons existed for reaching an agreement with
Nicaragua.

William F. Boone, the United States Consul at

San Juan del Sur, pointed out some of the problems inherent
in the non-treaty status.

In contrast to Britons who were

residing and doing business there, Americans contended that
no protection was provided by the United States government.
American sailors complained that this situation was unlike
that of any other port-of-call which they had visited.

In

addition, for the six-hundred Americans resident in Nicaragua,
there was no postal arrangement unless twenty-five cents were
prepaid in New York to the purser of the Vanderbilt line.

One key to the languishing of the treaty was another change

in the juridical status of Nicaragua.

On December 15, 1851,
I

.

•

Boone was informed by Foreign Minister Pedro Zeledon that his

10 clayton to Carcache, January 2, 1850, Notes to Foreign
Legations in the United States from the Department of State,
1834- 19 06, National Archives Microfilm Publication �9 9, roll
10, frame 2. An extraordinary error was made by Clayton in
this communication. He continually referred to the "Heisse"
special convention of September 3, 1 8 49. Presumably this
meant "Hise", but it was Squier, Clayton's own representative,
who signed it.
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country no longer existed as a sovereign state.

Zeledon

contended that a confederation of Honduras, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua had been formed some two years earlier, and that
the seat of this government was in Tegucigalpa.

Apparently

the Granada-Leon rivalry played a role in what appeared to
,
be a pretense on Zeledon's
part. The latter official was
aligned with the Granada faction i n Nicaraguan politics, while
J. Bozman Kerr, nominated by the State Department as Charge
d'Affaires, was in Leon.

Kerr had given Boone his commission,

but even Kerr had yet to be accredi ted .

Z e ledon told Boone

that in order to receive official recognition, he would have
to "apply to the Central Confederation, located some place
in the mountains of Honduras, some five hundred miles off. "
In later conversation, Zeledon conceded that he did not
really expect Boone to find a government there. 11
A problem for American citizens similar to that in San
Juan del Sur arose on the opposite side of the Isthmus at
San Juan del Norte where the United S tates was compelled to

give · a temporary countenance to the de- facto government

installed by Great Britain in order to provide protection for

her citizens congregating there.

Far from resolving the

llBoone to Webster, December 27, 1851, Consular Despatc._�es
from San Juan del Sur, National Archives Microfilm Publica�ion
T-152, roll 1, frame 38. John Bozman Kerr served as Charge
d'Affaires to Nicaragua from March 24, 1851 until July 30,
1852.
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difficulties between the United States and Great Britain, the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty seemed to compound them because of the
different interpretations put on its provisions.

Although

the United States never acknowledged the Greytown (San Juan
del Norte) authorities as a legitimate government to be
sustained against the claims of Nicaragua, the British
continued to deny that Clayton-Bulwer was retrospective, or
that they had yielded their
Indians.

protectorate over the Mosquito

In his instructions to Solon Borland, newly appointed

minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordi�ary to the
Central American states, Secretary of State Marcy

complained

that a copy of the instructions from British Foreign Secre
tary Lord Clarendon to British Minister to the United States
John F. T. Crampton showed that Great Britain maintained the
same right to "intermeddle" in Central American affairs as
before the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer accord, and "continued
to manifest an equally forward disposition to do so. "

Marcy

observed, however, that the British appeared to be willing to
relinquish their protectorate if Nicaragua would give assur
ances of good treatment of the Indians and would pay the
Indians some compensation.

Borland should therefore urge on

had made with her Indians !

Marcy noted that the Indian question

Nicaragua the same type of settlement that the United States
might be a subterfuge, and the rea l issue was Britain's

concern about protecting the commerce in British manufactures
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and Costa Rican coffee. 12

Costa Rica was dependent upon the port of San Juan del
Norte as the Serapiqui-San Juan River system provided the
major outlet from Costa Rica's heartland to the Caribbean
and thence to Europe.

As long as the Central American

"confederation" existed, there seemed to be no problem, but
when it broke up and the independent state of Nicaragua
purported to possess sovereign rights at San Juan del Norte,
the British felt compelled to move in.

Perhaps, Marcy told

Borland, the best course for the United States government

would be to urge the reconstitution of the confederation. 13
The minister was also directed to negotiate another

treaty with Nicaragua, and to try to include a provision
that Americans could buy and hold property for any purpose.
Marcy pointed out what he considered to be the benefits of
such a program:
The residence of our citizens in these states would
import strength and stability to the political and
commercial relations which for the mutual interest of
both countries, should be maintained. Our citizens,
should they find sufficient inducements to settle in
any of these states would carry with them their capital
and that enterprise, for which they are so much distin
guished. Coming from a country of similar political
institutions, imbued with the principles of a free
government harmonizing with their own, such residents
could not excite j ealousies, or create any apprehen
sions of disturbing influences.
1 2Marcy to Borland, June 17, 1853, M77, 27/177. Borland
served as Minister to Central America from April 30 , 1853,
until June 28, 1854.
13 Ibid.

4 5·
Borland was warned not to give reciprocity for this conces
sion, as the treaty might not pass the Senate.

Moreover,

such a provision was probably unnecessary, considering the
openess of the various American states in granting these

rights. 14

Borland concluded "A General Treaty of Peace, Amity,
Commerce, Navigation, and Protection between the United
States and Nicaragua" on February 14, 1854, but the treaty
was amended in Washington and returned to his successor for
acceptance in its _ new form by the Nicaraguan goverrunent. 15

By the time it was returned, other dramatic events had
occured and the Borland treaty, like its predecessors, mis
carried.

The first impasse was the bombardment of San Juan

del Norte by the United States Sloop-of-War Cyane on July 13,
1854. 16

Carcache's successor in Washington, Jose de

Marcoleta, protested vigorously to the Department of State
and demanded reparations "to those respectable citizens of
Nicaragua who suffered .

grievous losses of property .

and also , to the Government of Nicaragua. "

Marcy's rejection

of this protest clearly showed the depth of resentment and
misunderstanding between the two governments engendered by

the confused and complex situation in Nicaragua:
14rbid.

15Marcy to John H. Wheeler (Minister-Resident in
Nicaragua) , October 2 3, 1854, M77, 27/228.
16rbid. , 231.
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I beg to submit that it is scarcely credible, as your
note seems to imply, that any considerable number of
respectable citizens of the Republic of Nicaragua had
taken up residence or placed their property among
those whom you properly characterize as "the pseudo
sovereigns"--San Juan--a place as you admit, held by
usurpation against the sovereign authority of their
own government. These citizens for whom you make
reclamation, must have lived in treasonable associa
tion with the open and avowed enemies of your country,
and if engaged there in business they must have been
incorporated with that communi ty which you describe
in such severe but probably j ust terms.
Marcy pointed out that the residents had been given notice

"that the town would be punished for its misdeeds" and could
have evacuated the area.

Furthermore , they had time to .

persuade the Cyane's commander, Captain Hollins, to make a
distinction between them and those implicated in the destruc
tion of American property.

They chose instead to cast their

lot with "the abandoned and lawless dwellers at that place. "
Marcy concludes,
Nicaragua may think herself kindly treated if she is
not held responsible for the acts of those who were
permitted by her to occupy her territory and perpetrate
deeds injurious to friendly powers while within her
jurisdiction. She owed it alike to herself and to
these powers to have driven the band of marauders
settled at S an Juan from her acknowledged soil. If she
had the indiscretion to open an account with the United
States upon this matter this Government will be at
liberty to make her responsible for all the inj uries
its citizens have suffered from those occupying her
territory. 17
The second incident to disturb the relations between the

two countries was the organization of a colonizing expedition
by Colonel Henry L. Kinney.

Kinney and his associates had

17Marcy to Marcoleta, August 2, 1854 , National Archives ,
M9 9, 10/62.

acquired title to a grant originally made by the Mosquito
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Indian "King, " the grant being a tract of land on the
Mosquito Coast which included San Juan del Norte.

These

American entrepreneurs formed the "Central American Land and
Mining Company" to exploit the tract, and began advertising
for stockholders in the fall of 1854 in American east coast
newspapers.

Not only Marcoleta but also Pedro Molina, the .

Costa Rican representative in Washington, objected to the
anticipated occupation.

The Costa Rican concern stemmed

from a claim to the south bank of the San Juan River and to
rights in the Bay of San Juan.

Molina vigorously protested

against · the validity of "any title or grant made by the Kings

or Chiefs of the Mosquito Indians, " and avowed that his

government would "not allow any colonist or party of colonists
from whatever country they may proceed to occupy, locate or
take pos sies sion of lands belonging to Costa Rica fo'r the
purposes of agriculture, mining or any other, unles s he or
they shall have previously applied to the government of Costa
Rica, and duly obtained a permis sion and legal title to that

effect. 11 18

Marcy replied that the expedition appeared to be peace

able, so was not subj ect to the United States neutrality laws.
The Secretary said that he presumed Costa Rica' s concern was
l B Molina to Marcy, December 13, 1854, ibid. , �9 9 , 10/7 2
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about the land title, but that this was the exclusive juris
diction of Costa Rica and not the responsibility of the

United States. 19

Subsequently, the State Department did

develop misgivings about the nature of the Kinney expedition,

and introduced strategies to prevent it. 2 0

Despite the

concerted efforts of the courts and the New York port author
ities, Kinney managed to make his way to San Juan del Norte
with a reduced contingent by early September, 1855.

While

he was enroute, Marcoleta's importunities became more stri
dent, and he finally demand�d that the State Department issue
orders for the American Navy to intervene to prevent the
disembarkation of the colonists on Nicaraguan soil.

Again

Marcy lectured Marcoleta, and this time he took the Nicaraguan
agent to task for not recognizing the limitations of sover
eignty and jurisdiction:
Mr. Marcoleta is • • • fully aware that unassociated
individuals have a right to leave the United States,
and go whither they please, and that this government �
has no right to enquire into the motive for such a·
removal. They can be dealt with only as roombers of an
expedition fitted out within our limits, against a
friendly state and while they are within our j urisdic
tion. If such an expedition escapes the vigilance of
officers and arrives within the territories of a foreign
state, they cannot be pursued and seized while within
such territories by the authorities of the United States.

Marcy advised Marcoleta that an American naval vessel "could
not, without assuming illegal power and involving the

19 Marcy to Molina, December 19 , 1854, Ibid. , M99, 10/73.

20 At the direction of the District Attorney, the New York
port authorities seized Kinney's ship. Kinney was arrested
and subsequently released without trial.

4 9.

sovereign rights of that state, interpose to prevent the
disembarcation of arms, ammunition, or other articles to
which reasonable suspicions are attached. " 21
The third interruption of normal relations between the
United States and Nicaragua, and one that might be termed a
catastrophe, may have been referred to in Marcoleta's
request.

The Nicaraguan Minister's allusion to "the meeting

of suspicious persons in that locality" may have been a
reference not only to Kinney, but also to the filibuster
By August, 1855, Walker and his band had

William Walker.

landed in Nicaragua and were conducting independent military
operations against the government at Granada which Marcoleta
represented, ostensibly on behalf of the Derno'c'ratas head-

'

quartered at Leon.

It was widely believed at that time,

particularly on the·Arnerican east coast, that Kinney and

Walker were acting in concert rather than as rivals, as subse
quent events were to prove.

Marcoleta may have been alarmed

at the possibility of a filibuster pincer movement operating
from opposite littorals of the Nicaraguan Isthmus .

Unfortunately for Marcoleta, with Walker's arrival on the

Isthmian scene, the Nicaraguan agent's days were numbered.

October 23, Walker had succeeded in establishing a nominal
bipartisan government in Granada with himself in de facto
2 1Marcy to Marcoleta, August 2 2, 1855, ibid. , �99,
10/85.

By
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control.

One of the filibuster leader's first moves was the

cancellation of Marcoleta's commission.

Complicating matters,
I

the former conservative (Legitimista) president, Jose Maria
Estrada, had escaped to the northeastern province of Segovia
and there proclaimed his government still in existence.

The

Granada regime, under the provisional presidency of Patricio
Rivas, was, according to Estrada, illegitimate and invalid.
Having been appointed by Estrada, Marcoleta clung to his office
and defied removal.

When Walker's government named a replace

mept, the Department of State found itself in a dilemma.

If

the government withdrew its recognition of Marcoleta, it would

seem to be placing its approval of the filibuster government,
which the Department considered unrepresentative of the will
of the Nicaraguan people.

On the other hand, Marcoleta was an

embarrassment to the Pierce administration since everyone recog
nized that the Nicaraguan represented a phantom government.
The question was raised as to whom did he send his despatches ,
and from whom did he get his instructions? 2 2

As it was believed

that Marcoleta had never received a regular salary from the

government of Nicaragua, the New York Herald sarcastically

editorialized :

The generosity of this gentleman in serving a government
which could not pay is only equalled by his piety in con
tinuing to serve it after it is dead. He continues with
a constancy and disinterestedness unparalleled in the
annals of diplomacy to represent its . spirit long after the
body is dead and buried. 2 3
22

El Nicaraguense, January

2 3New

2 6,

1856.

York Herald, January 1 2 , 1856.

The wording of a State Department note to Marcoleta on
December 10 is obscure but Marcy seemed to as sure the
Nicaraguan diplomat that his recall by the Walker government
did not constitute withdrawal of Marcoleta's credentials. 2 4

Nevertheles s , such a withdrawal appears to have been conveyed
to Marcoleta shortly thereafter.
Even before Marcoleta's dismis sal, Walker began to send
a succes sion of representatives to Washington.

The leader of

the parade was Parker H. French, an American who had been a
member of President Rivas' cabinet. 2 5

The choice was not an

inspired one, as it emphasized the foreign character of the
Granadan regime.

Nonetheles s, the State Department was under

heavy pres sure from various sectors--both political and
journalistic--to receive French.

Some were in sympathy with

the Walker cause, while others pointed out that he was the
accredited representative of a de facto regime, and it was not
within State Department prerogative to pa� s judgment on that
regime.

But the Department remained adamant in its position,

refusing to recognize the government or its representative .

24Marcy to Marcoleta, December 10, 1855, National Archoves.

M9 9 , 1 0 / 9 8 .

25French had published a rival newspaper to Walker's in
Sacramento before going to Nicaragua. In Granada, French
offered his services to Walker and was appointed Minister of
Hacienda and later Nicaraguan Minister to Washington. Marcy
refused to accept him and, after American newspapers published
a revelation of French ' s shady past, Walker dismis sed and
repudiated him. William O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers
(New York : Rus sell & Rus sell, 1969, orig. pub. 1916), 89,
168-71. Senate Report 455, 33 Cong. , 2 Ses s.
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Domestic political considerations now entered upon the
scene to alter the situation.

Pierce's administration was

beginning to be criticized for being soft on British imperial
ism and not devoted enough to the cause of Manifest Destiny.
As the Democratic nominating convention was nearing, and
Pierce was actively seeking re-nomination, an about-face on
the issue of recognition of the Walker government was executed. 26

·'
This time the Nicaraguan emissary was Padre Augustin

Vijil, a respected cleric and former lawyer. 27

Marcy received

Vijil on May 14, 1856, thereby implying recognition of the
Granadan regime, and asked for the padre's legation personnel

list on May 16. 28

The resumption of relations was a cause for

celebration in the streets of Granada and among Walker's
supporters in New York.
The official recognition alleviated the pressure on
United States Minister John H. Wheeler 2iho had already engaged
in premature diplomatic activity.
26

27

s croggs, Filibusters, 1 7 1.

Wheeler to Marcy, April 17, 1856, National Archives,

M2 1 9 , 1 0 .
28

Marcy to Vijil, May 16, 1856, lliid. , M99, 10/112.

29 John Hill Wheeler, lawyer, diplomat, and historical
writer, was born in 1806 in Murfreesboro, North Carolina, the
son of a merchant and shipper. He graduated from Columbian
College (now George Washington University) in 18 2 6, was
licensced to practice law in 1827, and received an A . M. degree
from the University of North Carolina in 18 2 8. Wheeler served
in the North Carolina House of Commons from 1827 to 1830, was
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Wheeler had presented himself to the new government directly
30
upon its formation, and had been rebuked by Marcy for this
show of initiative.

The Department, Wheeler was informed, had

embarked upon a course of watchful waiting and would therefore
delay its judgment about the validity of the new regime .

In

the meantime, he was to assess the situation and keep the
Department posted:
It is very important that this government should have
the most accurate information in regard to the actual
political. . condition- - of--the. state -of---Ni-c aragua. The .
accounts which have been sent on here are conflicting .
While �ome of them represent that the present political
organization is satisfactory to the people of that
state--others -represent · tha-e- i t - has -no-found-a·t:ion- i n the -··
hearts of the people, who would very generally shake off
the power of Walker if it were possible for them to do
so, and that terror is its sole foundation . Your situa
tion is favorable -to the acquisition of a correct knowl
edge of the internal affairs of that country. 31

superintendent of the Charlotte branch of the United States
mint from 1837 to 1841, and was North Carolina state trea
surer during 1842-1844 . After serving again in the North
Carolina legislature in 18 5 2, Wheeler was appointed Minister
to Nicaragua on August 2, 1854. He resigned under pressure
from Secretary William L. Marcy on March 2, 1857 . After
living in Washington, Wheeler returned to his native North
Carolina at the onset of the Civil War, then journeyed to
Europe in 1863 to collect historical material. He then went
back to Washington and historical writing until his death in
18� 2. His major historical publication, Historical Sketches
of North Carolina, which came out in 1851, was undistinguished
and error-riddled. The biographical portions were so partial
to his own party that it was nicknamed " The Democratic
Studbook. " J . G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Dictionary of American
Biography, XX , 50.
3�eeler to Marcy, November 8, 1855, National Archives,
M219, 10/28.
31Marcy to Wheeler, January 8, 1856, M77, 27 /253 .
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Unfortunately, the creaking wheels of packet-ship diplo
macy could not keep apace of the events occuring in Nicaragua.

Wheeler's acknowledgement of Marcy's

despatch granting recogni

tion carried the news of a new political change in the Isthmian
state.

The government in Nicaragua was no longer that of

Rivas, who had defected to an opposition faction, but of
President Walker, who had been chosen in an election of

questionable validity. 3 2

At this intelligence, the perplexed

. State Department simply refused to act, and for the remainder
of the Walker period did nothing with respect to official .

recognition.

Walker himself sought to minimize the importance

of his break with Rivas, and ask�d Vijil to reassure

Washington that no substantial change had occured . 3 3

By the

time Walker's message reached Washi ngton, however, Padre Vijil
had already departed, leaving John P. Heiss as charge d'
affaires of the legation. 34

Heiss had been sent to Nicaragua in February, 1856, as

a bearer of dispatches from the State· Department.

t\Then he

arrived in Granada, Walker won his fellow-Nashvillian ' s enthu
siastic support .

The latter then returned to the United States

a "naturalized" Nicaraguan and devoted his energies to the
filibuster cause.

After first acting as charge for the

3 2wheeler to Marcy, June 30, 1856, ibid. ,

2 19 , 10/59

3 3walker to Vijil, June 2 9 , 1856, John P. Heiss Papers,
Tennessee Historical Society, Nashville.
34vijil to Marcy, June 2 3, 1856, ibid.
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legation , Heiss was designated by Walker as a special
commissioner to the United States and Great Britain to adjust
the continuing controversy over the British Mosquito protecto
rate.

Inconveniently , neither government accepted Heiss'

diplomatic overtures.

This setback notwithstanding , he con

tinued to serve Walker in other ways as when Walker needed
publicity in the press , or a defense against the attacks of
his critics , or a spokesman with an entree to the realms of
power and influence in Washington.

Warm letters were exchanged

between the two men into 1857 , but silence thereafter suggests
a rupture in their relationship. 35

Another American , Appleton Oaksmith , was the last of the
Walker regime's nominations as representatives to the United
States , and Oaksmith also was duly rejected by the Department

of State. 36

One of the victims of this diplomatic imbroglio

was the bilateral treaty.

Wheeler had negotiated a "Treaty of

Friendship , Corrunerce, and Navigation" on June 20 , 1855 , even
before the arrival of Walker.

Nicaragua had ratified the

accord on September 27 , 1856 , and in a September 3 0 dispatch ,

Wheeler urged action by the State Department.

The American

Minister pointed out that the treaty had met the approval of
the Department when he had first presented it , and that the

35Elleanore Ratterman , "The Walker- Heiss Papers. Some
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Walker Regime in Nicaragua , "
Tennessee Historical Magazine , I , No. 4 (December , 19 1 5) , 331.
36Marcy to Oaksmith , September 13 , 1856 , M99 , 10/116.
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President's annual message had indicated that it would be sent
to the Senate.

In order to comply with the time period

designated for ratification, Wheeler counseled, the treaty
would have to be �pproved during the current congressional

session.

His dispatch also enclosed a copy of the decree of

the Nicaraguan government repealing the Act of the Confed
eration Congress of Central America of 1824 which abolished
slavery on the Isthmus.

As if in explanation, the minister

gratuitously observed:
The experience of any pers9n who may reside for even a
short space of time in Nicaragua will convince the most
fanatical, that the rich soil so well adapted to the
culture of cotton, sugar, rice, corn, cacoa, indigo
etc. , can never be developed without s lave labour. 3 �
In response the . Department not only ignored the treaty but
recalled Minister Wheeler. 38
Meanwhile, the problem of trying to determine j ust who
_should be the authentic representative from Nicaragua continued
in Washington.

In early October, 1856, Patricio Rivas,

ensconced with a rival government at Leah, nominated a min
ister to the United States.

But Antonio Jos� de Irisarri,

already accredited as Minister from Guatemala and El Salvador,
began an ill-starred year of efforts to secure reception by

bungling his presentation of credentials.

In acknowledging

Irrisarri ' s note which referred to an accompanying intro-

10.

37 Wheeler to Marcy, August 6 and August 30, 1856, M2 19,

38scroggs called Wheeler's support of the decree "the
proverbial straw that broke the back of the camel" in sealing
the Minister's fate. Scroggs, Filibusters, 2 16.
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duction from the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Marcy quickly
advised him of the faux pas:
I have the honor to acquaint you, that the accompaniment
to your note is of a different character, being a
letter to me from the same functionary upon the subject
of Mr. Walker's alleged election as President of
Nicaragua. It is presumed that this was accidenta�ly
substituted for the letter referred to in your note. 39
On October 28, Marcy informed Irisarri that the President had
declined to accredit him.

The Secretary observed that there

was too much confusion regarding who had the authority to speak
for Nicaragua or to act as a de facto government, and some

reason to believe that there may very well have been no one. 40
After the fall of Walker on May 1, 1857, a new government

was organized in Nicaragua.

,

,

The chiefs of the political fac-

,

, .

tions, Legitimist Tomas Martinez and Democrat Maximo Jerez,
formed a coalition and ousted Rivas, who went into exile in
England.

Martfnez was named president, with Jerez serving in

various cabinet posts, and the new chief executive renamed
Irisarri as the Nicaraguan delegate to Washington.

In August,

the new Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, advised Irisarri that

the Nicaraguan's reception (and subsequent treaty negotiations)

would be delayed until formal diplomatic relations were restored
between the United States and Nicaragua. 41 While waiting
for the State Department to make up its mind, Irisarri
39 Marcy to Irisarri, October 2 0, 1856, M99, 10/118.
40 Ibid. , October 28 , 1856, 10/119.
41cass to Irisarri, August 28, 1857, M99, 10/ 131.
\
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lived in New York until he received a summons from Cass in
September:

"Wishing to have a personal conference with you I

will thank you to come hither so that I may see you on Tues day
morning of the 29 th instant. 11 42

Whether from petulance, prior

business conunitments, or indisposition, Irisarri declined to
make the trip immediately to Washington.

Cass' suspicion or

ire was raised, as he revealed in his next communication:
I have just received your letter of the 2 5th instant
and much regret that your health is so impaired and
especially, that it suffered in consequence - of your
late visit to this place. I am unwilling to subject
you to a recurrence of your illness, and if you cannot
come on here, of course the question of the recognition
of the existing government of Nicaragua, which has been
submitted to the President must be determined without
the benefit of your presence. It was upon that subject
I desired to converse with you, and I invited you to
repair hither by the direction of the President. The
President is now absent, but will return at the begin
ning of the ensuing week • . . . I think your presence
here • . • . would be useful in the consideration of
this matter. 43
In October Cass again delayed a decision due to a report
from the British Minister "and other sources" that Nicaragua
and Costa Rica planned to form a confederation.

Cass indi

cated that the United States would have to await the outcome

of this new development, and requested that Irisarri send the
Department a copy of the proposal if such existed. 44

response, Irisarri reassured the State Department that
42 Ibid. , September 2 3, 1857, 126
43Ibid. , September 26, 1857, 127
44rbid. , October 15, 1857, 128.

In
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Nicaragua intended to remain a sovereign state, and that the
rumors of a confederation probably grew out of the amicable
boundary negotiations currently underway between the two
countries.

Irisarri was then duly received, and negotiated a

standard bilateral treaty with Cass on November 16, 1857.
After the recall of Wheeler, the State Department was

severely circumscribed in its efforts to obtain independent
intelligence on Nicaragua.

Remaining to report were the

consuls at San Juan del Norte and San Juan del Sur, but neither
could be considered an asset.

Both had become involved in

Nicaraguan internal politics; the Greytown agent because of
the transit imbroglio, while the consul on the Pacific
littoral, John Priest, had apparently been committed to the
downfall of the filibuster government.

One American , a short

time resident of San Juan del Sur, bitterly attacked Priest,
complaining that he had solicited the intervention of the
United States Navy against Walker in order that the consul
might obtain his exequatur from the Chamorro government.

Withal , Priest was not fit for the j ob, the complainant con
tended.

"He is certainly a very immoral man, dissipated and

not strictly honorable.

He is completely under the influence

of the natives • . • • [That he has ] become the apologist for

the Chamorro government is a well-known fact. "45

Cass tried

45s. M. West to Cass, June 31, 1857, T152 , 1/173. West
had arrived in Nicaragua as a correspondent for the San
Antonio West Texan j ust before the Allies facing Walker had
closed the transit route. He was brought back to New York
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sending down a special agent, William Cary Jones , who osten
sibly reported from July to September of 1857.

Apparently,

Jones also remained inebriated for that period of time and was
singularly ineffective as a State Department correspondent. 46
The advent of the new year saw a full-fledged profes
sional named by the Department of State to carry out the
difficult job of identifying factions and political currents
in Nicaragua, and trying to secure ratification of the Cass
Irisarri Treaty.

The man selected was Mirabeau Buonaparte

Lamar, a veteran of over twenty years of. international diplo

macy.

Lamar had been President in 1838 of the new Republic of

Texas , an office he won largely by default and whose duties he
did not discharge with any conspicuous degree of success.

One

historian credits Lamar with having "destroyed whatever chance
there might otherwise have been of Mexican acceptance of the

aboard the St. Marys, and when he wrote Cas s, he was destitute
and requesting money from the Department of State to make his
way back to Texas .
46New York Herald, January 1, 1858. Scroggs claims that
Jones "was rarely sober and never diplomatic, and was called .
home without having furnished any information. " Scroggs,
Filibusters, 356. A dissenting voice in the case of Jones was
that of Dr. J. L. Cole, who claimed that Jones' inebriation
was a facade in order to take advantage of "in vino veritas, "
and that the ploy was quite successful. In addition, accord
ing to Cole, Jones was the only American agent who had not
been "humbugged" by the local authorities. Cole to Heiss,
June 20 , 1858, Heiss Papers.
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loss of Texas. 1

47

Most recently Lamar had been the Minister

. Resident ot the Argentine Confederation.
Cass's instructions indicated just how complex was the
task which the former Texan was about to undertake.

First

priority went to the treaty, for without it, Americans residing
in Nicaragua could not be assured of adequate protection from
their own government.

Cass cited William Carey Jones's report

that citizens we�e under surveillance, restricted in their move
ments, and threatened "with the penalty of instant death if they
attempted to escape from the harsh and arbitrary measures which
are imposed upon them. "

Cass noted that Lamar could not appeal

to treaty provisions for protection, but pointed out that amity
between nations required that unoffending aliens be properly
treated.

Jones had also reported that the mails were violated

in order to guard against filibuster movements.

Lamar was

directed to enter a strong protest and to report to the Depart
ment immediately if the official mails were disturbed.
The second item on Lamar's agen_da was the boundary dispute
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

Cass suggested that in order

47Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1938), 2 05. Biographies of Lamar are:
Herbert P . Gambrell, Mirabeau B. Lamar, Troubadour and Crusader
(Dallas: Southwest Press, 193 4 ) , and Asa Kyrus Christian, Mirabeau
Buonaparte Lamar· (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Co. , 19 22). Both
of these deal primarily with Lamar's activities in Texas, and
make only passing references to his diplomatic service. Also,
see: Ha�riet Smithers, ed. , The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte
Lamar (Austin: A. C. Baldwin & Sons, 192 1). These were edited
from the original papers in the Texas State Library, and volumes
V and VI deal with Lamar's diplomatic posts.
48cass to Lamar, April 15, 1858, National Archives, M 7 7 , 2 7 /309.
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to settle their differences, the two nations should retire
within recognized territory and begin negotiations where they
were left off when William Walker interfered.

If that did not

work, they could resort to the provisions of the Clayton
Bulwer Treaty (either to mediation by the United States or
Great Britain under Article 6, or the establishment of an
international zone under Article 4), or, finally, to mediation
by any friendly power.

Cass observed that Costa Rica appeared

to be trying to convert her success against Walker into
territorial aggrandizement, and the Department did not approve.
Lamar was directed to urge again that the Central American
governments unite, since no "political or geographical consid
erations" separated the m, but only divisions inherited fran
the Spanish colonial system.

They could prosper and avoid

conflict, Cass felt, by using the United States federation as
a model. 49

There was also the continuing problem of the differing
interpretations of the Clayton-Bulwer accord, a topic not
strictly within the province of Lamar.

The Mini ster was

49 cass to Lamar, January 2, 1858, fuid. , 288. Cass also
believed that a small party of filibust'ersunder Colonel Frank
Anderson (left over from Walker's second filibuster attempt
which had been arrested by Commodore Hiram Paulding) still
occupied Fort Castillo on the transit route. Cass informed
Lamar that the Department desired that their lives be spared,
and that a naval squadron commander had been ordered to pick
them up (actually, this had already been done). Just as in
the Paulding action, Cass conceded, this was not strictly
legal but was pragmatic and bloodless.

advised, however, that British legate William Gore Ousley
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was then in Washington to try to compromise the conflicting
construction of the treaty.

The United States would

never agree to the British interpretation, Cass reflected,
and had thought at one time that the British would give in,
but recent events had made that possibility seem unlikely. 50
The final issue was that of the reopening of the tran
sit route and the confusion engendered by the companies
competing for the franchise, not to mention the seeming
Nicaraguan _ intransigence with respect to any reopening at
all.

Lamar was aware before leaving the United States of the

aggressive attitude of Vanderbilt, and perhaps of the
conspiratorial nature of the association between Irisarri

and the Stebbins-White company. 51

Cass was unequivocal:

The course of Mr. Vanderbilt, a citizen of the United
States, is deserving of severe censure. His inter
ference in this matter is in every way indefensible,
and his assertion that he prevented for some time the
recognition of Mr. de Irisarri, as the Minister of
Nicaragua, is entirely unfounded, and certainly
exhibits a mistaken estimate of his own influence.
The delay in receiving Mr. de Irisarri originated, not
in the representations or efforts of Mr. Vanderbilt,
but in the political condition of Nicaragua and the
apparent instability of the government. It is due to

s o Thid.

51H. G. Stebbins and Joseph L. White, former colleagues
of Vanderbilt in the transit enterprise, were now his canpe
titors for control . of the route. Many believed that when
Irisarri signed a franchise contract on his own initiative
with Stebbins and White, the Nicaraguan was actually on
White's payroll.
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Mr. de Irisarri to say, that while he has conducted
himself as the faithful respresentative of his own
government, he has secured the respect and confidence of this, by the whole course of his proceedings. 52
Despite these myriad problems, Lamar was optimistic about
his mission, and thought he could forward the ratified treaty
by the first steamer after his arrival.

Much to his chagrin,

he found that Nicaragua was not enthusiatic about the treaty,
particularly because the government feared it would open
rather than close the door to filibusterism.

Irisarri had

even written his government that Nicaragua could not expect
anything but agression anyway, and they might as well sign
the treaty as it was preferable to be filibustered by the
United States government than by "private marauders ! "

Lamar

was informed that the Assembly intended to adjourn before
considering the treaty, but would reassemble just before the

expiration date for approval, and at that time would ratify. 53
Lamar did get an opportunity to discuss the ramifications

of the treaty with Foreign Minister Roaslio Cortes, and

,

,

Cortes in turn explained its provisions to President Tomas

,

Marti,nez, first observing that the United States would abstain
from all agression agai·nst Central American territory, and

would look with much disfavor on another outside country holding dominion over a part of the Isthmus.

,

Cortes assumed that

52 Ibid.
53Lamar to Cass, February 2 6, � 8 58 , National Archives,
M2 19, 11/6. Foreign Minister Cortes showed Lamar a copy of
the letter from Irisarri.
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Great Britain would hold the same views, in light of the
Clayton-Bulwer accord.

The Minister then discussed the

various provisions of the treaty.

Articles 1-13 were gen

eral articles, the same as in all treaties of commerce and
friend ship.

Article 14 defined the rights of the transit

companies, i. e. , for transit only, with Nicaragua retaining
total sovereignty.

Terminal ports were designated as free

ports for transit goods, not to include troops and arms,

in Article 15.

By Article 16, the United States would

guarantee all people and possessions passing through the
transit route.

It would be expected that Nicaraguan troops

would enforce this, but in the event they could not, American
troops would do so, ·after first advising the Nicaraguan government

and then retiring when they were no longer needed.

Article

19 prohibited the transit company from raising transit
prices by more than fifteen percent for ten years after the
es.tablishment of the route. . Writing to the Minister of

Finance, Gregorio Juarez, about the provisions for a free port,
Lamar referred to the treaty of 179 5, negotiated by Thomas

Pinckney, which provided that Americans could deposit their

goods at the port of New Orleans, and export them with no other
duty but the cost of renting a warehouse .

He assumed that

similar arrangements would apply in San Juan del Norte. 54

In addition to the endemic frustrations that American
54 Ibid.
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diplomats suffered in Nicaragua, Lamar's burden was augmented
by the continuing attempts of William Walker to reintroduce
a band of filibusters into the country.

Walker's arrival in

San Juan del Norte in late November, 1857, had strengthened

President Martfnez' fears of a new general war, and had

caused his government to take extraordinary measures against
the foreign residents within the country.

The order issued

by the Commanding General of the Rivas Department that all
alien males and females must report for an interrogation
particularly offended Lamar's southern sense of chivalry :
I wish to know whether this unmanly insult and outrage
is not a proper ground for reclamation. It is due to ·
the sex that such indignity and gross affront should
not go unpunished. The idea that a rude uncultivated
despot--and he a young man swaggering about with his
arms--should drag our women to his cuartel for mili
tary examination ! How uncivilized � And yet, how
consistent with the character of this people. 55
After Walker was intercepted and returned to Mobile by

the United States Navy, he immediately began fashioning a
third attempt.

In February, 1858, the Alabama legislature

incorporated the Mobile and Nicaragua Steamship Company, and

the next month, the Southern Emigration Society, with branches

throughout the South, was formed for the purpose of "coloniz
ing" Nicaragua. 56 With only minimal effort at camouflage,
Walker's aims quickly came to the attention of Irisarri, who
55Lamar to Cass, March 27, 1858, ! bid.
56scroggs, Filibusters, 369.
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complained to the Department of State.

Cass' reply reflected

his weariness with the whole question of filibusterism and,

with Irisarri's continual protestations:

In respect to the apprehended invasion of Nicaragua
through the agency of a company incorporated by the
State of Alabama intended as is alleged in your note
of the 16th instant "under the specious guise of
emigrants to introduce large parties of filibusters"
into that State, and to the measures by which it is
proposed to defeat the suspected obj ects of the
contemplated enterprise, the President instructs me
to say that the officers of the United States have
the most stringent orders to execute the neutrality
law of April , 1818, and that, without specific infor
mation which will warrant the interference of the law
officers of the Government with suspected persons or
movements, no other measures can, constitutionally, be
adoptecl with the view of preventing the legitimate
operations of the c ompany referred.
Cass affirmed his belief that Alabama's legislature would not
knowingly have incorporated an unlawful enterprise.

Nica

ragua, he said had
the unquestioned right to adopt such precaution as she
may deem necessary for her own security or defence.
But the President expects that in the exercise of this
right, great care . will be taken not to interfere with
or infringe the equally sacred rights of American
citizens who may not have committed any violation of
the laws of that state. 57
Lamar thought he had finally succeeded when, on . March

26, 1858, the Assembly approved the treaty and forwarded it

to the president for his signature.

'

Martinez had hardly

expected this, as his hostility to the agreement was well
knowri, and his Legitimist party controlled not only the
57 cass to Irisarri, April 26, 1858, National Archives,
M 9 9, 10/138.

68
executive but the legislative branch of government as well.
Nonetheless, the Domocrats managed to maneuver the treaty
through by employing a parliamentary ruse,

and the

president was confronted with the results. 58

He therefore

entrusted a sealed packet, purporting to be the presidenti
ally-endorsed treaty, to Colonel Louis Schlessinger, a former
filibusterer and now an agent for the Stebbins-White company,
So anxious was Lamar

for personal delivery to Washington.
to see the

document on its way that he accompanied Schless

inger on the first leg of the trip from Managua to Granada,
and he was astonished to learn subsequesntly that the treaty
had not been signed and '.sent at all, but had in fact been
returned to the Nicaraguan Assembly.

Lamar was at a loss to

explain , hut ventured the opinion that

"th� object of

practicing this deception upon me was to prevent me from
making known to my Government the fact that the President
had written to Mr. Irisarri instructing him to propose some
amendments [sic] to the treaty. "59

Cass directed Lamar to

lodge a protest with President Martfnez about the incident, 60
but Lamar had some even stronger advice for his own govern

ment:

My own impression is that our Government will have to
change entirely its policy toward this people. They
are a low, ignorant and degraded race ; false in word,
treacherous in action, and vindictive in all their
58Lamar to Cass, June 2 4 , 1858, i bid. , M2 19, 11/11.
59Lamar to Cass, April 28, 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/8 .
60 cass to Lamar, June 3, 1858, ibid. , M77, 27 /312.
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feelings • • • • It is useless for our Government to
establish any relations with them, founded, on their
part, upon good faith and friendly feelings. One · Man
of-War at San Juan del Sur would be worth more in
bringing t·hem to reason and justice, than any appeal
which may be made to their hearts, or to their under
standing. 61
Perhaps the frustrations attendant upon his task were

beginning to affect Lamar's judgment, or perhaps he was sim
ply not the proper person for the job after all.

He could

not seem to grasp the feelings of insecurity of the Nicara
He

guans after nearly a decade of foreign intervention.

could not fathom their frustrations in realizing the potential
of the country and yet seemingly unable to control their own
destiny.

But for Lamar the worst was yet to come :

the

French adventurer F;lix Belly had arrived on the scene in
March, and Belly not only persuaded the presidents of Nicara
gua and Costa Rica to grant an exclusive canal and transit
franchise to a company which the Frenchman would form, but
also to issue on May 1 a manifesto describing the American
threat in such violent terms that it was scarcely creditable
It said that a new invasion of filibusters was being pre

pared under the patronage of the American government as the
means of defitively taking possession of Central America if
she refused to surrender herself to the United States.

The

declaration further maintained that "all the official agents
of the United States in Nicaragua have made themselves
accomplices and auxiliaries of the invaders. "

But it i;:-eserved

61Lamar to Cass, April 2 8 , 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/8.
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its major virulence for Lamar :

"The Minister

at present

accredited in Nicaragua boasts in public of imperiously
laying down this ultimatum, either the taking legal pos ses sion
of Nicaragua, by the ratification of the Cas s-Irisarri Treaty,
or by a new invasion of filibusterers organized at Mobile
under the American banner. "

According to the manifesto, the

Washington government had itself declared that it was abso
lutely powerles s to prevent new filibusters and to protect
the neutrality of Central America.

Finally the document

emphasized the inability- of the Ce�tral Americans to defend
themselves against a new onslaught :
Three years of war and devastation have swept from the
two republics any means of resisting a new attack of
several thousand bandits; the cities of Nicaragua are
destroyed in whole or in part, their commerce is annihi
lated, their population is decimated, and, after an
obstinate resistance, which gives evidence of their
patriotism, they may succumb to superior numbers if
Europe will not deign at last to defend them against
unprecedented attempts in the 19th century.
This last poignant observation was followed by the declaration
that the supreme chiefs were placing " the independence and the
nationality o f the republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica under
the guaranty of the three powers which have caused to be res

pected the independence and the nationality of the Ottoman
Empire--France, England, and Sardinia. 11 6 2

On questioning by Lamar, the Nicaraguan government conceded that Martinez' signature was authentic, but deemed the
document invalid because Martinez. was in Rivas, and the
62 Lamar to Cas s, July 2 6, 1858,

mid. , M2 19, 11/18.
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constitution provided that when the president was out of the
capital, he �o longer exercised executive power.

Under the

circumstances, the acting president was Senator Augustin
Avilez, who had not signed the manifesto. 6 3 Cass was under
standably furious over the incident, and indicated as much
in his instructions to Lamar :
This absured declaration that the United States were
urging the annexation of this whole Isthmian region, is
made with as much gravity as if the authors of it had
the actual proof of the fact before them. The asser
tion is unworthy of refutation • • • •
Cass then proceeded to refute it, pointing out that Nicara

gua "owes its political existence" to the implementation by
the United States of its neutrality laws.

Otherwise, there

would descend on Nicaragua "bands of enterprizing men who
would soon attain the control of its affairs and change the
whole cause of its policy--probably of its destiny � 6 4 The
Secretary pointed out that normally when dealing with a major
power in a situation such as this, the United States would
simply suspend relations.

Under the circumstances, she would

show forebearance ; nevertheless, Lamar was directed to

give these governments distinctly to understand, that
a suitable reparation will be insisted on, or the
United States will no longer be restrained by the con
siderations I have adverted to, from seeking by more

6 3Lamar
6 4 cass

to Cass, August 26, 1 858, ibid. , M2 19, 1 1/23.
to Lamar, July 25, 1 858, '::ibid. , M77, 27/32 1 .
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efficacious means, proper redress for these unworthy
imputations. 6 5
The treaty fiasco, the Belly contract, and the manifesto
were beginning to take their toll on the Secretary of State
as well as the American Minister.

For a while their exchanges

of ideas seemed to resurrect the ghost of the Palmerston
Chatfield cabal of earlier in the decade.

Lamar wrote, "My

advice would be for our government to take measures of its
own for opening the route ; and to plant the necessary force
in the country to protect it without any reference to this
governm�nt : 6 6 He referred to the "strategic position and
virtual impregnability" of Castillo Viejo, the fort commanding
the San Juan River at one of the cataracts, and recommended

that American forces occupy it forthwith. 6 7

Cass responded

by directing Lamar to make both Costa Rica and Nicaragua
"distinctly understand that the American people, and govern
ment have yielded enough to the weakness of those republics,
and without doing them injustice they will now take care and
do justice to themselves. "

The Secretary said that naval

contingents would be stationed at San Juan del Norte, San Juan
del Sur, and Realejo for the protection of American citizens
and their property, and that the commanders would consult with
6 5 cass
66

to Lamar, i bid.

Larnar to Cass, June 24, 18 58, i bid. , M2 19, 11/11 .

6 7 Lamar

to Cass, July 4, 1858, ibid. , M2 19, 11/16.
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Lamar. 68

By October the naval forces had arrived, and Lamar felt
that things were taking a turn for the better.

The Home

Squadron flagship Roanoke, as well as the cruisers Savannah
and Saratoga, were lying in San Juan del Norte.

The Minister

addressed a note to the Flag O fficer assuring him "that your
presence in the vicinity with the force under your command
would materially facilitate .

accomplishing an amicable

and satisfactory solution of the present difficulties with
these Republics. " 69

The Merrimac was in the. harbor of

Realejo, and Lamar took advantage of its presence to converse
aboard with Costa Rican President Juan Rafael Mora, who was
on his way to a Central American chief executives' meeting
in Guatemala City.

Mora assured Lamar that he would take

the opportunity to promote good will _toward the United States.
Lamar responded by reading to the president a portion of the
State Department position ( previously supplied by Cass) with
respect to the Monroe Doctrine:
The feeling of the United States toward these countries
had undergone no change. No spirit of annexation, of
absorption or of aggression had been engrafted upon the
Monroe Doctrine. It still pretends to nothing further
that that the destinies of these countries shall be
68cass to Lamar, July 25, 18 58 , ibid. , M77, 27/ 3 2 1.
69Lamar to Cass, October 2 8, 18 58,

ibid. , M2 19, 11/2 9.
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left in their own hands. It is simply a doctrine of
non-intervention by the Monarchical Powers of Europe
in the political affairs of this hemisphere--a doc
trine which the peace and safety of the United States
requires to be maintained at all hazard. 7 0
Reiteration was not enforcement, however, and Lamar
found himself trying to sort out the meaning of the mission·
of Sir William Gore Ouseley, who was active in Nicaragua and

supported by the British fleet. 7 1

Ostensibly, Ouseley had

come to negotiate a bilateral commercial treaty and to arrange
for the resolution of the Mosquito question.

Notwithstanding

these instructions, he at first insisted on a general treaty
which gave Great Britain the right to land troops anywhere
at the consent of the Nicaraguan government , or at San Juan
del Norte to intercept filibusters without prior government
consent.

The British agent then gave Nicaragua an ultimatum

regarding the Mosquito Territory which virtually amounted to
acceptance of the Mosquito as an autonomous state, albeit

not under British protection. 7 2

Fortunately for the Nicara

guans, the British government disavO'wed the treaty and re
turned it to Ousely for renegotiation, instructing him to

relinquish the Mosquito protectorate and annul the military
70 Lamar to Cass, December 2 2, 1858,
71Lamar to Cass, December 2 6, 1858,

ibid. , M2 19, 11/33.
ibid. , M2 19/ 11/34.

72 Lamar to Cass, January 2 9, 1859, ibid. , M2 19, 11/39,
and April 28, 1859, M2 19, 11/43. BritisFi°a:nd Foreign State
Papers, XLVIII, 6 67.
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and naval commitments he had made. 7 3
While these diplomatic negotiations were going on,
British capital was active.

British financiers, notably

Thomas Manning, a former consul and still a resident of Leon,

were angling for a franchise contract to build a transit
route.

One proposal was to use the route up the San Juan

River to the Serapiqui, up the Serapiqui to a point to be
fixed, and then to build an $800, 000 macadam road to San
Jose, Costa Rica.

From there, an existing road to Punta

Arenas, Costa Ricq's only port on the Pacific, would be
utilized.

The new American Minister, Alexander Dimitry, who

had arrived in September, 1859, watched these developments
closely.

He seemed reassured when the acting president,

Senator Avilez, observed in a conversation thet "they had
had American contracts, French contracts, English proposals,
but he was satisfied now that Americans, from every consid
eration of neighborhood, of community of interests, commer
cial and political, [wi l l ] ultimately [ be] called to open and
carry on the interoceanic service. 11 7 4

Therefore, Dimitry was

startled when he learned that a Nicaraguan commission appoint

ed to st�dy the British proposal had in fact signed a con
tract.

The American Minister �eported to the State Depart-

73cass to Irisarri, May 4, 1859, National Archives, M99,
1 0/1 58. British and Foreign State Papers, XLVIII, 67 6.

7 �Dimitry to Cass, December 7, 1859, National Archives,
M21 9, 1 2/28.
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ment that Avilez had given a very lame explanation.

The

commission was supposed to draft a contract, not sign one.
"Through a mistake, " Dimitry said, the commission made a
contract
under a ninety years' lease of the route, with a supposed
English company, supposed to be represented by a supposed
agent in the Republic of Nicaragua ! The absurdity of
the thing would be inexpressibly ridiculous, did it not
borrow a certain degree of dignity from the help of
ingenious dishonesty. 7 5
The affair turned out to be a tempest in a teapot, as the con

tract was rejected by the Nicaraguan Assembly. 7 6

The final British diplomatic efforts of the period· were
engineered by Charles L. Wyke, who had replaced the discre

dited Ouseley in October, 1859. 77

Wyke negotiated a treaty

with Foreign Minister Pedro Zeledon in January, 18 6 0, with .
ratifications exchanged in August, by which the British
government agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Nicaragua
over the Mosquito Indians and their territory.

In both

Honduras and Nicaragua, the British protectorate was to be
abolished at the end of three months after exchange ratific
ations, and each of the two Central American governments

pledged itself to pay to the Mosquito Indians the sum of
$2, 50 0 semiannually for ten years.
7 5 nimitry
76

Nicaragua agreed to set

to Cass, February 28, 18 6 0, ibid.
--

. . try to Cass, April 31, 18 6 0,
D1m1

ibid.

77 nimitry to Cass, October 31, 1859, ibid.

77
aside a definitive area, known as the Mosquito Reserve, with
in which the Indians were guaranteed the right of local self
government with the privilege of becoming Nicaraguan citizens.
Greytown was to be a free port under Nicaraguan sovereignty. 78
The real threat to American commercial dominion over the
transit route was not British capital but French, or so it
appeared at the time.

Felix Belly reappeared on the scene

late in 1858 and immediately began wheedling for another
exclusive franchise.
senate

and

To make way for Belly, the Nicaraguan

Chamber issuai a

decree in February, 1859, stating:

"The transit route is free for all nations; therefore, there
is not recogni zed or permitted a monopoly over it in favor of
any individual or company. "

The decree was aimed at American

financiers; so for good measure, the Assembly issued an
addendum cancelling the Stebbins-White contract {negotiated
by Irisarri in New York) and confiscating the American com
pany's property in Nicaragua.

The publication of the no

monopoly decree was deliberately delayed until a contract with
Belly could be agreed upon.

This latter contract, signed on

April 1 2, 1859, for the Virgin Bay- San Juan del Sur portion,
and on June 15, for the remainder , provided an exclusive
78oimitry. to Cass, December 7, 1859,
Foreign State Papers, L, 9 6.

ibid. British ·and

transit franchise until a canal could be constructed. 79

78

Cass was infuriated and conveyed this sense of outrage
to the Nicaraguan Minister in Washington.

He pointed out

that "when fair contracts are fairly entered into with Ameri
can citizens, they should not be wantonly violated. "
This government has neither the authority, nor the dis
position to determine the conflicting interests of these
claimants. But what it has the right to do, and what it
is disposed to do, is to require that the government of
Nicaragua should act in good faith towards them, · and
should not arbitrarily
and wrongfully divest them of
rights justly acquired and solemnly guaranteed • • • •
[When a contract is annulled] by a process which pre
cludes any investigation, the plainest principles of
justice are violated. B O
In this instance, Dimitry seemed almost amused by the
whole affair.

He noted that President Martinez had taken a

month's leave and left town the very day and the very hour
that Dimitry arrived.

The American Minister suspected that

Martfnez did not want to talk about transit matters until the
Belly contract was firm ; that is, until the European financing
had been arranged.

In a despatch to Cass, Dimitry face

tiously noted:

[The president] repaired to Masaya • • • to attend the
baptismal rites of the child of one of his intimate
friends. For - this important object, which amply justi
fies his recession from public duties and, it may be,
for the equally important purpose of participation in
the irrq;>endin} festivities, here and elsewhere of the
Immaculate Conception and of the Christmas holidays,
he .has given to himself a month ' s leave. B l

79 Dimitry to Cass, October 31, 1859, National Archives,
M 219, 12.
80 cass to Maximo Jerez, May 5, 1859,

ibid. , M99, 1 0/154.

81 Dimitry to Cass, December 7, 185 9, ibid. , M 2 1 9, 1 2.

79

Perhaps the reason for Dimitry's equanimity was that he
was becoming convinced

that the transit was not going to be

reopened under the auspices of anyone.

One reason was

physical: the bridges on the transit route were out, and the
port at San Juan del Norte was rapidly silting up, with no
one, apparently, disposed to maintain it. 82

The second rea

son, and probably the more significant one, was that the
government did not want the route reopened.

Dimitry recei

ved second-hand information that Avilez had declared:
It is not to the interest of Nicaragua that [the tran
sit] should go into operation--there is not a patriotic
Nicaraguan who desires to see it re-opened ; because all
are convinced that its active operations must infalli
bly result in the sweeping of the country, by hordes of
filibusters, on their way to the American possessions
on the northwest coast of the Pacific. 83
Dimitry's assessment was accurate.

Belly was unable to o.eliver

on his promises: the perfidy of business agents and financial
angels alike, and the overthrow of President Mora, his major
mentor in Central America, in August, 1859, spelled doom for
his enterprise. 84

Aside from the transit issue, there remained the prob

lem of the disposition of the Cass-Irisarri Treaty, nego
tiated on November 16, 1857 .

Although the Legitimist

82 oimitry to Cass, September 19, 1859,

ibid.

83Dimitry to Cass, December 7 , 1859, ibid.
84cyril Allen, France in Central America, F�lix Belly and
the Nicaraguan C anal (New York: Pageant Press, I nc. , 1966} ,

117- 2 5 .

,

President Martinez seemed determined to avoid its ratifi-

80

,
cation, the Democratic faction, led by Maximo Jerez,
was

more disposed to cooperate with the Department of State.

Jerez was so annoyed with the recalcitrance of the chief
executive that he remained in Ledn, refusing to participate
in the government even though it was ostensibly a bipartisan
administration.

Jerez even published a newspaper in the

Democratic stronghold chiding the Assembly for its delay .
The Democratic leader himself was under pressure by members

�f his party to take the treaty to Washington, equipped with
plenipotentiary powers, and substitute his own ratification
for that of the Assembly.

An American correspondent noted

that Jerez was not "systematically opposed to the Americans, "
and was n�t "so brutally ignorant as the pretended Solomon
of the Granadian aristocracy. 11 85
Jerez did take the treaty to Washington, but it was
encumbered with a number of Nicaraguan amendments.

His sub

stitution for Irisarri as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary was o fficially recognized on October 5,
1858. 86 Cass explained to Lamar that J,rez was received

only after the Nicaraguan had given a clear explanation and
85J. Debrin (Private Secretary to Lamar) to Cass, June
28, 1858, National Archives, M2 19, 11.
86cass to Jerez, October 5, 1858, ibid. , M99, 10/150.
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disavowal of "the offensive language and imputations against
the United States" contained in the notorious Manifesto.
Jerez was empowered to conclude the treaty if the changes
made by the Nicaraguan Assembly on June 28 were accepted.
Cass indicated that the American government could no longer
discuss the content of the treaty , but would accept one of
the article modifications.

With this limited concession

Cass assumed that J�rez' mission was over , but gave the
Nicaraguan time to submit the views expressed to his own
government. 87

Jerez took the document back to Managua , but

the Nicaraguan regime set it aside for consideration of the
Ouseley treaty. 88

With the Ouseley treaty confronting him , and time
running out on his appointment , Lamar seemed to panic.

On

his own initiative , the American diplomat negotiated a new
treaty with Foreign Minister Zeled6n which incorporated the
Nicaraguan changes to the Cass-Irisarri treaty that Cass had
already rejected.

Lamar explained that these provisions

were in the British treaty , and he thought they might now

be accepted by the United States since there was no other
basis on which a pact could be concluded. 89 The Lamar-Zeledon

accord of March 16 , 1859 , was the last major official act of
87 cass to Lamar , November 2 , 1858 , ibid. , M77 , 28/14
88 cass to Lamar , March 4 , 1859 ,
ibid. , 28/ 3 2.
89Lamar to Cass , March 20 , 1859 , ibid. M2 1 9 , 1 1/43
,

the frustrated American Minister.

As his departure date

82

neared, he began having second thoughts about some of
his vituperative observations with respect to Nicaraguan

officialdom.

Trying to erase the record, he directed this

last poignant request to Cass:
I have also occasionally commented with some harshness
upon the character and conduct o f individuals. It is
my desire, in case it should become necessary to pub
lish any of my Despatches, that the portions alluded
to may be omitted--especially as subsequent official
and social intercourse with some o f the gentlemen
spoken of has materially changed my opinion with regard
to them. 90

'

.

'

Jerez dutifully transported the Lamar- Zeledon Treaty to
Washington, and there he found the Secretary of State sur
prisingly amenable.

First, however, Cass pointed out that

the President still considered the stipulations of the Cass
Irisarri treaty "just and mutually beneficial. "

He thought

"that treaty should have been ratified by Nicaragua, without
hesitation, and also, that the course of the government of
that republic in the delays that took place, and in the other
obj ectionable circumstances attending its actions, gave j ust
cause of offence to the United States . "

The President's

conviction " was still further strengthened by the rej ection

of that treaty and by the substitution of another without the

kn9wledge" of the United States government .

Nevertheless,

in order to expedite normalization o f relations between the
9 0 Lamar to Cass, August 11, 1859,

ibid.

two countries and to show the good faith of the United
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States, the President would submit the Lamar- Zeleddn treaty
to the Senate if one objectionable passage were removed.
Article 16 stated:

"The United States agree to use all legal

means and reasonable vigilance to prevent the formation,
within their territories, of hostile expeditions destined
for those of the Republic of Nicaragua. "

Cass indignantly

declared that
the government of the United States . will consent to the
insertion of no such provision in any treaty into which
they _ may enter. They consider the proposition itself
offensive. They choose to j udge what laws they will
pass and how these shall be administered without the
intervention of any foreign Power. The retention of
this clause in the treaty will ensure its rejection by
the United States. Its omission • . • will be
followed by the favorable action of the President. 91
With this admonition, Jerez hastily sought permission of
his government to drop the offending article.

The Nicaraguan

Assembly made the concession on July 25, 1859, and Luis Molina,

who had now assumed the duties of charge ' d'affaires for the
Nicaraguan mission, so advised Secretary Cass. 92

Honoring

his cornrni tinent, Cass then submitted the· Lamar-Zeledon treaty
to the Senate. 9 3 Unfortunately, the Senate was not as amen-

able as the Department of State.

The Department found it

necessary in June, 1860, to forward to the Nicaraguan govern
ment two Senate resolutions with respect to the treaty, plus
91cass to Jerez, May 2 6, 1859, ibid. , M99, 10/156.
9 2 Molina to Cass, August 3 0, 1859, ibid.

93 cass to Molina, September 27, 1859, ibid.

amendments to certain other articles. 9 4

The treaty was

84·

returned from Nicaragua the following June with additional
amendments: 9 5 however, by this time Confederate guns had
fired on Fort Sumter, eleven states had seceded from the ·
Union, and the nation no longer held in high priority a
treaty with the Isthmian country.

The era ended with no

satisfactory diplomatic accord having been achieved.

The

decade did see the settlement of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican
border dispute, however, with the State Department playing
a major role in arbitration efforts but none in . the eventual-
albeit temporary--resolution of the problem.
the area that was in dispute.

9 4 williarn

Figure 4 shCMS

Henry Trescott to Molina, June 2 9 , 18 6 0, · ibid.

9 Swilliam H. Seward to Molina, June 4, 1 8 61,

ibid.
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Figure 4 .

Area Disputed between Nicaragua and Costa Rica .

CHAPTER III
THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BOUNDARY DISPUTE
The government of the United States would see with great
pain the prevalence of hostilities in the states of
Central America either between themselves or between
any of them and a foreign power. Recent events, the
increase of commerce on both shores bounding this coun
try, the plans for various lines of communication
across it by railroads and canals from sea to sea have
given to the whole region a new importance. All must
desire that the Republics of· Central America should now
come into the enj oyment of peace and the pursuits of
industry so that they might commence that career of
prosperity and progress to which their climate, soil
and position seem to invite. I
Thus Secretary of State Daniel Webster summarized the
ambivalent attitude of American officialdom toward Nicaragua
during this period.

Couching his language in the rhetoric

of diplomatic communication, Webster advised the Nicaraguan
representative that hostilities in Central America, particu
larly around the transit route, would seriously inconvenience
American business enterprise.

Fostering the efforts of pri

vate American capital on the Isthmus was probably the first-

and most practical--policy o f the Department of State.

Other

motives for interference in Nicaraguan domestic affairs, such
as colonization and filibusterism, were entertained by

Americans as groups or individuals, and tended to cloud the
1 Daniel Webster to Ignatius G6mez, February 7, 1851,
National �rchives, M9 9 , 10/6. In the same message, Webster
advised Gomez that his accreditation would be delayed . until he
received fresh instructions since his commission was rela
tively old.
86

87

issues for the State Department.

In addition, it was not

clear what were the aims of British policy, or what degree
of posture of defiance or belligerence the United States
should adopt vis-a-vis this policy.

Nonetheless, there was

a high degree of altruism in the efforts of the State Depart
ment to help settle the long-standing dispute between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica over their mutual frontier.
The ques�ion of borders among the various Latin American
states was probably the most difficult and enigmatic that had
faced the republics in the national period.

The problem was

largely inherited from colonial times, when Spain--considering
that the territories in the new world would be under Spanish
sovereignty in perpetuity--established a conglomeration of
overlapping jurisdictions.

Lines were drawn according to

juridical, administrative, and canonical dictates , and were
juggled regularly , often superimposed rather than readjusted.
The system gave rise to friction between - among others 

these two Central American states .

The maj or areas in question were the San Juan River and

the province of Nicoya ( called Guanacaste by Nicaragua) , which
lies on the Pacific side directly south of Lake Nicaragua.

The influx of American travelers crossing the Isthmus after

the discovery of gold in California provoked an inflammation
of the issue .

In its initial contracts with American transit

entrepreneurs, Nicaragua seiz ed the initiative , but by 1852

the Costa Ricans were clamoring for their "legitimate" rights
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and some participation in the proposed commercial ve ntures.

In addition, economic reverses had caused Costa Ric1, to need

desperately the San Juan port if its cof fee was to � ompete in

the European market, freight costs via Cape Horn h aving become

prohibitive.

The disagreement spanned the national p eriod to

that time, and both sides marshalled historical evi dence to
support their claims.

As an example, a Costa Rican apologist demostrated the
antiquity of that country's claim to Nicoya ( Guanacaste) by
quoting an eighteenth century epgineer:
On the 19th of January, 1744, I reached the mountain of
Nicaragua, a very rough one, which marks the end of the
province of that name • . • and I entered the juris
diction of Nicoya, which although an "alcaldia mayor, "
separate from the Government of Costa Rica, is reputed
to belong to this province. 2

This vague colonial properietorship led directly to the issue
of ownership in the national period.

The same disputant clairrs

that after the constitution of the Federal Republic o f

Central America was promulgated in 1824, Nicoya "by an act of

its free and spontaneous will,
Costa Rica. " 3

asked for its annexation to

Neverthe less, it appears that Costa Rica may

have drawn its state lines in 182 5 without including either
'
'
.
2 Pedro Perez
Zeledon , Argument on th e Question
o f the

Validity of the Treaty of Limits between Costa Ri ca and
Nicaragua, Translated by J. I. Rodr�guez (Washington: Gibson
Brothers, 1887) , 26.
3rbid. , 27.

the S an Juan River � Nicoya. 4
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Its first constitution, that

of 182 5, provided that:
The territory of the State extends, for the present,
from west to east, from the river Salta which divides it
from the State of Nicaragua, to the river Chiriqui',
bounding the Republic of Colombia ; and from north to
south from one sea to the other; its limits on the North
Sea being from the mouth of the river San Juan to the
Escudo de Veragua; and on the Pacific from the mouth of
the river Alvarado to that of Chiriquf. 5
The reference to the Alvarado River is unclear, but the
designation of the Salta River as the boundary between Costa
Rica and Nicaragua clearly concedes Guanacaste to the latter,
at least "for the present. "

After the breakup of the Federal

Republic in 1838, "the Province of Nicoya or Guanacaste felt
once more the necessity of again emphatically expressing its
desire to remain united to Costa Rica and, by new acts, it

renewed its annexation. " 6

What may be regarded as Nicoya's

second secession from Nicaragua was formalized in the lan
guage of Costa Rica's second constitution, promulgated in
January, 1847.

This document designated the frontier as the

S an Juan River, Lake Nicaragua, and the Rio de la Flor. 7

4oavid I. Folkman, Jr. , The Nicaragua Route ( Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, 1972), frontispiece map drawn
by Ephraim George Squier, United States Charge d'Affaires to
Guatemala,· in 1851.
5Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts
in Central and North America and the Caribbean ( Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1941), 3.
6 zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 2 8.
7 rreland, Boundaries , 3, 4.
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The selection of the La Flor River boundary unquestionably
incorporated the entire province of Guanacaste and, if any
thing, encroached upon territory indisputably Nicaraguan; how
ever, the language appeared to anticipate a Nicaraguan chal
lenge, and provided that the issue might be settled by arbi

tration. 8

During the period of the Federal Republi c,

Nicaragua had made gestures toward

incorporating the prov-

ince, but failed to press its claim when Costa Rica threat
ened hostilities. 9

Actually, it appears that Nicaragua,

aside _from being distracted by domestic quarrels, was acting
in a somewhat pragmatic fashion.

Nicoya was not at the

moment as important as the San Juan River, particularly after
the establishment of the transit route in 1849 .

From this

point on, it seems that Nicaragua acted with a cavalier dis
regard for the presumed rights of Costa Rica in that area.
The issue again goes back to the colonial era.

Most of

the references in colonial documents refer to the" desaguadero"
(outlet) as the dividing line between the two jurisdictions.
8Article 25 stated that " the frontier boundary line
between this State and that of Nicaragua shall be definitively
fixed when Costa Rica shall be heard in the national represen
tation, or failing this, the matter shall be submitted to the
impartial decision of one or more States of the Republic. "

9 rn 183 8, the Costa Rican representative to Nicaragua
said his country would defend her frontiers of the San Juan
River, the Lake, and the La Flor River. Zeledon, Treaty of
Limits, 46. The first three constitutions of Nicaragua { 182 6,
1838, 185 0) do not establish definitive boundaries, but merely
refer to the boundary with Costa Rica as being Nicaragua's
southern limits. Ireland, Boundaries, 8, 9 .
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To what did the "desaguadero" refer?

Costa Rica claimed that

it meant the outlet to the sea for Lake Nicaragua via the San
Juan River.

(This posed another question:

as the San Juan

River has three mouths--the San Juan, the Taura, and the
Colorado Rivers--to which did it refer?)

The Nicaraguans

claimed that the "desguadero" meant the valley--or port-- of

Matina, some sixty miles to the south. l o

The issue was brought to Washington with the nomination
of Jose de Marcoleta as Nicaraguan Envoy Extraordinary and

Minister Plenipotentiary in February, 185 �. 11

Although the

State Department was already embroiled in the question of a
United States-Nicaraguan treaty which would serve to protect

the rights of the transit entrepreneurs, Webster was called
upon to mediate between Marcoleta and Felipe Molina,

Marcoleta's Costa Rican counterpart. 12

lO zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 28-43 passim.

11webster to Marcoleta, February 2 1, 1851, National
Archives, M99, 10/8.

12 There was initial hesitancy over even recognizing
Molina. To try to keep things untangled among the ubiquitous
Central American representatives, who had a penchant for
representing different republics in various categories, the
State Department appeared to delay in the reception of
Molina, the representative of both Costa Rica and El Salvador.
The required interview with the President for Molina to pre
sent his credentials was postponed the first time due to
"unforeseen causes, " and on the second scheduled occasion
because the President had to accompany some army officers to
(Webster to Molina, March 2 0 and 2 1, 185\,
Mount Vernon.
ibid. ) The problem was further confused when Ignacio Gomez
claimed a commission from El Salvador ,
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Even though the State Department initially acceded to a
request by Molina to lend its good offices in a different but
allied dispute, 1 3 it hesitated about assuming the responsi
bility for ensuring that an equitable treaty between Nicaragua
and Costa Rica should be drafted on Marcoleta's request1 4 -
reluctance due, according to the Department, to the fact that
'
the United States charge d'affaires had not been, even after
three months, recognized by Nicaragua, and to the rumor that a
treaty was being drafted among Nicaragua, Salvador, and
Honduras, which might nullify any efforts toward a bilateral
accord.

As in the case of many previous plans to reestablish

all or part of the Central American federation or confeder
ation, the latter treaty proved to be a will-of-the-wisp.
By early the next year, however, the State Department
realized that the claims of Costa Rica would have to be taken
into consideration before the contract between Nicaragua and
the transit company could be considered secure, and before a
definitive treaty between the United States and Nicaragua
could be formalized. 15 In April Webster conceded to Mol ina
13w. s . Derrick (Acting Secretary) to Molina, August 1 4 ,
1851, ibid. , 10/14. Derrick promised to instruct the newly
appointed Chargi to Central America, J. Bozman Kerr, to use his
good offices--within the bounds of propriety--between Guatemala
and other Central American states.
1 4 webster to Marcoleta, November

15

11,

1851 ,

ibid. , 10/ 15

webster to Molina, November 2 5, 1851, ibid. , 10/17.
Webster acknowledged receipt of a copy of Molina's letter to
Joseph L. White, agent of the Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal
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that the President would hesitate to sign a treaty with

Nicaragua without the cooperation and consent of Costa Rica ,
in view of the latter's claims.

But he also pointed out that

Nicaragua had already granted the transit company land on
either side of the San Juan River , so if Nicaragua sho�ld--by
treaty with Costa Rica--cede the south bank , Nicaragua should
simply stipulate the rights of the company , thereby expediting
the matter. 16

In view of the positions of the two nations and the
personalities of _ the emissaries , the State Department's deci
sion to accept the role of honest broker put it into an almost
untenable position.

The first response from Marcoleta was not

encouraging :
Costa Rica should sacrifice either the district of
Nicoya , or the right bank of the San Juan River , and the
river itself , which since the foundation of the colony
[Nicaragua] had been , and is , one of its principal exits
to the Atlantic , and which will afford to it a proper
communication with both seas when the work of the Inter
oceanic Canal shall be accomplished. 17
But it was Molina's reply that most irritated Webster.

Costa

Rica would concede two sections of land on the south bank to
the transit company if Nicaragua would pay Costa Rica $ 100 , 0 00
from revenues from the company , along with other conditions.
Company , protesting projected plans of the company to occupy
lands claimed by Costa Rica.
16webster to Molina , April 8 , 1852 ,
17zeledo'n , Treaty of Limits , 48.

ibid. , 10/2 0.
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Webster's annoyance at the presumption of Molina's propo
sition was evident:
It is to be regretted that the expectations of your
government should be so high in regard to its differ
ences with the Nicaraguan government. I had indulged
the hope that the proposition contained in my note of
the 8th instant would under the circumstances, have been
considered by you so moderate and reasonable that you
would not, by rejecting it, lose the opportunity which
it afforded Cos ta Rica to avail herself of the good
offices of the United States and Great Britain towards
accommodating the disputes between her and Nicaragua. 18
Because of the Costa Rican attitude, Webster said, he and
British Minister John F. T. Crampton would resolve the

Mosquito question (as the British protectorate encompas sed the
San Juan area} , and would merely communicate this settlement

to the governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 19

Aside from the request that the United States take a role
in the mediation of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan treaty, there
were other dis tinct reasons why the agreement should be vir
tually quadripartite.

The major interest of the United States

was to settle the question of conflicting claims along the
existing transit route (and the propos ed canal route) in order
to guard against confusion for American companies which might
secure the transit conces sion by contract with--preferably-

only one of the contending states .

Great Britain ' s interest

lay in the fact that she claimed a protectorate over the
Mosquito Kingdom, a strip of land lying on Nicaragua's
18webs ter to Molina, April 15, 1852, National Archives,

M9 9 , 1 0 / 2 1 .

19 rbid.
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Caribbean coast , and had occupied the area (which included
the Atlantic terminus of the transit route) since January 1,
1848.

Conversely, it was the hope and the continuing policy

of the United States to try to remove British influence from
the area, something the State Department mistakenly thought
it had achieved with the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer
agreement.
After Webster and Crampton worked out a tentative solu

tion, Webster dispatched Robert M. Walsh as corranissioner to

Costa Rica to circumvent the Molina-Marcoleta bottleneck, and
to persuade the Costa Rican government to accept the arbitra
tion treaty.

As background information for Walsh's mission,

Webster explained that the Costa Rican claims to the south
bank of the San Juan River were sound, but not those to
Guanacaste.

Costa Rica probably calculated that if its

claims were upheld, and if the Pacific terminus of the canal
were the Bay of Salinas in Guanacaste, it would have virtually
exclusive control of the canal.

Conversely, Webster continued,

the Webster-Crampton arbitration actually did j ust the oppo

site, giving Nicaragua effective control .

Costa Rica would

get Guanacaste, but that would be immaterial, since the

engineers indicated that the most feasible Pacific terminal
would be at Brito (north of Guanacaste), and thus wholly within
Nicaraguan territory.

On the Atlantic side, Costa Rica would

be awarded only the right bank of the Colorado River (the
southernmost mouth of the San Juan River), well below the
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Atlantic terminus of S an Juan del Norte ( British Greytown).

The negotiators felt it preferable to have the entire route
in Nicaraguan territory to avoid possible conflicting grants
to other companies by Costa Rica, and because of the history
of negotiations between Nicaragua and American companies (as
well as the money already spent by the latter) under the
assumption that the area was indeed Nicaraguan territory.
Webster advised Walsh that if Costa Rica did not agree-- and
it appeared from Molina's representation in Washington that
it might not--the United States and Great Britain would

simply impose settlement by means other than pers uasion. 2 0
At the same time, Webster sent instructions to John

Bozman Kerr, the charg; d'affaires in Nicaragua
that government's adherence to the mediation.

to obtain
He first

explained why Marcoleta and Molina had been bypassed :
Marcoleta had not been invited to join the negotiations
because it initially appeared that Kerr had not been received
in the Nicaraguan capital, and when that was resolved it

seemed Marcoleta's instructions f rom his government were
inadequate.

As for Molina, he was merely written off as

uncooperative, and Webster and Crampton had proceeded to sign

the agreement, which restored the Mosquito Territory to
Nicaragua on the payment of a stipulated amount to the

20webster to Robert M. Walsh (United States Special
Commissioner to Central America) , April 2 9 , 1852 , ibid. , M77,
2 7/123
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British-protected Mosquito Indians .

If Nicaragua objected,

Kerr was to point out that the payment did not concede the
validity of the British occupation, even though that occu
pation had never been contested.

In addition, the amount

was s mall and the terms reasonable.

If Nicaragua should

think that by being obstinate it could wait out the admin
istration in Washington until a new one would allow them to
take the area by force of arms, the proposition would be
self- negating, as potential investors of capital simply
wouldn't risk their money.

Kerr was to ask the Nicaraguan

president and senate to ratify the quadripartite treaty and
empower Marcoleta to sign, and it would be submitted to the
United States Senate at the current ses sion.

Finally, Kerr

was to point out that this was probably Nicaragua's last
chance to settle amicably and peaceably,

and as the canal

would probably use the San Juan River bed, along with locks
and dams , it would pres umably be entirely in Nicaraguan

territory. 21

After the mes s age advising the United States represent

atives of the situation and of their responsibilities were
dispatched, Molina was informed of the contents of the
settlement .

The Department explained to him that the major

difference from Webster's previous "recommendation" was that
it now required that four sections rather than two be stipu2lwebster to John Bozman Kerr, April 29 , 1852,

2 7/ 1 2 9 .

ibid. ,
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lated for the transit companies' use on the south, or Costa
Rican, bank of the San Juan River.

To soften the impact,

the Department observed that the company might not want to
use all four sections.

In addition, the area now had no

appreciable val ue, but that would come i f the company
"should apply capital and skill to the cultivation o f the

. sections allotted to them

• Pesides

raising the value

of the lands reserved by Costa Ri ca this will give her an
i mportant source of direct revenue and other i ncidental
adyantages. 1 2 2 In a subsequent note to Molina, the Depart
ment acknowledged his concern about losing steam navigation
rights on Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River in perpetu
ity, but felt that Costa Rica should not mind a stipulation

that it be ceded only for the life of

the contract--that is, ·
until its normal expiration or legal forfeiture. 23
Considering all the groundwork lai d by the State Depart

ment, the response from Ni caragua was unexpected.

The legis

lature · not only rejected the treaty but also castigated the
United States for " interference. "

On this occasion, it was

Marcoleta who sustained the brunt of State Department anger.
A

Department spokesman explained to him that the United·

States government had interceded with Great Britain at the
"soli citation" of Ni caragua.

1852 ,

The State Department had not

2 2william Hunter (Acting Secretary) to Molina, May 5,
ibid. , M9 9 , 1 0/ 2 3

2 3Hunter to Molina, May 19, 1852, ibid. , 10 /24/
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gotten all that Nicaragua wanted, but certainly more than
Great Britain had heretofore conceded.

The Department had

also presented the recommendation to the Government of
Nicaragua for "consideration" only, and the latter had a
perfect right to reject it.

Unfortunately, "the Legisla

tive Assembly of Nicaragua s aw fit 'solemnly to protest
against all foreign interference in the affairs of their
government. '"

The response was "unfair and unexpected. "

H ad it been made by a "more powerful nation, " Washington
would simply have declined further cornmunication. 2 4
Hard on the heels of this impasse, Marcoleta got into
personal trouble with the Department of State.

Previously,

in spite of the fact that the treaty was being negotiated on
a tripartite basis (due to his lack of credentials) , the
Department had endeavored to keep him informed, allowi ng him
to read the draft negotiations .

The chief clerk had given

Marcoleta the treaty to read in the anteroom of the clerk's
office, and he seemed to have taken an inordinate amount of
time to peruse it.

On July 2 5, 185 2, a Senate resolution

calling for a copy of the propositions to be sent by the

President to Congress indicated that the Senator who had

framed the resolution had actually seen the document itself.
The executive branch did not comply, but on July 1, the draft
24 c . M . · Conrad (Acting Secretary of State) to Marcoleta,
October 28, 1852, ibid. , 10/28/

proposals were published in the New York Courier & Esquirer
over the byline of its Washington correspondent who,
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In

incidentally, was known to be an intimate of Marcoleta.

describing the incident to Kerr, the Secretary of State noted
that Marcoleta's hostility to the canal and particularly to
the transit company were " known to any reasonably informed
man in Washington. "

Continued the Secretary,

It was impossible for any person, living in the society
of Washington, to remain ignorant of the boasts which he
made of his influence with Senators, and of his menaces
to use it. The executive might have been destitute of
every feeling of self respect, if it had continued to
place confidence in a man who was daily threat � ning that
he would baffle their measures in the Senate. 2
This episode resulted in Wa�hington's e fforts to get

Marcoleta recalled. 2 6

Again there was frustration on the

Potomac when the Nicaraguan government virtually ignored the
request, inquiring only as to the reason for it.

Subsequently

the Department's position was that Nicaragua's reluctance to
replace Marcoleta amounted to a rupture of relations.

In any

event, Washington felt that unless the Nicaraguan government

gave an explanation for the rej ection o f the quadripartite

25Edward Everett ( Secretary of State) to Kerr, January
5, 1 8 5 3 , ibid. , M7 7 , 2 7 /1 5 2.
26The New York Times added that because Marcoleta was
afraid that Nicaragua's interests were being sacrificed to
England and her " protege " Costa Rica, he had " indulged in some
rather undiplomatic language with respect to Mr. Webster and
the Administration. " Also, " there is no doubt that the influ
ence of· the Canal and Transit Company • . . has been actively
e mployed against him. " Times, January 4, 1853.
27Everett to Kerr, December 30, 1852, National Archives,

M7 7 , 2 7/1 4 7.
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treaty, no further discussion could take place. 2 7

Marcoleta

continued to reside in Washington, and with the change in
administration was subsequently recognized as Nicaragua's
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary;

28 thus his

previous problem with the Department of State did not perma
nently impair chances for a settlement.
At the same time that Marcoleta was under a cloud,
Molina ' s star was rising.

The Department notified him that

it was pleased that Costa Rica had accepted the Anglo
American proposal in direct proportion to the displeasure it
felt with Nicaragua for rejecting it.

The State Department

also indicated it would study the Costa Rican suggestions for
modifications, but could not treat separately with that
country yet (and hoped it would not become necessary at all) .
In order to expedite matters, Washington would send a minister
to Central America to reside alternately in the various
capitals to try to arrange some sort of settlement of the

problems existing between the several governments. 29

In the

meantime, Secretary William L. Marcy assured Molina that the
United States and Great Britain would not prej udice the rights

of Costa Rica with respect to the borders claimed by that

27 Everett to Kerr, December 30 , 1852 , National Archives,
M7 7, 2 7/147.
28william L. Marcy (Secretary of State) to Marcoleta,
November 16, 1853, ibid., M9 9, 10 /47.

29 Everett to Molina, February 2 3, 1853, ibid. , 10/40.
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country. 30
Molina's apparent effort to enlist the United States in
backing the Costa Rican position to the exclusion of
Nicaragua was soon matched by a similar maneuver on Marcoleta's
part.

Marcy declined to cooperate with Nicaragua in making

a tripartite treaty with Great Britain with respect to terri
tory and jurisdiction on the grounds that (1 )· the issue was
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and no treaty could be made
without Costa Rican participation or at least its assent , and
(2) as the United States denied that Great Britain �ad any

territorial rights in Central America , such negotiations might
be misinterpreted as tacit acknowledgment of British claims.
Marcy did suggest that it might be acceptable to submit the
provisions of a Costa Rican-Nicaraguan treaty to Great
Britain for acquiescence to the provisions for the Mosquito
Indians. 31

This was the last effort of the United States to negotiate
a multilateral convention in association with Great Britain to
res olve the confusing and conflicting claims.

New initiatives

30Marcy to Molina , October 14 , 185 3 , ibid. , 10/45 � Solon
Borland had been dispat.ched on April 30 with instructions to
"use his good offices in regard to any controversies that may
exist among the Central American states. " He was "cautioned
against any interference in these matters which may be objec
tionable to any one of them. " Ibid.
3 1Marcy to Marcoleta , February 2 1 , 1854 ,

ibid. , 10/53 .
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were now the responsibility of the Central American states.
Henceforth, both the United States and Great Britain would
fall back on the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
which provided for each to negotiate bilateral treaties with
the various Central American republics to implement fully
the intent of that treaty.
Marcoleta and Molina finally broke the impasse the next
year and, on January 28, 1854 , signed at Washington a pre

liminary convention upon boundaries and interior navigation. 32
In Article 1 it was agreed that unfortunate differences
should be terminated as soon as possible by direct agreement
or by arbitration of a friendly power.

Article 2 provided

that if pending negotiations failed , the questions should be
submitted without reservation to the arbitral judgment of the
French emperor or any other government agreed on at the
exchange of ratifications.

Article 4 stipulated that in the

meantime the status quo should be strictly maintained , with no
concession of land or navigation privileges on the disputed

rivers and l a�e.

In Article 5 , Cos ta Rica conceded that

although Nicaragua . had made contracts for the opening of an

interoceanic canal , with privileges which Costa Rica considered
affected her rights, she would not oppose Nicaragua's ful
filling her obligations in case of the execution of the pro
jected canal works.

On the other hand , Nicaragua agreed to

put no obstacle in the way of the execution of the contracts
32 rreland, Boundaries , 12 , 13.
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which Costa Rica might have made for the navigation of the
Serapiqui River , a southern tributary of the San Juan River
and Costa Rica's principal outlet to the latter river and the
port of San Juan del Norte.
Unfortunately for the troubled San Juan frontier area ,
this Marcoleta-Molina preliminary agreement was not brought
to fruition for four more years.

The major distraction was

the interference of American adventurers Henry L. Kinney
and William Walker.

Walker's government sent its own repre

sentatives to Washington ., thus presenting the Department of
State with a quandary with respect to recognition and nego

tiation.

At the same time , there was little hope of reaching

any understanding over frontiers or any other mutal problems
with Costa Rica since the latter country never recognized the
legitimacy of the Walker regime.
Costa Rica emerged from the Walker era both stronger and
more prestigious than Nicaragua , and generally set the tone
for boundary negotiatio�s that followed.

I

•I

General Jose Maria

Canas for Costa Rica and Gregorio Juarez for Nicaragua signed

at Managua on July 6, 1857 , an agreement setting out the ·

proposed boundary between the two countries.

On December 8 ,

General Canas and Emiliano Quadra for Costa Rica and President
I

•'

General Tomas Martinez for Nicaragua signed at Rivas , Nicaragu�
a treaty of peace. 33

There were two major reasons for this

new and--in the context of recent relations among Central
33Ibid. , 13.
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American states--enlightened--convention.

The first was that

both countries were now governed by moderate and progressive
presidents. 34

Martihez for Nicaragua and Juan Rafael Mora,
'
'
brother of General Jose Joaquin Mora, for Costa Rica. The
'

second was a certain sense of urgency, and a feeling of
commonality of fate and inter-dependence.

Walker had landed

on the San Juan River with a new collection of filibusters,
and though the invasion failed due to the intervention of
American Commodore

Hiram Paulding, feelings of Yankeephobia

again ran_ high.
""

·'
Th e Canas-Martinez
agreement provided that Costa Rica

should return to Nicaragua El Castillo Viej o and Tortuga
Point, that the countries should mutually forego their claims
against each other, and that the boundaries should be either
'
,.
those of the Canas-Juarez treaty of July, 1857, or the ancient
lines of the Partido de Nicoya, as Costa Rica should prefer .
If Nicaragua should cease to be bound by the transit conven
tion made for her by Antonio Jos; de Irisarri in the United

States with the canal company, Nicaragua would make no further

contract concerning transit without fi rst hearing the opinion
of the other Central American governments.

was signed at San Jose,

A boundary treaty

Costa Rica, on April 15, 1858, with

34Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central America,
18 2 4 - 1 9 6 0 (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press,
19 6 1 ) , 1 4 2 .
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the second article 3 5 establishing the frontier as the San
Juan River upstream to Castillo Viejo, then

two miles south

of the San Juan, Lake Nicaragua, and the Sapoa River, to the

Pacific.

It was also agreed to mark this line, with power vested
in the conunissioners to deviate slightly from the described
lines in case of natural landmarks.

The bays of San Juan del

Norte and Salinas were to be common to both republics, who
consequently were bound to their defense.

Until Nicaragua

should recover full possession of the port of San Juan del
Norte from the British protectorate of Mosquito, Castilla
Point was to be for equal use, and without collection of port

taxes by Costa Rica from Nicaragua.·

Nicaragua was to have

exclusive dominion and full power over the waters of the San
Juan, from the lake to the Atlantic, but Costa Rica was to
35 The dividing line of the two Republics, starting from
the North Sea, shall begin at the extremity of Castilla Point,
at the mouth of the San Juan river, in Nicaragua, and shall
continue along the right bank of said River to a point three
English miles from El Casti llo Viej o , measured from the
exterior fortifications ; thence in a curve , with center in the
works of El Castillo and distant three English miles therefrom,
to a point two miles from the river bank at the waters above
El Castillo; thence towards the Sapoa river, which empties
into Lake Nicaragua, in a course distant always two miles
from the right bank of the San Juan river , with its turnings,
to its origin in the Lake and along the right shore of said
Lake to the aforesaid Sapoa river, where this line parallel to
the said banks terminates; from the point where it meets the
Sapoa river, which as stated should be two miles from the
Lake, in an astronomically straight line to the center point
of Salinas Bay in the South Sea, where the demarcation of
territory of the two Republics terminates. Ireland, Boundaries,
14; Coleccidn de Tratados Internacionales de Nicaragua
(Managua, 1909), 3 3 5 .
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have perpetual rights of free navigation in those waters.

It

was further agreed that this territorial division was not to
prejudice any obligations previously contracted by Nicaragua
in political treaties or in canalization or transit contracts.
If for any reason the canalization or transit contracts
previously made by Nicaragua ceased to be in force, she was
not to make any new ones without consultation with Costa
Rican rights, the latter's opinion would be merely advisory.
As in the Marcoleta-Molina agreement, all claims by both
countries were to be permanently suspended.

Finally, with

El Salva�or acting as . both mediator of the treaty and special
guarantor of this particular clause, no act of hostility was
to be permitted in the port of San Jaun del Norte nor in the
San Juan River or Lake Nicaragua. 36

If at the beginning of the negotiations, Costa Rica
claimed both Guanacaste and the right bank of the San Juan as
bargaining chips, she achieved more than expected.

Except

for a three mile buffer zone from the shores of the San Juan

River and Lake Nicaragua running from Castillo (about three

quarters of . the way up the San Juan from San Juan del Norte to
the lake) to the Sapoa River on the Pacific side, Costa Rica
got both of the major areas she claimed.

It may well have

been that Nicaragua made these concessions because she was
still fearful of a return of Walker or some other North
36Ibid.

1 08
Ameri can filibuster, and wanted a defensive alli ance to ensure
against this eventuality. 37

A Nicaraguan government offici al

later maintained that Nicaragua was still obsessed with
gratitude for Costa Rica's earlier deliverance from the hands
of Walker, and that she was also i ntimi dated in the negoti a

tions by Juan Rafael Mora's superior army. 37

Nevertheless, the boundary agreement if not the treaty
i tself proved remarkabiy res ilient .

The first challenge w as

by Ni caragua, which doubted the vali dity of the treaty
considering the circumstances under which it was negotiated .
The issue was submitted to President Chester A . Arthur, who
On February 5, 1883,

found generally in favor of Cos ta Rica.

the two governments involved signed a new accord in Granada,
Nicaragua, resolving some of their confli cting interpreta
tions based on the Arthur judgment. 38

Though s light

modi fications have subsequently been made and remade, the
present Nicaraguan-Costa Rican frontier remains substanti ally
the one fi xed in the treaty of 1858.
Throughout the decade of the eighteen-fifties, Nicaraguan

i ntransi gence and diplomatic eccentrism seemed to be the bane
of the Department of State .

Nonetheless, the Nicaraguans had

difficulty formulating a cons i stent foreign policy due to the
i ntervention i n that country of the American fi libusters Henry
L. Kinney and Willi am Walker, for which the Central American
37 zeledon, Treaty of Limits, 62, 63.
38rreland, Boundaries, 15 ; Tratados de Ni caragua, 437 .
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country had a legi timate gri evance.

Walker operated primarily

on the Pacific side, while Kinney attempted to colonize a portion of
the r-t:>squito Coast (Figure 5).

110

Figure 5 .
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CHAPTER IV
HENRY L. KINNEY: COLONIST OR FILIBUSTER
A country [which is] · without a rival in its natural
capabilities and in the importance of its geographical
position, yet for want of the improving hand of man,
declining even in the plenitude of its resources, is
to be created anew. The civilization, the arts, the
stable laws and policy, the religion, the business
enterprise and industry of the hardy Anglo-American
race are yet to be extended over a territory ample
enough for their most generous expansion . • . . I
have entered upon one of the noblest enterprises of the
present century. 1
The man who made this statement was one of the American

entrepreneur-adventurers who viewed Nicaragua in the 1850's
as the definitive answer to a search for wealth, prestige,
and perhaps historical immortality.

Henry L. Kinney was born

in t�e Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania in 181 4 to a family of
moderate means, even though his father was a lawyer.

He left

home at the age of fourteen, settling two years later in the
area that was to become the metropolis of Chicago, but was
then virtually uninhabited wilderness.

According to his own

account, Kinney was--by the age of twenty-one-- perhaps the

' richest and most influential man in Illinois.

His baptism of

fire came as a volunteer in the Black Hawk War, and he later
helped . flush out the Seminoles in Florida. He next earned a
reputation as a "swashbuckling merchant" in Havana, and in
1839 moved to Corpus Christi, Texas; there he began accumu. 1Henry L. Kinney, · "Pronunciamento, " New York Weekly
Po�t � September 6, 1855.
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lating land that by 1855 totaled nearly one-half million acres.
A member of the Texas legislature from 1841 to 1855, Kinney
served in the Mexican War where he earned the rank of colonel,

the title by which he was subsequently known. 2

During the

years after the war, Kinney maintained a small private army
of eighty to one hundred men whom he employed against both
the Indians and the Mexicans, and this may have been the
.
genesis of the famed Texas Rangers. 3
The fringe area of · Nicaragua coveted by Kinney, the

Mosquito Coast, had _ already undergone a turbulent history

quite apart from that of the Pacific Ocean side of the Repub
lic.

Geographically, it is a strip along the Caribbean coast

of Nicaragua (and a portion of Honduras) about 40 miles wide
and 2 25 miles long.

The name is derived from its early Indian

inhabitants, the Miskito or Mosquito Indians.

While the term

2 The Royal Standard and �azette of the Turks and Caicos
Islands, July 7, 1855. Material on Kinney's early life is
sketchy. The information in The Royal Standard came from an
interview with him when Kinney ' s ship Emma was shipwrecked on
. Grand Turk Island on his first voyage to Nicaragua. Scroggs
merely notes that Kinney was a native of Pennsylvania who
migrated to western Texas in 1838. There he traded in live
stock ·and speculated in real estate on an extensive scale.
Scroggs , Filibusters , 99.
3 New York Times , December 15 , 1854. This last attribu
tion may have been fanciful, perhaps on the part of Kinney
himself. One historian points out that Stephen F. Austin
formed a company of ten men at his own expense to serve as
"rangers" against hostile Indians. John Coffee (Jack) Hayes
was authori zed in 1836 by the Congress of the Republic of
Texas to organize and serve as captain of a company of Texas
Rangers , " and these-grown to several companies--were mustered
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"Miskito" can still be used to refer to an identifiable
Indian population, a large percentage have long been mixed
with Negroes from Jamaica and especially the Lesser Antilles.
Although the Mosquito Coast was first dis covered by Columbus
in 150 2, the Spanish made only a few tentative efforts at
colonization, and for practical purposes it did not come
into contact with Europeans until the era of the buccaneers
in the seventeenth century. 3

A Bri tish clai m to the area dates from the colonial
period when, between 1741 and 17 8 6, the British actually _
occupied the coast with a small contingent and the Spanish
permitted the Mosquitos " to consider themselves under the
protection of Great Britain, "
shadowy authority.

Britain never relinquished this

She continued to crown Mosquito kings in

farcical pomp and circumstance, but more practical aid and
control came from the supplies of money and goods given by
the British to the somewhat unindustrious and apathetic

Mosquitos. 4

King Robert Charles Frederi ck I (the king and h is chi efs

were required to adopt " Christian names " ) was crowned April
23, 18 25.

In 1 8 39, His Majesty cancelled a debt contracted

into federal service by General Zachary Taylor i n 1846.
Joseph Chadwick, The Texas Rangers (Derby , Connecticut:
Monarch Books, 19 6 3) 5-40, passim.

3Mari�no Fi allos-Gil, " Mosquito Coast, " Encyclooaedia
Britannica (Chi cago: William Benton, 19 70) , XV , 8 87 .

4Peter F. Stout , Nicaragua: Past, Present and Future (Phila
delphia: J. E. Potter, 1859) , 16 8-7 1. In a letter informing the
heir apparent of inaugural arrangments, A British offi cial
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for "sundry liquors and other royal supplies" by making a
grant of territory encompassing the mouths of the San Juan
River and amounting to about 2 2, 500, 0 0 0 acres.

The grantees,

Peter and Samuel Shepherd, formerly of Georgia, subsequently
transferred the grant to the Central American Colonization
Company, an American association.

This was the basis for what

afterwards became known as the Kinney Expedition. 5

The grant

made in January and confirmed in November, had the advice and
consent of the King's chiefs and head men.

The land was to be

subject to colonization, and free from taxation and other

"burdens usually incident to citizens and subjects. 1 1 6

It could be--and was--argued that the land was not really
theirs to alienate and that they did not have an inkling as to
what they were doing.

The most serious economic crisis they

had heretofore faced was when the turtle shell harvest was bad,
remarked: "I sincerely trust you will not be disappointed in
the advantage you expect to derive by its being understood by
your subjects, that you are in a particular manner under the
protection of the British Government. " Sir George Arthur
(Superintendent of Honduras) to Prince George, January 14, 1816,
British and Foreign State Papers, 1848-1849, XXXVII, 679.
SJames Jeffrey Roche, By-Ways of War, The Storv of the
Filibusters (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 190 1) , 84-85.

6 stout, Nicaragua, 172. The Shepherds had been intinerant
traders in the area for a number of years. In May, 1833, ,King
Robert had granted them a license to trade in the Chiriqui
Lagoon region which was well to the South and in present-day
Panama. The concession included the right "to build houses and
land traders at any ports or places" in return for an annual
payment of $ 10 0. British and Foreign State Papers, XXXVII,
69 0.
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so their naivet; probably knew no bounds.

At the instigation

of the British, Robert Charles Frederick's successor, King
George William Clarence, revoked the grant two years later on
the grounds that (1) the consideration was insufficient, and
(2) the grant had been fraudulently obtained inasmuch as the
king and his court were drunk.

When it appeared that there

was a movement in the United States to utilize the grant, and
that Nicaragua might intervene, the British reoccupied the
area on January 1, 1848. 7
The British position vis-a-vis the Mosquitos was. outlined

in a letter of May 2, 1854, from Foreign Secretary Lord
Clarendon to Secretary of State William L. Marcy.

Britain,

Clarendon averred, had never claimed sovereignty over Mosquito,
but her protectorate had not been extinguished by the Clayton
Bulwer Treaty.

He conceded that a British consul might "be

called upon to give his opinion or advice to the Mos quito
government, as is usual when weak governments are in alliance
with strong ones. "

The Foreign Secretary also observed that

Englishmen may thus be in the councils of the king of
Mosquitos, acting as his ministers . • • . To alter this
state of things might, at the present moment, be impos
sible, but her Maj esty's government would be ready and
willing to enter into such engagements as should prevent
Great Britain from receiving any privileges or advantages
from the Mosquito government, not qranted to other States. 8
7 stout, Nicaragua, 175.

8Boston Daily Advertiser, January 30, 1856.
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In character with Kinney's previous restles snes s, he was
preparing to undertake a journey to Europe in order to observe

the military operations of the Crimean War when his attention
was diverted to Central Arnerica. 10 Along with eighteen other
capitalists from New York and other cities , Kinney obtained
the Shepherd Grant and organized the Central American Coloni
In order to pave the way

zation Company to exploit it.

diplomatically for the venture, Kinney went to Washington in
December,

1854,

and "had interviews with the President and

other members of the Government, and • .

s atis fied them

entirely that the enterprise is not a filibustering one in any
sense, and contemplates neither a violation or evasion of our
neutrality laws � 11 11

The company is s ued 2 25, 000 shares at

twenty-five dollars each, a share representing

10 0

acres, and

offices were opened in New York and Philadelphia to promote
the s ale of the stock.

The company's stated obj ectives were

the colonization of the land and the development of its
resources. 12 Kinney himself spent more than $52, 000 of his

own funds in fitting out a party o f coloni s ts to carry out
this design. 13
10 The

Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7, 1855.
this was Kinney's own te�timony.
· llNew York Times , December
12

scroggs, Filibusters ,

13The

15,

10 0 .

1854.

Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7,

1855.

Again
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Although Kinney was not prescient enough to anticipate
it at the time, the opposition--in Washington, New York, and
Nicaragua--which his expedition would engender would prove
to be overwhelming.

The apathy of prospective American

colonists would eventually be the death blow, but there were
a number of other problems along the way.

It might be

expected that there would be some objections from the British
government over this encroachment into its protectorate, but
perhaps Kinney actually believed the British masquerade with

respect to the independence and sovereignty of the Mosquito
king.

The first registered opposition, however, occured not

in Nicaragua, but in the United States.
Jos� de Marcoleta, Nicaraguan Minister to Washington,
lodged a vigorous protest against this planned " invasion. "
He did not rely exclusively on diplomatic channels of commu

nication, but took his case directly to the newspapers. 14

Initial suspicions were aroused that Marcoleta was not acting
on instructions from his government when it was reasoned that
s ince Nicaragua was caught up in the distraction of a civil

war, that nation could hardly address itself to ·the problem of
a colonization scheme being projected in faraway New York.

Nor was Marcoleta's own status entirely clear.

Suspicions were

heightened when it was determined that his legal counsel was
14At one point, Marcoleta and Joseph W. Fabens, former
United States Consul in San Juan del Norte and an associate of
Kinney's, exchanged insults in letters to a New York paper.
Marcoleta attempted to prevail upon Secretary Marcy to obtain
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Joseph L . White, a director of the Accessory Transit Company,
whose terminus on the Caribbean side was the very area that
Kinney proposed to settle.

The extinguishing of any author

ity at San Juan del Norte (British Greytown) other than that
of the transit company was a goal of White and his colleagues.
The Kinney Expedition could not be regarded as anything but a
threat to that goai. 15
Nicaragua itself did act when on June 1, 1855, President
'
'
Jose Maria Estrada issued a proclamation stating that the
government had information that the "filibusters Kinney and
Fabens" were mounting an expedition in the United States and
calling for war to the death against them.
men were subject to mobilization.

All able-bodied

All foreigners (except long

residents and transients on the transit route) were to be
moved away from the frontiers .

Anyone caught helping the

f ilibusters would be considered traitors.

Any area occupied

by the filibusters should be abandoned, and those not comply
ing would suffer the consequences . 16 A protest was also made
to the United States government .

"reparations" from Fabens for the "rude" things the latter
had said about the Nicaraguan minister. Marcy declined on
the grounds that Fabens was not acting in an official capac
ity, and because apparently Marcoleta introduced the conflict
by writing the paper first about Fabens. Marcy did say that
he regretted the language Fabens had used. Marcy (unofficial)
to Marcoleta, May 1, 1855, National Archives, M99, 10/77.
15 scroggs, Filibusters, 10 2 .
16John Priest (United States Consul in San Juan del Sur)
to Marcy, June 1, 1855, National Archives, T152, 1 ; Wheeler
to Marcy, July 1, 1855, ibid. , M2 19, 11/ 19.
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Sympathy among both the press and the public in the United
States depended--though by no means exclusively--on one's
position vis-a-vis slavery.

Those who condoned the institution

hoped that the private incursions into Nicaragua would be the

opening wedges of Anglo-Saxon domination, turning the Central
American Isthmus into another Texas.

They assumed that

Mosquito, given the putative nature of its plantation econany,
would be a new slave-holding region.

Supporters also were

motivated by the fashionable creed of Manifest Destiny.

Those

opposing the expedition did so out of a fear of slavery
extension, as well as a legal and moral concern about the
flouting of American neutrality laws.
An indication of the interest and indignation aroused in
the United States can be found in family letters to William
Sidney Thayer, a journalist who subsequently accompanied and
aided Colonel Kinney.

Thayer was of a prominent New England

family, a Harvard graduate in the class of 1850, a sensitive
if unpolished poet, and an admirer of Charles Sumner, the

abolitionist senator from Massachusetts ; hardly, it would seem,
a likely · candidate for an expedition reputed to have filibus

tering designs.

Nonetheless, when Thayer moved to Washington

to become a correspondent for the New York Evening Post and to
launch his journalistic career, mutual friends led him into
association with the controversial Kinney.

Thayer's father

wrote him in May, 1855, that the New York Tribune had charged
the expedition was designed to establish slavery in Central

12 0
America. 17

In June the elder Thayer wrote that he had read

in the newspaper that his son had "taken stock in the Kinney
Expedition. "

It was bad enough, he said, that Thayer should

associate with Kinney, and write articles and make speeches
in the colonel's behalf, but this was too much.

Apparently

Thayer's father had never been satisfied with the legality

and morality of Kinney's activities in Texas. 18

Thayer's brother wrote him in August that he was having
trouble explaining to their friends (who read the Tribune and
other New York papers) just what "Bill" was doing on a fili
buster expedition.

" I am always careful, " he said, "to state

first what I believe to be the nature of the expedition, which

is simply praiseworthy, and second that you go out not as a

member of the concern but for the sake of the trip and to see

the country. 19
11

Two days later, Thayer's father wrote :

The government prosecutions of Col. K. and his partner,
together with the printed condemnation of the expedition
by the New York Tribune, identifying it with the brigand
troop of Walker & Co. and also alluding to it in connec
tion with the Cuban Filibusters [presumably a reference
'!=f the landings in Cuba of former Venezuelan Narciso
Lopez] , have created a strong public sentiment against
the whole enterprise ; and everyone in any way connected
with it is regarded as more or less of a fillibuster-
an outlaw. 2 0
17Abijah W. Thayer to William Sidney Thayer, May 2, 1855,
William Sidney Thayer Papers, Library of Congress
18 Ibid. , June 8, 1855.
l9 Jarnes B. Thayer to w. S. Thayer, August 3, 1855. The
word "concern" is a reference to the Central American Coloni
zation Company.
20

A. W. Thayer to W. S. Thayer, August 5, 1855.
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Regardless of this civil opposition, it still appeared
that the expedition would at least be able to get underway
without official interference.

American lawyers of the

calibre of Daniel Fletcher Webster, and English lawyers s uch
as William Burge, had rendered the opinion that the grant was
valid. 2 1 Kinney claimed to have a letter from Secretary Marcy
with "instructions" on how to avoid violating the neutrality
laws. 2 2 The New York Times correspondent in Washington opined

that "the Government will throw no obstacles in their way. "2 3
Despite these reassurances, a popular but damaging chord was
struck by the British news-magazine Blackwood's:

A great deal was said about the promotion of agriculture
on the Mosquito coast ; but it was pretty generally
understood by the public, that the real object in view
was to filibuster the State of Nicaragua, or at all events
to establish a · depot in that part of the world, from
which, when all should be ready, a descent upon Cuba
might be conveniently made. 2 4
It was apparently this view held by the public (and pro
moted by the press), as well as the remonstrances of the
Nicaraguan minister, which finally caused the government to

intervene .

A proclamation was issued by New York District

2 1 samuel Shepherd, Peter Shepherd, and s . T. Haly (orig
nal grantees) to the New York Herald, December 1 2, 1855.
Webster, son of the form�r Secretary of State, was a member of
the Kinney Expedition. This association may have affected his
objectivity.
2 2 New York Times, April 30, 1855.
2 3 Ibid. , December 15, 1854 .

2 4 Blackwood's Magazine, March, 1856, reprinted iri Littell's
Living Age, XIII, No. 62 1, April 1 9 , 1856.
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Attorney John McKean warning people "not to take part in the

hostile invasion of a friendly state. " 25

In the meantime, a

federal grand jury returned an indictment against Kinney,
charging him with violation of the neutrality law of 1818,
to wit:

"Setting on foot a military exp�aition. "

A United

States marshal brought the defendants to court on April 28,
1855, and, on McKeon's recommendation, bail was set at
$ 10, 000.

Trial date was set for May 7 . 26

A co-defendant of Kinney was Joseph Warren Fabens, former
United States commercial agent at San Juan del Norte.

Fabens

had managed to acquire "title" to one and a half million acres
in Chontales, an area bordering on Lake Nicaragua, by pur
chase from the Nicaraguan government, the church, and from
local "owner-associates. " 27 He had created the Nicaragua Land
and Mining Company for the purpose of developing agriculture,
mining, industry, and transportation on his lands. 28

Because

Kinney's venture appeared to be better organized and financed,
Fabens had elected to join forces with the redoubtable colonel.
Kinney and Fabens had chartered a large steamer, the

United States, to take several hundred colonists to Nicaragua.
On May 24, the government stationed three steamers and a reve

nue cutter in New York harbor to prevent a surprise departure
25 Ibid.

26New York Times, April 30, 1855.
27 rbid.
28 Ibid. , April 19 , 1855.
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by the emigrants.

Government litigation against Kinney was

introduced in Philadelphia, and he was compelled to travel
there to post another substantial bond.

It became clear that

the strategy of White and Marcoleta, aided and abbetted by
McKean, was to delay the expedition while Kinney's funds
dwindled and his supporters became demoral{zed. 2 9
When the Kinney-Fabens case was brought to trial on May
7, McKean requested a postponement because he had not located
two essential witnesses who lived in Philadelphia.

The

. district attorney's maneuver was revealed as a sham when it

was shown that the affidavits of search had neither the first
names nor the addresses of these "key" witnesses.

McKean

also tacitly acknowledged that the grand jury had not examined
these witnesses and the judge correctly pointed out that, in
that case, the prosecutor should be able to proceed without
them.

This McKean declined to do. 30

The attorney for the defendants contended that the di s
trict attorney was deliberately inconveiencing his clients.
The expedition was scheduled to sail that very day, and in

anticipation a ship of 1, 600 tons was waiting at dockside with
coal and provisions on board.

The charter cost for the vessel

was $ 2 1, 000, and daily demurrage of $ 1, 500 had to be defrayed
by the company.

In addition, four to five hundred colonists

2 9 s croggs, Filibusters, 1 0 2.

30 New York Times, May 8, 1855.

12 4
were being quartered at New York hotels at a cost to the
company of $ 1, 000 a day.

"The proposition of the District

Attorney was to plant the colony here termporarily--to detain

all these men in the City of New York through the dog days. 11 31
Kinney's lawyer then turned his attention to the motiva

tion for McKeon's strategy.

" The indictment, " he charged,

"was founded upon the suspicions, if not upon the affidavit
[ of ] Mr. Marcoleta. "

Marcoleta's attorney, who was assisting

the prosecution, responded by ridiculing the defendants'
assertion that the expeditionists were "peaceful agricul
"There would be about as many furrows turned up by

turists. "

the plow, as many hillocks made with the hoe, and as many
fields leveled by the harrow by them here. "

This was a "new

breed of farmers, " he asserted, who lived in hotels and
frequented public houses to the tune of $ 1, 0 00 a day !

Con

cluding the hearing, the judge reduced bond for the two defen
dants to $ 1, 000, released them on their own recognizance, and
reset the trial for June s. 32

Marcoleta was not satis fied with the government ' s efforts,

and he asked Marcy to prevent the departure from American ports

of every vessel which may have been chartered by Kinney and
company.

11

Mad enthusias m" and "excitement, " he remonstrated,

had been created by a map of Nicaragua "embellished with like- ·

nesses of Kinney [� ] and Fabens, and in which the points are
J!Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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marked where the new cities of Montezuma, Cortes, Fabensville
and Kennyville, are to be built. 11 3 3

Marcy replied that "the

prosecuting attorney has availed himself of all the proof
which Mr. Marcoleta could indicate or which could be otherwise
obtained • • • •

The government and its officers have done

their whole duty in this matter. 11 34

Marcoleta's importunities seem to have borne fruit in
the surveillance of the United States, but the Nicaraguan agent
did not rest.

Shortly afterwards, he advised Marcy that

Kinney now planned to hire a small vessel, the Grape Shot,
and perhaps sail from another port.

In that event, the United

States should send a warship to intercept him at San Juan del
Norte .

Should Kinney land there, he "would at once place the

de facto Government of that town at his disposal. "

Among

other calamities this would cause, the peaceful settlement of
diplomatic problems there ,..,ould
.
be seriously impaired. 35

On June 5, Kinney secured a one-day continuance of his
arraignment.

When he failed to appear the following day, his

trial was postponed until June 7, but by the latter date Kinney

was safely at sea.

By employing a ruse invo lving a mass

3 3 Marcoleta to Marcy, May 9, 1855, in William R. Manning,
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American
Affairs, 18 3 1- 18 60, IV, Central America, 1851- 18 60 (Washing
ton: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 34) ,
457-60.
34Marcy to Marcoleta, May 15, 1855,
35Marcoleta to Marcy, June 1 , 1855,

ibid. , 6 8 .

ibid. , 463 .
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meeting at dockside--where the United States was moored--to
protest the government ' s treatment, Kinney distracted the
federal marshals and quietly slipped the lines of a small
schooner in another part of the port.

The New York Times

description of the coup was that in order "to cure a conges

tion in one part he claps a blister on a distant part. 11 36
Nonetheless, the White-Marcoleta plan had been reasonably

successful, and when the � sailed on the evening of June 6 ,
Kinney's army of colonists had been reduced to a mere p�atoon.
Even out of the clutches of the government, the emigration
was not uneventful, and a near-disaster occurred with a wreck
in Turks Islands in the West Indies.

After about a week on

the island, Kinney and his argonauts were carried the rest of
the way to San Juan del Norte on the English brig Huntress, 37

where one report asserted that their "arrival was hailed with
enthusiasm. " 38

But if Kinney thought his major difficulties were behind
him, he had misjudged the situation ; in reality, he had walked
into an imbr(XJlio of international and local conflict.

In

terms of international politics, the issue was between the
United States and Great Britain over the interpretation of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

From the American point of view, the

treaty seemed to suggest the withdrawal of the British from
36New York Times, June 18, 1855.

37 The Royal Standard and Gazette, July 7 , 1855.
38 stout, Nicaragua, 176.
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their Mosquito Coast protectorate.

The British held, however,

that the treaty was "prospective, " and did not apply to
existing arrangements.

As a result, the diplomatic--and

sometimes open--battle was being joined with San Juan del
Norte, or Greytown, as a microcosm for the entire Isthmus.
Greytown stood on one side o f the entrance to San Juan
Bay, the mouth of the San Juan River, with the settlement of
the Accessory Transit Company across from .it on a sandspit
called Punta Arenas .

Greytown was ostensibly a part of the

Mosquito king's dominion, but in reality its inhabitants were
largely British, Nicaraguan, American, and Costa Rican, with
perhaps a few Indians for "seasoning, " and it enjoyed a
separate existence under an elected city council �

Although

its raison d'etre was as a port city for the handling of
Nicaraguan and Costa Rican products destined for European
ports, it could in no way have been called thriving .

The Punta

Arenas settlement, located at the Caribbean terminus of the
transisthmian route, served as a barracks for workers and a

warehouse for the equipment of the American-owned. transit
company. 3 9

Dissension between the two settlements had been building

up since the opening of the transit route some four years
previously.

Generally, the Greytowners resented the company

personnel's conducting their business independently and vir
tually ignoring the town.

Specifically, it meant loss of a

3 9 New York Times, April 2, 1853 .
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substantial financial windfall.

The British government--this

time in accord with the Clayton-Bulw�r provision for free
ports at each terminus--had directed the town council not to
collect duties.

The company had ignored the council's

decree that transit steamers
fees instead.

using the bay should pay port

Finally, the town fumed because transit passen

gers were transferred directly from the ocean steamers to the
river steamers, without setting foot in Greytown and thereby
having the opportunity to spend some money in the local

economy. 40

The antagonism was exacerbated in February, 1853, when
the council ordered the company to dismantle its settlement and

move across the bay to Greytown.

To aid in inducing the Ameri

cans, a band of men rowed over from Greytown and demolished
some of the company structures.

When a company official

protested, he was summarily incarcerate� for using " threat
ening and seditious language, " and released only after posting
a $7, 50 0 bond.

The physical �amage could not have been much,

as it was later revealed that the company property consisted

of "three miserable shanties and one shed, " but the affront as
well as the menace was real.

The company appealed to the

United States government for protection, and the Navy responded
by dispatching Commander George N. Hollins in the sloop-of-war
Cyane.

Upon entering the harbor on March 10 , Hollins inquired

as to which banner he should salute.

When told he could

4 DFolkman, The Nicaragua Route, 60.
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choose among the American, British, Mosquitan, or Nicaraguan,
he professed amazement at "persons who did not know the flag
under which they were enjoying protection. "

On the following

day, the commander landed a small contingent of marines to

prevent further destruction. 4 1

A year later, on March 10, 185 4 , another crisis arose.
Greytown deputies attempted to arrest Captain T. T. Smith
aboard his river steamer Routh for having shot and killed a
native in a canoe up river.

Minister Solon Borland, who hap

pened to be on board, intervened; but when Borland went to
Commercial Agent Fabens' house in Greytown, a town mob held
.
. ht. 4 2 Fina
. in
. virtua
.
. 11 y,
1 house arrest for t he entire
him
nig
on May 1 5 some Greytowners stole a boatload of merchandise
from the transit company. 4 3 For all these "outrages, " the

Navy Department again ordered Commander Hollins and the
Cyane to San Juan harbor with these instructions:
Now, it is very desirable that these people should be
taught that the United States will not tolerate these
outrages, and that they have the power and determin
ation to check them. I t is, however, very much to be
hoped that you can effect the purposes of your visit
without a resort to violence and destruction of prop
erty and loss of life. The presence of your vessel
will, no doubt, work much good. The d epartment reposes
much in your prudence and good sense. 4 �
Un fortunately, "a resort to violence and destruction of
41

New York Times, April 2, April 5, April 27, May 5, 1853

4 2 Ibid . , Ma y 2 6 , 1 8 5 4

43

Ibid. , August 2, August 5, 185 4 .
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property" seemed unavoidable to the sloop commander.

When

the citizens of Greytown were unable to make a hasty rconetary
restitution, the town was shelled (after proper warning to
allow the inhabi tants to escape with some baggage) for most of
the day of July 13 .

Marines were sent ashore to fire those

buildings still standing to ensure that the destruction was
complete.

The only British ship i n the harbor, the outgunned

H. M. S. Bermuda, stood helplessly by. 45

Even though the facts make it appear that the catas
trophe was the result of local i ndigation and precipitous
action on the part of a nava l commander, ample evidence exists
to indicate that it was a transi t company-State Department
affair.

Colonel Kinney subsequently made public a letter

(apparently provided him by Fabens) from Joseph L. White to
Fabens:
Captain Hollins, commanding the corvette "Cyane, " leaves
on Monday. You will see by his i nstructions, which I
have written on the margin, that it is . intended his author
ity would not be so exercised as to show any mercy to
the town or people.
If the scoundrels are soundly punished, we can take
possession, and build i t up as a business place, put in cur
own offi cers, transfer the jurisdiction, and you know
the rest.
It is of the last importance that the people of the town
should be taught to fear us. Punishment will teach them .
After which you must agree with them as to the organi
_zation of a new government, and the offi cers of it.
4 SBri tish and Foreign State Paoers, XLVI, 859-88. When
advised of Hollins' intentions, the Bermuda's Lieutenant Jolly
expressed regret that "the force under my command is so to
tally i nadequate against the Cyane, that I can only enter this
my pratest. "
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Everything now depends on you and Hollins. The latter
is all right. He fully understands the outrage , and
will not hesitate in enforcing reparation. 4 6
Further State Department involvement can be perceived by
its negative response to British , Nicaraguan , and Costa Rican
protests. 47 Apparently Washington felt the British should be
convinced that the United States meant business in Central
America , and the Greytown happened to be a pawn in the big
power conflict.

But aside from the impli cations of Clayton

Bulwer interpretations , Kinney , at least , was convinced that
the State Department was squarely unde� the influence of the
transit company.
Kinney claimed that he had a copy of a letter ( again
probably given him by Fabens) from White to Secretary Marcy
explaining the event.

It said in part , that "the transit

company had been plundered to the amount of thousands of
dollars by a camp of savages pretending to exercise authority
over Greytown , and that the lives of citizens of the United
States were imperilled by their cruelties. "

Marcy , in turn ,

used virtually the same language in his letter of vindication

to British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon.

Kinney also

charged that "the object in these falsehoods was the overthrow

4 6Henry L. Kinney , "Pronunciamento , " New York Weekly Post ,
September 6 , 1855.

4 7 London Times , August 14 , 1854; Marcy to Jviarcoleta , August
2 , 1854 , National Archives , M99 , 10/62 ; Marcy to Molina ,
October 4 , 1854 , Manning , Diplomatic Correspondence , IV , 61.
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of the then existing government at Greytown, and the establish
ment of a new goverrnent more pliable to the hands of the
company. 11

48

But in Kinney's eyes the real villains were White and the
transit company.

Kinney felt, Thayer wrote the Post, that "the

sources of all his persecutions and troubles were Joseph L.
White, whom he characterizes . with all the vigor of the Texan
vernacular, and M. Marcoleta, 'who signs himself, ' the colonel
says, ' (as in one sense he might justly claim to be) Envoy
Extraordinary from Nicaragua. 1 11 4 9 Kinney accused Marcoleta of

serving White for financial reasons (Marcoleta received no

salary from the government of Nicaragua) , and charged that
White and Marcoleta had used the courts "to delay his departure,
·
.
. .
.
. companions,
and thus break up the enterpr�se. " 5 0
his
to dispirit
Apparently the transit company preferred to deal with

Nicaraguans and Mosquitos rather than Anglo-Saxons; at least
that is what Kinney thought was the true motivation for the
company's actions.

He maintained that the company knew it could

not run roughshod over Americans as it had over Nicaraguans, .
avoiding or denying its contractual obligations.

(The company

had pledged a percentage of the transisthmian transit profits to
the Nicaraguan government, and had committed itself to build a

canal across Nicaraguan territory. ) The company perhaps recognized
4 8 Kinney,

"Pronunciamento, " ibid.

49 New York Weekly Post, September 6, 18 5 5 .
5 °Kinney, "Pronunciamento, " ibid.

133
that--with a large permanent contingent--the Americans would
gain influence in the government, and would "discharge the
obligations of that government to others, then would exact

the obligations owed it. " 5 1

Conversely, perhaps that was why

the Greytowners, thinking they had found a champion against
the arrogance and inconsiderateness of the company, "hailed
their arrival with enthusiasm. "
At any rate, Kinney felt that he had natural allies when
he arrived, and he issued an optimistic proclamation:

I have • • • the fullest confidence in the ooinion that
not many months will elapse before Central Ame�ica will
throng with industrious Anglo-Saxon farmers and artizans,
who need only the enterprise and business habits of their
native land to ins ure an ample reward for their labors
in developing its resources. The climate has proved
eminently healthy; and the disposition of the native
races, notwithstanding the hostile decree of June 1st,
which the government was inveigled into promulgating by
the Transit Company, are ready, almost without exception,
to give us a healthy welcome. 5 2

With Kinney's arrival, the rebuilding of Greytown con
tinued apace.

"Houses were erected, stores opened, hotels

built, " and there was a general regeneration of the town. 53
There was also a vacuum of government which he moved quickly
Slrbid.

5 2 rbid.

53stout, Nicaragua, 177. Independent reporting on the suc
cess of Kinney' s efforts was negligible. The State Department
had dismissed Fabens from his post because of his association
with the expedition. Minister Wheeler was absorbed in the
swift-moving events in Granada following the intervention of
Walker. The glowing reports sent back by the expedition were
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to fill.

It had existed since before the bombardment crisis,

each succeeding council being unable or unwilling to deal
realistically with the threat presented by the transit com
pany's demands.

On September 6, Kinney was "unanimously

chosen Civil and Military Governor of the City and Territory

of San Juan del Norte" by an assembly of Greytown citizens. 54
According to Marcoleta, it was a rump convention consisting
of members of Kinney's party along with renegades who were
responsible for the problems with the transit company.

The

Nicaraguan minister contended that "the native born citizens,
and other foreigners . . •

energetically protested • • • •

Even the British authorities who were invited, and also the
Captain of the vessel of War 'Eurydice', refused to acknow

ledge those proceedings. 11 55

Nonetheless, Kinney's government issued a decree which
provided that property owners--those with a "stake in the
community"--would elect a governor and council.

The governor,

in turn, would choose subordinate officials and, with the

advice and consent of council , establish laws and regulations.

propaganda for the purpose of attracting settlers. Thayer's
letters to the Post were virtually the only newspaper coverage,
and even these might be considered suspect. The New York Times
derided his deferential relationship with Kinney. "He is to
the Colonel what Cromwell was to Cardinal Wolsey . . • whose
chief pleasure is to magnify the virtues of his chivalric
leader. " New York Times, August 2 9 , 1855.
5 4 Ibi d .

55Marcoleta to Marcy, October 8, 1855, Manning, Diplomatic
Correspondence, IV, 480-1.
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The meetings of the governor and council were to be open to
the public.

This arrangement would continue until a cons ti

tution could be drafted, ratified, and a new govern..�ent
es tablished under it.

There would he no taxes without the

consent of property owners, but ships must continue to pay

existing tariffs. 56

Though particioation in the government

was limited, there s eemed to be general concurrence that a
responsbile government had at last been es tablis hed.

One

report claimed that "physicians, attorneys , merchants, land
agents , and others flocked to support the new adminis
tration. 11 57

And things did s eem to be going rather well.

Thayer

reported in a dis patch dated September 30 that
the expeditionis ts, before thev had marked out their
farms, ·- set to work at once in San Juan, in the line of
their respective vocations. One of them, for example,
is a doctor, and has quite a run of practice. Another
• • •
has opened a school, there being no other in the
place, buckling down to the busines s of teaching with
such succes s that hi s henches are filled with urchins
and little mis ses of various races and complexions .
The Californians have taken to gold-s eeking, and others
have made arrangements fnr beginning trade on their
own account. S B
The diplomatic relations with the new officialdom of

Greytown was a different story.

Needles s to say, the ques tion

of recognition of the independence of the new San Juan

"colony" didn't need to be referred to the purported saverS6 stout, Nicaragua, 17 9 .
5 7Thirl. , 1 8 0-8 1.

5 8 Thayer, New York Evening Pos t, October 16, 1 8 55 .
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eign, the King of the Mosquitos .

But Kinney did "officially"

notify the agents representing both the United States and
Great Britain .

Becaus e Fnbens had joined forces with Kinney,

his designation as Consul and Commercial Agent had been
revoked by the Department of State .

Discharging these func

tions was E . F . Mason, the Vice-Commercial Agent .
ment .

On September 10, Mason acknowledged Kinney's announce
The vice-commercial agent chose--in the absence of

instructions from Washington--to enploy the precedent estab
lished in 1852 by James Geddes, his Briti sh counterpart .
Geddes, in turn, had based his decision for recognition on
the judgment made by Daniel Webster on that occasion:
"Meanwhile a temporary recognition of the existing authori
ties of the place, sufficient to countenance any well
intended endeavors on its part to preserve the public peace
and punish wrong-doers, would not be inconsistent with the
policy and honor of the United States . "

Mason also quoted

former Secretary of State Edward Everett's belief that Nica

ragua could g i ve the citizens of San Juan del Norte" a govern
ment agreeable to them, and allow them to carry on their own
affairs, according to the j udgment of their own elective

municipal officers . "

The American agent maintained that this

was what Nicaraguan President Fruto Chamorro had meant in
March, 1854, when he "recommended that the frontiers, heing
mostly occupied bv foreigners, should be allowed their own
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local government. "

For his own �art , �ason congratulated

Kinnev and said that he had "seen this movement in favor of
a government and the establishment of law with great satis
faction , and am confident that it will be productive of

great good to this place. 59

But the Mason enthusiasm did not represent a chorus of
diplomatic approval : . the initial response of the British
consul was one of stern rebuke.

grudging a<:XIW-escence

This attitude changed to

when Kinnev challenged the British agent

to suggest an alternative.

The consul's maj or liability in

the maneuvering was his perculiar relationships with the vari
ous governments , i. e. , Greytown , British , and �osauito.

In

1850 , when the people of San Juan del Norte first organized
a municipal government , their right to do so was expressly
recognized by the British consul general for Central America ,
acting as the agent for the �osquito king.

When , in 1852 ,

the Greytowners framed a constitution , . the same counsul

general , in behalf of the British government , withheld his
sanction from the constitution and the government organized

under it.

Nevertheless , the British did not obj ect when

Secretary of State Webster announced recognition of the

government.

Furthermore , the Grevtowners simply ignored

59 E. F. Mason to Kinney , September 10 , 1855 , New York
Evening Post , Octover 16 , 1855.
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Britain's tacit disaporoval and thereby effectively nullified
.
t . 60 Eventually , with a British consul in Greytown ,
1. ts 1mpac
the British recognized the government , and that gentleman even
served at one time as chief of the city council in one of the
pre-bombardment governments . 61
The British consul's position was rendered even more
tenuous because the Foreign Office failed to back him up in
his initiatives against the trans it company with resoect to
collection of port fees and transfer of the company's opera
tions to Greytown; in fact , the Foreign Office had specifi
cally disavowed these acts .

The British reaction to the

bombardment of Greytown , presumably protected by the furls of
the Union Jack , had been one of righteous indignation , but
reparations had never been aggressively pressed desoite the
fact that British property { including the consulate) had been
destroyed .

Finally , with the twenty-six gun H . � . s . Eurydice

in port and not an American naval vessel in sight , Kinney

and his contingent were allowed to land unmolested . 62

truth , the British consul may have begun to feel a bit
abandoned by the Foreign Office .

60New York Times , April 2 , 1853; New York Herald ,
November 30 , 1855.
61Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 60 .

62 New York Herald , November 30 , 1855 .
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Nevertheless , when Colonel Kinney notified Consul James
Geddes of the new government on September 1 2 , Geddes' reply
was a formal protest.

The consul claimed that Kinney's

"assumption of authority was an infringement of the rights
of the Mosquito sovereign , and in contravention of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 11 63

He then appended a longer letter

addressed to Geddes from Captain J.
Eurydice.

w.

Tarleton of the

Tarleton requested Geddes tell Kinney that the

government established under the 1 852 constitution , and
rec�gnized by both Great B ritain and the United States , could
only be dissolved by a najority vote of the citizens.

Only

about twenty persons--and those had "no legitimate qualifi
cations to vote"--had attended Kinney's assembly which pur
ported to erect a new government.

Tarleton continued that

even if he considered the Kinney election valid , he would still
have to object to the title of "Civil and Military Governor"
which would "confer powers inconsistent with the prerogatives of the King of Mosquito , and with the s trictly provis
ional arrangements heretofore sanctioned by the governments

of Great Britain and the United States : 6 4
Again the question arises :

under- what authority were

Geddes and Tarleton making the protest?
63 Ibid.

The seal on the

6 4 Tarleton to Geddes , September 13 , 1855 , Thayer Papers.
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consul's letter displayed the British coat of arms , with
the word "Mosquito" underneath, and surrounded bv the title,
"H . B . M. Agent and Consul General. "

With these impress ive

credentials, why then di d Geddes feel it incumbent to refer
the letter to a naval officer, and use that reply as the
bulk of his response to Kinney?

The latter gently alluded to

this apparent di screpancy in procedure when he, in effect,
presented the British with a rather awkward alternative to
recognition of his government.

He would assent "with eaual

cheer fulness" to the formation of a res ponsible government
"by any duly empowered representative of Her Majesty ' s
government. "

Judg ing from the correspondence, Kinney averred,

it appeared that Tarleton was "clothed with special diolo
matic

powers. "

Therefore, "it would afford me pleasure to
witness his ef forts" to achieve that goai . 65
At this point, Tarleton retired from the debate , and
Geddes seemed to have wished he could do the same.

The consul

responded weakly that he s till coul� not grant hi s imorimatur
to Kinney as long as he theoretical ly recogni zed the previous

government : however, he fully conceded the right of the people
of Greytown to elect their own officers, and would not inter

pose any obstacles to the popular wil1. 66

' 65New York Herald, November 30, 1855.
6 6 Ibid .
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For a brief moment things seemed to be going in Kinney's
favor.

Reports from the Nicaraguan capital were encouraging

as Minister Wheeler observed that "the prospect of their
[Kinney's] undisturbed possession from this Government seems

fair. 1 67

Thayer had returned to the United States on

September 30 , and a friend in Grevtown wrote him on October
18:
Colonel Kinney yesterday concluded a grant treaty with
the various Mosquito tribes of Indians and indeed it
was a grand sight to see the weather-beaten Indians
smiling and rejoicing in soirit , to think that the
great deliverer had at last come and they called him a
second "Penn. " The contents of the treatv was that the
Indians shall occU?Y their lands peaceable and that they
will in no wise molest any person connected with the
Kinney expedition. 68
Kinney's newspaper , The Central American , reoorted on
September 2 9 that the Colonel had �een invited to Granada to
confer with the Nicaraguan chief executive , Jose Estrada , and
had even been sent a passport hv the latter.

Kinney did not

immediately take advantage of this because "his multifarious
business operations .

orevented his leaving the

immediate vicini ty of hi s labors. 1 6 9

One chroni cler went even

67Wheeler to Marcy , September 2 1 , 1855 , Manning , Dinlo
rnatic Correspondence , IV , 478.

68J , R. Swift to Thaver , October 18 , 1855 , Thaver Paoers.
6 9 New York Evening Post , October 16 , 1855.

14 2

further:

Overtures were made him by the Nicaraguans through
their then Provisiona } Chief, Don Patricio Rivas,
by whom he was urged to visit the City of Granada.
Had he desired to grasp the reins of Government,
ere Gen. Walker had been tempted to do so, Kinney
would have occupied the position of Commander-in
chief, by the unanimous consent of the nation. Costa
Rica also sent deputies to confer with him, entreating
but
him and his followers to settle in its province
7
0
he was wedded to his tract on the Mosquito coast.
The assertion that Kinney could have played any role in
Granada after October 12 seems unlikely.

That was the day

William Walker, another American adventurer, entered the city
with his small army and assumed control of its destiny for
more than a year.

Patricio Rivas, a former customs official

at Fort San Carlos, was Walker's hand-picked man, with Walker

himself des ignated as "General-in-Chief of the Nicaraguan
Army. "

His fellow American's success �· pro mpted Kinney to

attempt to take advantage of the new situation.

Despite the

glowing reports dispatched to New York, the San Juan colony
was not prospering.

Walker's domain--not Kinney's--was

attracting the adventuresome from the United States, and
Kinney felt an alliance would be in his interest.

He there

fore sent Fabens, J. R. Swift, and several others to Granada
70 stout, Nicaragua, 182. Apparently, Secretary Marcy had
received information about the invitation to Kinney. "1arcoleta
was still badgering the Department to intervene, even to the
extent of forcibly removing the Kinney Expedition fr-om the
Mosquito Shore. Marcy appeared to be losing patience with the
importuning of the Nicaraguan Minister; in his reply he
pointed out that Marcoleta still did not seem to under�tand
the United States' relationship to Kinney. The United States
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to make the proposal.

Walker was unreceptive and replied

"that Kinney should be distinctly informed, that if he was
caught in Nica. (and he considered San Juan del Norte as a
part of her territory) that he would treat him as a Traitor
and hang him in five minutes. 1 7 1
But the blow to Kinney's aspirations was even greater:
His entire contingent defected to Walker without returning
to Greytown.

Walker then added a new dimension to the

problems which had already beset Kinney.

On February 8,

1856, Walker's government issued a decree claiming and a�nex
ing the whole Mosquito territory as an integral portion of
the state of Nicaragua, and thereby nullifying the Kinney
had tried to "arrest his enterprise against Nicaragua. " How
ever, Kinney went from the United States not to Nicaragua,
but apparently to the Turks Islands, and then to Nicaragua.
He had subsequently declared his citizenship and allegiance
to another sovereign--perhaps one of his own making--but
thereby renounced United States citizenship. Therefore, the
United States could have no interest or exercise no authority
over him or the members of his expedition. The activity
imputed to Kinney could not "injure the fair name of this
country . • • • The United States has not in any fashion
countenanced or sanctioned their activity. I presume, from
the tenor of your protest, that the rumors which have reached
the United States that the Nicaraguan government is about to
receive these usurpers and adventurers, as you call them,
into favor, is known to you to be unfounded. " Marcy to
Marcoleta, October 10, 1855, National Archives, M99, 10/93.
7 1wheeler to Marcy, November 12, 1855, Manning, Diplo
matic Correspondence, IV, 487-88. The Herald's version of
Walker's reply was even more colorful: "Tell Governor Kinney,
or Colonel Kinney, or Mr. Kinney, or whatever he chooses to
call himself, that if I ever lay hands on him on Nicaraguan
soil I shall surely hang him. " New York Herald, January 3o,
1856.
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purchase.

The proclamation also stated that "the said

Sheppard, Haley, and Kinney and all other persons claiming
this unlawful acquisition, are declared guilty of an attempt
against the integrity of Central Arnerica. 1 7 2

Strange talk,

from one filibuster to another !

But the audacity of the

approach encompassed even more.

Walker's paper, El Nicara

guense, editorially observed:
With a single decree [the new government] set at rest
a matter about which the United States and England had
quarreled for years. Mosquito was annexed to Nicaragua,
and there was no necessity for further protocols
explanatory of the Clayton-Bulwer imroglio. Truly, the
cabinet of President Rivas deserves credit for so easy
an adjustment of so important a matter. 73
The decree did not deal specif ically with what to do about
Kinney.

Walker's strength was unquestionably far superior to

that of the Texas colonel, but a foray down river to dislodge
him might have seriously weakened Walker's forces in Granada.
While Walker and his aides were still mulling over the ques
tion, Colonel Kinney, much to the amazement of the Granadians,
alighted from a lake steamer seeking an interview.
to El Nicaraguense :

According

He almost forfeited his reputation for sanity, and today
a great many point knowingly, and with a peculiar expres
sion, to the head, when he is spoken of. He did not im
prove this impression by his conduct after his arrival.

72 New York Evening Post, February 28, 1856 ; Wheeler to
Marcy, February 26, 1856, Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence,
IV, 508.
73El Nicaraguense, February 16, 1856, quoted in New York
Evening Post, February 28, 1856.
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The Colonel entered the city on foot, and after com
posing his toilet, prepared for a formal visit to Gen.
Wm. Walker or "Uncle Billy, " as he is known in this
vicinity. 7 !
In sharp contrast to Kinney's normal garrulity, Walker
was usually rather laconic.

This put Kinney at a disadvantage,

considering that his position was somewhat awkward to begin
with, and forced him into an opening gambit.
sulted in a somewhat truncated interview.

It also re

The conversation,

according to El Nicaraguense, was:
Col. Kinney--The difficulties under which we labor in
forming a peaceable government for Nicaragua, may be
consummated by dividing the country and creating two
states, one of which shall be called Mosquitia.
Gen. Walker--If Nicaragua chooses to divide her terri
tory, she will do so without advising with ?ny one,
and last of all with Mr. Kinney.
The visitor felt disconcerted, but he was not discour
aged, as what follows will show:
Col. Kinney--! have come to offer my services to the
Republic, and feel confident my financial ability will
be of great benefit in the procurement of money, the
negotiation of loans, and so forth. I succeeded very
well in such matters in Texas.
Gen. Walker--Your antecedents preclude the possibility
of the state's placing you in any official position.

Colonel Kinney was dismayed, and the interview ended,
with the impressive caution from Gen. Walker to his
visitor, that he should be particular in his speech,
or he might be guilty of uttering treasonable language. 75
Apparently the colonel did not heed Walker's admonition.
On the following day he was placed under arrest "for some in74 1bid.

75 Ibid.

146
discreet remarks on the conduct of government, " and was "ban
ished from all the Nicaraguas. "

Subsequently, Kinney was es

corted under guard back to Greytown, with the mayor of
Granada, Theodore J. Martin, acting as custodian. 7 6
As soon as Kinney arrived in Greytown, he began a j ourna
listic counterattack.

The March 3 edition of the Central

American carried his defense of his claim, declaring that the
proclamation that Nicaragua's title to Mosquito Territory was
"notorious and incontestable" was a simple assertion, unsup
ported by "a single proof or argument to ground a claim to
the Territory. "

He further pointed out that the grant to

Sheppard and Haley had been in existence since 1839, and had
not been publicly questioned by the government of Nicaragua
until after a lapse of seventeen years.

Then it was done

"only when the ruling Government has been overturned and another
substituted under the dictation and control of an invading
military power. "
With respect to Nicaragua's "notorious and incontestable"

claim, Kinney retorted that Great Britain had maintained the

authority of the King of the Mosquitos for two centuries and

in 1848 had compelled Nicaragua to renounce formally any claim
to the Mosquito Territory.

Finally, he again pointed out that

the highest legal authorities of the United States and Great
76New York Evening Post, February 28, 1856.
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Britain had sanctioned the Sheppard and Haley grant, and

denied that he or they were "guilty of any attempt against
the integrity of Central America. " 7 7
Later that month it appeared that Walker might not be
too much of a problem.

An augmented battalion of his army

had been routed by the Costa Ricans at Santa Rosa, a planta
tion near the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border.

Then Walker

himself was defeated in an assault on Costa Rican defenses
at Rivas.

In addition to the consequent scattering of his

forces, Walker dismissed his French and German mercenaries,
and all who could not speak English. 7 8

The New York Times

chronicled the event:
Deserters from Walker's army are hourly coming down
the river, in a state of destitution. Most of them
carry their arms and ammunition. They all say they
were starved out, and for want of means to carry
them to the states they are living on charity. Col.
Kinney has given relief to about 2 2, all his house
will hold; the rest are sleeping in sheds or on
wharves, and make out a mouthful anywhere they can. 7 9
The sight also bouyed the spirits of Kinney, as he wrote to
Thayer:

Walker has been badly whipped by the Costa Ricans. He
richly deserved his fate. Now my Dear Thayer, our day
is coming that soon. We will have a new Republic ·in a
short time, and that American. I want you to come down
as soon as you receive this, and help in organizing

7 7 The Central American, March 3, 1 8 56, quoted in New York
Times, March 15, 1 8 56.
7 8 william Walker, The War in Nicaragua (Detroit: Blaine
Ethridge, 19 7 1 [ 1 8 60J· ), 195-203.
79

New York Times, April 2 8 , 1 8 56.
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a new government. I have some southern men interested
with me that will make the enterprise certain to
succeed • • • • I have had a hard time of it my Dear
Thayer since you left but I think the day is dawning
[when we] will have our labors reimbursed. 80
But despite Kinney's momentary ebullience, the situation
was inexorably deteriorating.

The colony simply was not

getting the recruits or the support from the United States
that the founders expected.

Kinney had begun to recognize

the dilemma as early as the preceding November, when he wrote
Thayer, "The old Central American Company has done nothing so
far nor have I had any assistance from any quarter excepting
that which came from my own immediate resources. "

Then he

added with his characteristic optimism, "If I could have a
little backing up by parties interested with me I could come
out triumphant. 11 81

The best description of the degeneration of both the
colony and the hopes of Colonel Kinney is found in the New
York Times of April 28.

The report observed that Kinney had

been in Greytown over nine months, and notwithstanding all

the inducements he had offered, and the several attempts made
by different parties to cultivate the soil there were not yet

ten acres under cultivation.

Worse still, with the rainy

season approaching, nothing more could be done for the next
six months.

The Times attributed this partially to the soil

being low sandy bottom land that would produce nothing but
B O Kinney to Thayer, April 5, 1856, Thayer Papers.

B lrbid. , November 14, 1855.
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bananas and yams.

Moreover, the title to the land was still

precarious, claimed as it was by the "Mosquito King, Nicaragua,
Sheppard

&

Haley, and finally Col. Kinney, who is willing to

dole it out in lots of 1, 280 acres to anyone · who applies. "

The reporter also saw the unsettled conditions on the Isthmus

as a major contributing factor:
Everything connected with the Central American continent
seems to be in a complicated dispute that will require
centuries of time or the intervention of some strong
Government to settle. Hundreds of Americans who have
come out here during the past six months under false
hopes and misrepresentations, have all gone back to
Uncle Sam's dominions, poorer but much wiser than
they left.
Finally, the expectations of Kinney himself may have been
unwarranted all along.

The Times correspondent described him

as a "good-hearted, honest man" but "an enthusiast in this
land speculation, and his anticipations never can be realized. "
It was noted that the Colonel himself was discouraged when
trying to clear an area near the city; after one month's labor
he gave up in disgust.

In the eyes of the Times correspondent,

the situation was virtually hopeless :

The inhabitants of San Juan del Norte present the most
wretched appearance that animated nature is capable of
being reduced to; and to acquire this phantom form
every new comer must serve an apprenticeship of at
least two years to chills and fever.

The city can boast of about ten frame houses and a lot
of bamboo native huts. There is one hotel, kept by a
German, but the best and, indeed, all the other houses
of accommodation are kept by gentlemen of color. The
British Consul owns his own frame house, but the
American Consul hires his rooms and dwells in the house
with colored men.
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The population consisting, as it does, of English,
Americans, Spaniards, natives and colored people,
is said to be about 7 0 0. Yet there is no church,
no minister, no school • • • •
The commerce of the place is entirely in liquor and
plantains. These two articles make the eating and
drinking of the inhabitants, but they always savor
their food with a large dish of hope that San Juan
is soon to �ecome the greatest commercial city of
the world. 8
This last sanquine observation was but a pious trust which
might or might not precede the millenium.

For his part,

Kinney remained in Greytown for more than a year thereafter,
clinging to his hopes and unwilling to admit failure.

In

July, 1857, he set sail for Corpus Christi where he expected
to raise funds for the colony.

His vessel was shipwrecked

at Belize where, to add to his woes, he was briefly j ailed

for alleged non-payment of a debt to a local Englishrnan. 8 3
Nonetheless, he was able "to interest some English Mormons in
his grant, and one of their agents agreed to buy one-half of
the territory. "

With this commitment as collateral, Kinney

borrowed money from some Panama merchants 8 4 and staged his
last effort, a farcical tragicomedy which cast him in the
uncharacteristic role of villain.

On May 17, 1 8 5 8 , the barque Osprey arrived from Aspin-

82 New York Times, April 2 8 , 1856.
8 3 Ibid . , August
31, 1 8 57.

scroggs, Filibusters, 132. Another version was that
the purchase price was two million dollars, of which the
Mormons made a ten-percent downpayment. Stout, Nicaragua, 1 8 2.
84
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wall, Panama, and Kinney and some other passengers debarked.
The colonel proceeded to his former house (which had been sold
some time earlier in foreclosure of a mortgage) and took
possession of it by force.

On the 25th, Kinney and his

party hauled down the Mosquito flag, substituted their version
of the "flag of Nicaragua," · and set a guard to prevent its

being taken down.

Afterwards, six armed men went to the

residence of the mayor, presenting an order signed by Kinney
for his arrest, and demanding that he accompany them to the
Station House.

The mayor declined to do so and slammed his

doors, whereupon the party forced the doors open and compelled
him to accompany them.

At the Station House, Kinney informed

the mayor that he must resign his office, and that Captain
Kennedy, of the American sloop-of-war

Jamestown ( with its guns

trained on the city) would support the takeover.

The mayor

appealed to the citizenry who intervened, allowing their chief
official to return home unmolested.
On the following day, Captain Kennedy responded to a citi

zens' protest by emphatically denying " having aided, or

abetted, or offered any assistance to Kinney. "

On the third

day, Kinney and his band were arrested by Greytown authorities

and taken by Kennedy on board the Jamestown.

Under the super

vision of the British consul, the British flag was hoisted
and saluted with a one-gun salvo, and then the Mosquito flag
reappeared on the flag staff.

Kinney and his contingent were

then directed to sign a pledge accepting Kennedy's asylum
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and agreeing not to return to shore.

As soon as possible ,

they would leave "by bungoes or other Conveyance , for the
interior of the country. "

They further promised never again

to return to Greytown "except with peaceable and friendly

intentions to the local authorities. "85

Apparently the Nicaraguan authorities, now back in
control of their country after the Walker episode, did not
want Kinney and his party either ; and shortly thereafter
they quit the country for good.

Kinney went to Aspinwall

and from there to the United States.

In the fall of 1858 he

was back in Texas, where friends urged him to become a
canidate for governor.

Involvement . in a local feud in

Matamoros resulted in his being shot and killed in 1861. 86
The effect of the Kinney venture did not loosen the grip
of the British on Greytown or the Mosquito Coast and did not

entice American colonists or enterprise into the area, but it
did along with Walker's escapades--serve to heighten the

sensitivity of Nicaraguans to American ambitions on the
Isthmus.

It thus aggravated the difficJlties . of other

Americans trying to establish and maintain a transit route

through Nicaragua. The proposed routes are shCMil in Figure 6.

85Mirabeau B. Lamar (United States . Minister to Nicaragua)
to Lewis B. Cass (Secretary of State), May 26, 1858, National
Archives , M 219 , 1 1.
B 6 scroggs, Filibusters, 132.
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Figure 6 .

Nicaraguan Transit Routes .

CHAPTER V
THE NICARAGUAN TRANSIT ROUTE
[ Regarding] the completion of that enterprize which
has heretofore engaged the attention of philanthropists
and statemen for three hundred years without effect • • •
tell the members . of the Company who have with the aid
of the United States obtained the power to construct
this work that if there be any mean spirit of specula
tion indulged in by them, or any of them, to blight or
disgrace so glorious an undertaking, they will merit and
receive the execrations of good men, while on the other
hand, if they be true to their own honor, their own
interests and the best interests of their own country,
and of the human race, their names will be handed down
to posterity among those of. the noblest benefactors of
man. 1
The grandeur of these instructions given by Secretary
of State John M. Clayton to his consul in Central America,
Ephraim George Squier, indicates the hopes and expectations
that were attached to the project of building a canal across
the Central American Isthmus through Nicaragua in

185 0.

More

than three centuries had passed since Charles I of Spain had
entertained the same dream, but in neither the colonial nor
the national period oid men or governments have the technology
or the sense of purpose that activated Americans and some
Europeans in the mid-nineteenth century.

In global terms,

the man who would become Napoleon III, Emperor of France,
wrote in

1846:

The State of Nicaragua can become, better than
Constantinople, the necessary route of the great
commerce of the world, and is d.estined to attain an
extraordinary degree of prosperity and grandeur.
1 Clayton to Squier, May 7, 1850, National Archives, M77, 27/104.
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France, England, and Holland have a great conunercial
interest in the establishment of a communication be
tween the two oceans, but England has, more than the
other powers, a �olitical interest in the execution
of thi s project.

Americans had a sense of urgency about canal construction

for a more mundane reason.

Before the ink was dry on the

Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo whose terms ceded California to

the United States, gold was discovered at Sutter's Mill on
California's American River.

This di scovery, along with the

long-range neces s ity of settling California and Oregon to
as sure their continued adherence to the Union, caused an almost
overwhelming demand for some route--other than acros s the vast
expanse of the American continent or the long and perilous
voyage around Cape Horn--from the east coast to the west coast.
Central America was the logical area in which to undertake
the establi shment of some sort of trans i sthmian pas sage and,
by 1850, a number of routes were already in some stage of
operation.

Two were in Mexico, one utilizing a Vera Cruz

Mexico City-San Blas route, and the other making a water and
land cros sing of the Tehuantepec Isthmus.

Another, and by

.far the mos t popular, was the cros sing in Panama (then still
a part of Colanbia)

City on the Pacific.

from Chagres on the Caribbean to Panama
This route was served by a line of

steamships with irregular schedules :

calling at Chagres was

the United States Mail Steamship Company ; operating between
2 Napoleon Lou i s Bonaparte, Canal of Nicaragua, or a Pro
ject to Connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by Means of a
Canal ( London, 1846) , quoted in Folkman, The Nicaragua Route,
14.
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Panama City and San Francisco was the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company.

Unfortunately ·for this route, the passage between

the two coasts in Panama was both difficult and debilitating.
Passing the night in the disease-ridden squalor of Chagres
was so hazardous to the traveler's health that his insurance

policy carried a cancellation clause in such an event. 3

From Chagres, only canoes and mules were available for trans
In

portation to the embarkation port for San Francisco.

addition, by 1850, this route was vastly overladen by the
tide of humanity bound for the California gold fields.

A

railroad across the Isthmus at Panama, which a trio of Ameri

can entrepreneurs had contracted to build in that year, would

not offer relief until its completion five years later.
A more salubrious route, and one that promised to be
more feasible, was through the state of Nicaragua.

A few ten

tative efforts had been made· by American companies to incor
porate this route into a through service from New York or
New Orleans to San Francisco.

Initially, the passage across

the Is thmus at Nicaragua was not much more inviting than that

of Panama, except for the beauty of the scenery, the attaction
of the colonial city of Granada, and the tropical fruits that

grew in abundance.

The passengers debarked at the nondescript

port town of San Juan del Norte and traveled by hollowed-out
3Folkman, Nicaragua Route, 2 .
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log canoes called bungos up the 122-mile San Juan River to
Lake Nicaragua.

En . route, the passengers were forced to

debark at least three times for passage of rapids while
the bungos were either poled through or portaged around these
cataracts : Upon reaching Fort San Carlos, where the San Juan
flows out o f Lake Nicaragua, larger craft were boarded for
the crossing to Granada at the far corner o f the lake.

The

trip across the lake could also become eventful, as an early
traveler suggests :
the rapacious shark fins his way along, and the timid
mariner witnesses waterspouts, and experiences the most
sudden dangerous squalls met with in any water on the
globe. a
The last leg, from Granada to the Pacific port of Realejo,
was accomplished primarily by cart pulled by either oxen or
mules.

The 134-mile journey was particularly difficult during

the rainy season when the trail was turned into a quagmire.
One other problem was that, as the Nicaraguan passage was not
an established route, connections at both San Juan del Norte
(for those traveling east) and Realejo were far from depend

able.

One solution to the arduousness of this passage which
would later be implemented was the employment of river and
lake steamers for the water portions of the journey, and a
shorter and more dependable route from Lake Nicaragua to the
4Peter F. Stout , Nicaragua: Past, Present and Future
(Philadelphia : J. E. Potter, 1859), 19.
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Pacific for the land leg.

Another intriguing and more

. challenging solution was the construction of a trans i �thmian
canal connecting the Caribbean · and the Pacific, which would

permit pas sengers to travel from the east ·coast of the United
States to the west coast without debarking .

Planners antici-

· pated that the canal would employ the San Juan River or its

trough, Lake Nicaragua, and a channel which would be cut at
some point between the lake and the Pacific Ocean.

Original

expectations were that the canal's western terminus would be
Realejo, perhaps because Lake Managua, north of Lake Nicaraqua , could be used to s horten the distance, and because this
was the traditional outlet for Nicaragua to the Pacific .

One

major i�pediment was the neces sity of constructing a number of
locks in order to utilize Lake Nicaragua.

The lake level was

128 feet above sea level, while Lake Managua wa s 1 5 6 feet, 5
thus entailing the construction of at least one lock between
the two lakes. By comparison , · it s hould be observed that Lake
,
Gatun, created in the early part of the twentieth century by
the impoundment o f the Chagres River to provide a c hannel for

the Panama Canal, rises only eighty-five feet above sea

leve1 6 and requires three locks to ascend there from either
sea.
Selection of a route and contracting with the s tate of
5Folkman, Nicaragua Route, frontispiece map drawn by
E. G. Squier.
6The Panama Canal, 5 0th Anniversar
The Panama Canal Company, 19 6 4 , 69.

1914 -64 { Panama :
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Nicaragua to build a canal , with the necessary financing and
technology , were not the only problems faced by prospective
transportation magnates .

A diplomatJ c· impasse , long brewing

in that region o f the Isthmus , made Louis Napoleon's allusion
to the special British interest quite prophetic .

A major

portion o f thi s problem could be attributed to one man , the
British consul-general in Central America , Federic k
Chatfield , who had arrived in Central America in 1 8 34 like
a human hurr i c ane , determined to ensure that British interest
in trade--and perhaps territory--would predominate in that
area .

For the next seventeen years , Chatfield was the domi

nant foreigner in Central Ameri ca , and so highhanded and
overbearing were his tactics that a Salvadoran newspaper was
moved to complain :
The ravages of smallpox , cho lera , civil war , tyranny ,
barbarism . . •
all these pass away . • • • But
there is an evil � horrible and interminable , there is
a living curse whic h corrodes the vitals o f Central
America--and that is Chatfield , the eternal
of
· Agent
·
Engl and. 7
Although Chatfield wa s unpopular in some quarters o f

Central Arrierica--and in Britain- -he was nonetheless · ef fective .

Lord Palmerston , who was British Foreign Secretary for

thirteen o f Chat field's seventeen years in C entral America ,
appeared on many occasions to allow his consul suf fic ient
rein virtually to set British foreign policy for that area .
7 cyril Hamshere , The British in the Caribbean (London :
Weidenfeld a nd Nicolson , 1 97 2) , 177.
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The two men were s imi lar in their thinking with respect to
the leverage Briti sh imperia li sm should a s sume in newly
developing a rea s .

The Roya l Navy wa.s directed to make shows

of force at Caribbean or Pac ific ports at Chatfield's
behes t, in order " to protect British nationa l s from inter

ference in their comrnerci al exploits . n 8

Chatfield's grand des ign , initi ally encouraged and
endorsed by Pa lmerston , wa s Briti s h control of the I sthmus
of Central Americ a by superv is ion of the Mos quito Territory
on the �aribbean coa sts of Nic aragua , Costa Rica , and
Hondura s , and by occupation of i slands and ports in the Gulf
of Fon sec a , shared by El S alvador , Honduras , and . Nicaragua.
Thi s s cheme implied Briti sh control of at lea st one of the
anticipated termini of the " inevitable " canal , S an Juan del

Norte , and perhaps the others . 9
8 Ibid .

9 There seems to be some confus ion over the location of
Reale j o. One author states , " [ Chatfield] pointed out to Lord
Palmerston that the ports of Rea lej o and La Union , both in
the Gulf of Fonsec a , were the most valuable ones between Peru
and California. The former was the logical terminus of any
interoceanic pas sageway through Nicaragua . • • . " M ario
Rodrfque z , A Palmers tonian D iplomat in Central Americ a
(Tuc son : The University of Arizona Pre s s , 19 64) , 282 . Another
identifies Realejo , the terminus of the early land trans it
route and of the proi ected canal as the pre sent-day Cor into ,
whi ch i s about fifty miles south of the Bav of Fonseca on the
Nicaraguan coast . Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 5 . Squier ' s map
also puts Reale j o there. Rodri'gue z ' s map calls the place
Cortina (perhaps a mi sprint ) and does not have Reale j o.
Willi am Walker also places Realei o · at the s i te of the present
port of Corinto , when he refers to · the proxi mity of the i sland
of Cardon . William Wa lker , The War in Nicaragua · ( Detroit :
Blaine Ethridge , 19 7 1 ( 18 6 0 ] ) , 36.
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Chatfield ' s opposition to Yankee expans ion, particularly
after the amicable settlement of the Oregon question and the
Mexican War , final ly affected Whi tehal l .

The Bri tish occupied

the Mosquito Coast early in 1 8 4 8 and quickly extended the "bound
ary of Mosquito n down to the Colorado River, effectively control
l ing the three mouths of the San Juan River .

They thus shut off

any Caribbea n outlet for a Nicaraguan canal not under British
control.

The British consul in New York, trying to interest

American capi ta l in a British-bui lt canal, asserted, " From Machuca
Rapids, . about 3 0 mi les below Lake Nicaragua, to the mouth of the
S t . John, the navigation of that river belongs to Mosquito . 11 1 0
Understandably, a degree of concern about British encroach
ment in the I s thmus was mounting in Washington .

During the Mexi

can War, · President Pol_k had appointed Eli jah Hise as charge d ' af
faires in Guatemala , instructing him to try to bring about a
union of Central American states in order to resi:3 t the further
He

incorporation of the area as a British sphere of influence.

was also to report on British activity , and to negotiate treaties
·

of friendship and commerce with the independent states . 1 1

When

Palmerston and Chatfield learned of Ilise ' s mi ssion , they were de
termined to undermine and thwart it .

Chatfield observed, " It

wi l l I think be necessary to take a high hand with the North Ameri .

.

cans, if we are to hold our ground in Central America .
l O M i' l es P . . DuVal, Jr .
' . z to
, Cadi
Cathay ( Palo Alto :
Stanford University Press, 1940 ) , 5 1.
11 Ibid .
12 Rodr igue z, Palm.erstonian Diplom at, 2 9 5 .

,, 1 2
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Pa lmerston's instructions to his consul were to defeat the
United States' policy " as far · as its .ob j ect is hostile to the
. . ,, 1 3
.
interests o f Great Britain.
Upon Hise's arrival in October,
1 8 4 8, he found considerable political confusion due to the e f14
.
agents to fornent di. sruption.
forts of British
. .
Probab ly the ma j or reason the United States did not take
more vigorous action and con front the Bri tish occupation of
Mosquito with the Monroe Doctrine was that Washington hes itated
as the Centra l American states were doing little for themselve s.
They seemed intent upon allowing their patrimony to be nibb led
away by the British lion while b�ing preoccupied with internal
dis sension and civil war .

Nevertheless , Hise fel t that it was

neces sary to negotiate quickly a treaty with Nica ragua to b lock
the British ef fo rts to contro l the canal route, and he forthwi th
asked permission o f the Department of State to execute the agree
ment.

Despite the lack of formal approval he negotiated the

Hise-Selva Treaty in accordance with Po lk administration policies,
15
signing i t on May 3 1, 1 8 49.
Providing for a right of way for a canal , road, or ra i lroad
in perpetuity, the treaty permitted fortifications and guaranteed
the integrity of Nicaragua .

Both Hise and his treaty were repu

diated by the les s expansionist- �inded administration of Polk ' s

succes sor, Zachary Taylor, and Hise was replaced by Ephraim George
Squier.

Wi th the arrival of Squier on June 6, 1 849, the battle

for hegemony in Central America between America and Britain was
1 3 Ibid .
-1 4 DuVa
l , CAd i z to Cathay, 5 2 .
l S I b id . , 5 3 .
.
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under way.

The main problems for Squier to solve were which

of the ma j or powers would supervise the area a s a sphere o f in
fluence , along with the capitalists and filibusters from the

competing· nations , and how much the respective governments could
and should back the claims o f their citizens. 16
Secretary of State John M. · Clayton ' s , ins tructions included
an account of the history of the British claim · to · Mo squito , as
well as the recent events and current situation , pointing out that
Lake Nic�ragua was the key to the passage to the Pacific .

In

treaty negotiations , Squier could as sure the Nicaraguans that
the United State s government would use all moral means to dis
lodge the British from Mosquito .

Squier was further directed to

help acquire a canal contract for American entrepreneurs approved
by the Nicaraguan government .

He wa s not , however , to guarantee

the independence of the territory of Nicaragua.

The ma j or thrust

o f the canal negotiations should be equality o f transit for all :
" Our ob j ect is as honest a s it is clearly avowed , to claim no
peculiar privilege , no exclusive right , no monopoly of commercial
intercourse , but to see that the work i s dedicated to the benefit

of mankind. " 1 7 .

The problem of securing a treaty favorable to and supporting
a canal contract was not Nicaraguan intransigence.

I f anything ,

the Nicaraguans were even more anxious than the American s to see
16

2 7/98 .
17

clayton to Squier , May 1 ,
Ibi�. , M 77 , 2 7/ 6 4 .

1

8 49 , National Archive s , M 7 7 ,
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the great dream brought to fruition.

Their ma j or concern was

that the transit should benefit Nicaragua a�d not redound ex
clusive ly to the benefit of a foreign power or company.

Early

in 1 849 , Nicaragua had rushed into a contract with Gordon's
Pass enger Line of New York for the navigation of the San Juan
River and for making a road across the I sthmus from Lake Nicaragua to Realejo.

.

,·

The peculiar situation in which the Secretary

of State found himself in trying to remain disintere sted wa s
demonstrated by the fact that he hims elf had to caution the com
pany thr-o ugh his consul.

British intere sts had complained to

Washington that the contract cal led for the company to have the
privilege of maintaining four customs hous e s , a provision which
would have conflicted with a contract for a loan made in 1 8 2 6 by
a British banking firm , the Hous e of Barclay , Henning

&

Co . , to

the late government of Central America , by which the customs
hous e revenues of that !�pub lic were pledged for the . s ecuring of
the loan .

Clayton suggested that a stipulation in the contract

should provide for the a ssumption of a part of the payment of
the loan.
•

However , it seems that the customs question faded
I

I

during the subsequent wrangling over trans it contracts.

18

The customs house issue became moot when the Gordon contract
was abandoned or lost by default.

The river s teamer sent by the

company proved defective , and pass engers and crew were compel led
to navigate upstream and through the rapids on the San Juan River
by polin g and paddling any s erviceab le craft they could obtain . 1 9
1 8 Ibid . , June 1 9 , · 1 8 4 9 , National Archives , M77 , 27/97 .
19 Folkman , Nicaragu a Ro�e , · 5
•.
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The Gordon fiascd provided an opening for Cornelius Vanderbilt,
a giant among transportation magnates , to obtain a charter from
the Nicaraguan government for the transis thmian transit .

Along

with associates Joseph L . White and Nathaniel H . Wolfe, Vander
bilt organized the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com
pany, on whose behalf the contract was signed on August 26, 1 8 4 9.
The agreement granted to the company the exc lusive privilege of
constructing a ship canal acros s Nicaragua .

The company agreed

that the canal would be open to the transit of ves se l s of al l
nations,- sub j ect to fixed and uniform tol ls.

The immediate bene

fits to Nicaragua would be an initial payment of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 by the
company, and a similar amount yearly thereafter until co�p letion
of the canal .

In addition, Nicaragua was to receive $ 2 0 0, 0 0 0

worth of stock in the enterprise , and ten percent of the net pro
fits of any route which the company might establish.

In the rnean

time, in order to begin_ competing immediately in a realistic
fashion with the Panama route, the company could in stal l river
and lake steamers, plus a carriage route for the Lake Nicaragua�
Pacific portion .

Final ly, in the event the construction of the

canal prov&d to be unfea s ible or impos sible for engineering or
other reasons , the company was committed to building a railroad
acro s s the I sthmus , or a rail and carriage route which would in

corporate the utilitarian aspects of the existing water transit. 20
While these negoti&tions were in progre s s, Squier was en
gaged in trying to negotiate a binational treaty that would
2 Orb id. , 1 8 .
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provide official protection for the American entrepreneur s.
He continually found himself frustrated by British intrigue and
diplomatic maneuvering , and felt that these problems were not
For this reason ,

fully understood and appreciated in Washington.

Squier proceeded to negotiate a pact which provided for the neu
trality of the canal , as the Department· of State had directed ,
b ut also conceded a guarantee of Nicaraguan independence , which
Clayton had specifically forbidden him to do.

This latter in

fraction was one of the reasons for Washington's rej ection of
the agreement.

The other was that the treaty had only a twenty

year duration , whereas the construction contract called for
eighty-five years , and Squier's agreement was sub j ect to ·�nnul
ment by either party on twe J ve mon ths noti�P- .

In h i s meR s � ge

of rej ection , Clayton advised Squier that more instructions
would be forthcoming after the settlement of a treaty with the
0

I

I

Briti s h to d i s 1 o d ge them from the Mosquito Territory.
0

I

But Squier was s till on the move.

21

He negotiated another

treaty , this time with Honduras , in which that state agreed to
cede Tigre Island in the Bay of Fonseca to the United States for
eighteen months and to permit a naval station. on the Gulf of
Fonseca for the protection o f the Pacific end o f the canal.
When the British received news of the Honduran treaty , Captain
T. A. Paynter , on the advice of Chatfield , appeared at Tigre
Island with a squadron on October 1 6 , 1 8 49.

He seized the island

and raised the British flag , thereby establishing British power
21clayton to Squier , November 20 , 1850 , National Archives , M77 , 27/101.
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on both sides of the Isthmus and presumably at the terminal points
of the proposed canal.

After Squier'� prot�st that they were oc

cupying United States territory was ignored by the B ritish, the
American diplomat issued an ultimatum threatening to use American
force if the island were not evacuated within six days ; the British
.
22
backed down and withdrew.
Al though the Uni·ted 'S tates never subsequently implemented the terms of the Squier treaty , this was
probably the closest that the two nations came to armed hostili
ties during the protracted conflict over transit and hegemony on
the Isthmus .
A welcome note of harmony was introduced when the United
States Minister to Great Britain , Abbott Lawrence , addressed on
December 1 4 , 1 8 4 9 , an eloquent appeal to Lord Palmerston. 2 3 A
canal built by " the two greatest conunercial nations on earth , "
Lawrence said , would " perpetuate peace between Great Britain and
the United States. "
It is our mission to extend commerce , the pioneer of
civilization and child of peace , to al l parts of the
world , to cultivate friendly relations with all , to
bring the distant near ; and to illustrate by our ex
ample the elevating effects of Christianity.
The canal would be " given up to the use of the world , dedicated
to peace, and [would bring ] incalcul�ble benefits to mankind. "
The two countries should invite all nations to j oin in guarantee
ing the canal's neutrality to avoid . the possibility of future
friction
2 2 ouVal , Cadiz to Cathay , 5 5.
2 3 Ibid. , . 5 9 .
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To a large d.e gree , this mes sage prompted Palmerston to

instruct Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer ,

British Minister in Wash

ington , to work out a satis factory agreement with Secretary
Clayton .

Clayton , who was taking time out from a distingu

ished senatorial career to s erve as Secretary o f State in the
truncated administration of Zachary Taylor, was a commercial
expansionist , but not an imperialist .

In the Senate , he had

opposed the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War , and he
did not intend to see American sovereignty extended any furthe r
while h� was the nation's chie f diplomatic o f ficer .

As a result ,

he ran counter to the tides o f Manifest Destiny that were sweep
ing the nation .

Although he regarded . the treaty he signed with

Bulwer on April 1 9 , 19 5 0 , as the crowning achievement o f his political career , it was probab ly "the most . persistently unpopular
treaty "

24

in American history because o f the constraints it im-

posed upon American activity in Central America .

Clayton was

almost_ euphoric in his des cription to Sequier o f what the treat�{

was designed to do . 2 5

The ob j ect i s to secure the protection o f the Briti sh
Government to the Nicaragua Canal and to l iberate Cen
tral America f,rom the dominion of any foreign power
. • . • [ It wil l ] secure the pas sage across the I sthmus and any and every other practicable· pas sage whether
by Canal or Railway at Tehuantepec , Panama · or elsewhe re
• . . • Al l other nations that shal l navigate the Gana!
wil l have to become guaranto rs of Central America and
the Mosquito Coast . • • . The agreement is not to erect
or maintain any fort i fication commanding the canal or in
24

Alexander de Conde , "John M . Clayton , 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 5 6 , " Ency
c lopa�dia Britannica , V { Chicago : Encyclopaedia Britannica ,
Inc . , 19 7 0 ) , 8 9 3 .
2 5 Clayton to Squier , May 7 , 1850 , National Archives, M77 , 27/104 .
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the vicinity· thereo f nor to occupy , forti fy , colon i z e or
assume , or exercise any dominion whatever over any part
of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or Central
America, nor to make us e of any protection or all iance
for any of those purpo ses .
Clayton then addres s ed himse l f to the effect the treaty should
haveon Britain's Mo squito Protectorate.

Warming to hi s sub j ect,
.

the Secretary betrayed a startling ingenuousnes s and an interest·)�,

ing ins ight into the attitude o { the American government towards
its own indigenous population.
I trust that means wil l speedily be adopted by Great
Britain to extinguish the Indian title • • • • We
have never acknowledged • • • the exis tence of any
c laim o f sovereignty in the Mosquito King or any other
Indian in America . To do so would be to deny the title
of the United State s to our own territory . Having al
ways regarded an Indian title as a mere right of occµ
pancy, we can never agree that such a title should b e ·
treated otherwi se than a s a thing to be extingui shed
at the wi ll of the discoverer of the country.
Following the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, the Ameri can Atlantic
and Pacific Ship Canal Company made preliminary plans for carry
ing out the requirements o f their contract with Nicaragua.

The

company sent retired Colonel Orvi lle W. Chi l ds to make the canal
survey acro s s the I sthmus in Nicaragua .

Starting work in August ,

185 0, he completed hi s report in March, 1 8 5 2, a fter a thorough
investigation and systematic elimination of undes irable routes .
Child s' recommendation adopted the fami liar route via the San Juan
River and . Lake Nicaragua, but deviated from the traditional version

· on the Pac i fic s ide by selecting Brito as the best terminus .

The

Caribbean s ide would have twelve locks, with thirteen on the Paci
fic s lope .

The · cost .was estimated at $ 31,5 38, 3 19 and the time
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for completion at· six years.

The Childs report , which was pre

· sented to President Millard Fil lmore ,· was checked by two United
States Army engineers and found to be feasible. 26
The report showed that a canal was technical ly and finan
cially practicab le , but the siz e was an unresolv�d question .

It

was to be seventeen feet deep , fifty feet wide at the bottom , and
27
1 1 8 feet wide at the top.
The fact that it would not meet the
specifications in the charter accommodating vessels of a l l siz es
was brushed aside by Vanderbilt .
financiers of the
be more difficult .

Unfortunately , convincing British

feasibility of a limited-use canal proved to
I n the early summer of 1 8 5 2 , Vanderbilt com

missioned Childs to present his report to British enginee�s and
Londo� capitalists .

The engineers appointed by the British gov

ernment approved the report , but those retained by the British
banking firm of Baring Brothers were less sanguine.

The latter

examination prompted th� London firms to demur from financing
the pro j ect .

They pointed out that while great advantage would

accrue to the United States from such . a pro j ect , the limited siz e
of the proposed canal would prevent nearly two-thirds o f the East
I ndian and western American trade--the only trade in which the
canal would prove serviceable to Europe--from passing through the
canal .

Also , the Orient trade would probably opt to continue us-

: ing the route around Africa as the distance was 1 , 500 miles shorter .
In addition , the original plan for the Sue z Canal had been drawn
26 nuVal , Cadiz to· Cathay , 6 7 .
2 7 The original locks of the Panama Canal could accommodate
ships 1 1 0 feet wide and drawing forty feet in salt water .
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up in 1 8 4 6, and tne pos sibility of this_ route would be far more
attractive to British shippers .

Finally, the heavy tol l of three

dol lars a ton proposed for passage would probably discourage even
ships o f the proper size from using the Nicaraguan canal .

On a

ve s se l of 1, 0 0 0 tons, the tol l would be $ 3, 0 0 0 --more than the
average earnings o f such ves sel-s · on their voyage s.

Increasing

the size of the proposed canal to accommodate all ves sels would
swel l the cost to about $ 1 0 0, 0 0 0,0 0 0, a sum b eyond the private
capabilities of

any

one country .

As Vanderbilt and his associates

felt they could not finance the construction alone, they were
forced to abandon the pro j ect . 2 8 .
In the meantime � however, Vanderbilt had proceeded with
estab lishing an interim water and land route which ultimately
became the only route .

The traditional route on the Paci fic

side had b een from Granada to Reale j o, employing the only servi
ceable road between the . lake and the ocean.

Some Americans,

early arrival s who hoped to get in on the ground floor of what
they expected to be a bonanza, had already begun establishing
busines ses along this route.

Several had married natives and

had settled in to await inevitable prosperity .

Thes e men were

sub s equently disappointed when the lake-ocean route was changed,
and buildings and businesses were abandoned at a great los s.
The British vice- consul at Reale j o reported in December,
1 8 5 0, that the Nicaraguans treated the pas s engers going through
quite well, probably because those from California, particularly,
2 8 Fo lkman, Nicaragua Route, 3 5 . 3 6 .
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spent liberally .

The Nicaraguans e specially needed forebear

ance becaus e the Americans were a "turbulent set o f peop l e
interspersed , here and there , with some o f the most violent
characters on earth . ". The commentator noted that the least

re spectab le probably used the route as it was much cheaper than
the Panamanian alternative.

He then de scribed the rest o f the

j ourney , acros s the lake by schooners because the transit company
had been unab le to get lake steamers up the rapids , and by bun
gos down the river .

Viewing the difficultie s and hardships o f

this trek , h e was l e s s than complimentary in his remarks about
the transit company leadership . 2 9
The New York Company must have been much mis led and
ill-informed by their agents in this country ; American
enterpri ze and their great experience in River Steam
Navigation are so prominent , that one is astoni shed at
their want of foresight in almost everything re lating
to this undertaking , as we ll in competent persons to
direct, as in materials and money.
· The vice-cons ul was equal ly indignant in his as ses sment o f

the Nicaraguan government :

Amidst al l the excitement , · the - government appears the
only party who doe s not enter into the American spirit
of go-aheadism. It gives not the least attention to
matters of the mo st vital importance to its we lfare and
improvement , but squanders its time and money in idle
disruptions and intrigues ; whi l st its Finances are in
the mo st s erious condition ; and in its blind compliance
to certain partie s at the commencement of the California
tra ffic , omitted to obtain the s lighte s t privilege to im
prove its revenues . 3 0
2 9 John Fo ster to Chatfield , December 3 1 , 1 8 5 0 . Fo ster made
his report availab le to U. S . Navy _ Commander Will iam L. Hudson , who
forwarded it on June 1 4 , 1 8 5 1 , to Navy Secretary Wi l liam P:.. . Graham.
National Archives , Tl52 , 1/19-26 . Foster ' s report was out.dated by the time it .
reached Chatfield ' s hands , and certainly so by the time Gran.am received it .
30Ibid .
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The s ituation pictured in the latter obs ervation would

continue to exi s t throughout the life · of thi s transisthmian
s ervice .

American financiers put tog�ther a serviceable and

imaginative route, engaged in internecine s trife over the con
trol of the enterprise, and then watched the route deteriorate
in s truggles with American

filibus ters ,

and all without re fer

ence to the native Nic araguan government.
With respect to the vice-consul ' s views on the route it
s e l f, prob lem solving had already begun when he submitted hi s
report.

A lake s teamer was winched pas t the wor s t of the San

Juan River rapids in November , 1 8 5 0 , and immediately went into
service .

A series of small river s teamers were introduced to

ply between the rapids , though p a s s engers continued to di s em
bark to make the j ourney on foot around the se catarac ts.

Later ,

a smal l ra ilroad was bui lt to carry the pas s engers and their
bagg�ge around Castillo Vie jo, the largest o f the river rapids .
Vanderbil t himse l f went down to oversee ·the progres s in January,
1 8 5 1.

Under his dire ction , a new l ake-oc ean route was laid out

which would utili ze the shorte s t distance between the two points.
From Virgiri Bay on the lake , to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific,
the dis tance wa s only twelve mi les, but fores t and undergrowth
had to be cleared to provide for pas s age o f oxen and mule-driven
carts. 3 1
3 1 Fo lkman , Nicaragua Route , 2 6.
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Located just a few mile s south o f Brito , t�e site selec ted
by the canal engineers for the Pacific terminus , San Juan del
Sur had been an overlooked j ewel on Nicaragua's Pacific coast .
The · entrance to the bay was guarded by towering cliffs , .and
though the tides were sometimes tricky , all the port needed were
wharves and s ervice areas ·. · ''T he port , probably because o f its
isolation , had been rarely us ed previously .

American ships cal

ling there had amounted to no more than four small brigs or
s chooners a year . 3 2

The service point on the Caribbean side

was located at Punta Arenas , the sand pit which formed the bay
o f San Juan del Norte , and acros s from the town o f San Juan del
Norte or Greytown , as the British called it.

The selectiop o f

these. sites completed the initial transit route des ign .

The

first east-to-we st transit over the new route was made on August
30

, 1 8 5 1. 3 3
In that same month , Vanderbilt turned his attention to a

reorganization scheme for his company .

A new corporate person

ality , the Accessory Transit Company , , was grafted onto the ex
isting organization , the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal
Company .

The A . T . C . would have the respon sibi lity for carrying

pas sengers across the I sthmus , while the Canal Company woul.d con
cern itself s olely with the construction of the canal ( the plan
. had not yet been abandoned) .

Finally , the Vanderbilt Line , a

3 2 Francis V . Clark ( commercial agent at San Juan del Sur)
to James Buchanan ( Secretary of State ) , September 8 , 1 847 , Tl5 2 ,
1/1 .
3 3 Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 3 2 .
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company operating· ocean steamers , . would carry pas sengers be
tween ports in the United States and ·ports qn the Isthmus. 3 4
Before Vanderbilt could turn his entire attention to the
transit pro j ect , he had to face the problem o f the prior British
presence.

Although there would later be disagreements between

Washington and London over .whethe·r or not the C layton-Bulwar
Treaty was retrospective in application , particularly with re
spect to British occupation of the Mosquito Coast , Lord Palmer
ston seemed initial ly to be conscientious ly trying to live up
to the spirit of the accord.

The two countrie s had agreed

j ointly to support Vanderbilt's · company in its e fforts to con

struct a transit route through Nicaragua.

In keeping with this

commitment , the Foreign Secretary had encouraged British bankers
to we lcome Vanderbilt ' s request for financial support , and had
promised the company that the authorities at Greytown would not
interfere with transit construction.

One o f the provisions o f

the agreement was the establishment o f free ports a t the termini
of the pas sageway across the Isthmus.

For this reason , Palmer

ston vetoed Chatfie ld ' s tariff schedule and made Greytown a free
port.

Unfortunately , this left Greytown without revenue for its

garrison , so the citiz ens organiz ed _a municipality and began
charging minor port fees .

As fate would intervene , on November 21 ,

185 1 , the first ocean steamer to confront the new levie s , the
Prometheus , had carried Cornelius Vanderbil t on board. Vanderbilt
ob j ected saying that these fees violated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
3 4 Ibid. , 3 3.
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and Lord Palmerston ' s assurances.

But when the British war

ship Express, designated to enforc e · the municipal regulations,
fired across the bow of the Prometheus, Vanderbilt paid under
protest.

Subsequently, he complained to the State Department,

and they referred the protest to the Foreign Of fice.

On January

1 1, 1852, the British government disavowed the action and apolo· gized .

Repercussions were far-reaching, however, as Palmerston

had resigned a month earlier, and Chatfield was recalled a few
weeks later . 35 The only other maj or problem that Vanderbilt ' s
company �incurred with Greytown was the one which had resulted in
the bombardment of the town by the American sloop-of-war Cyane
Jos eph L. White, a· director of the Accessory
' 1'
d in
' that 1nc1
' . d ent. 3 6
Transi' t C ompany, was 1.mp_1ca.te

on July 1 3, 1854.

One other diplomatic issue remained with respect to the
transit route between Lake Nicaragua and the Caribbean , the
long-standing claim of Costa Rica to the south bank of the San
Juan River.

Apparently, at one time or another the transit com

pany had entertained the idea of damming the Colorado River, the
southern-most distributary of the San Juan, at its j uncture with
the San Juan.

Originally, this plan would have formed part of

the canal-and-locks proj ect.

Later, it was probably anticipated

that this diversion would insure that the major f low of the San
Juan would exit by the northern-most mouth, at San Juan del Norte.
35Mario Rodrigue z, Central America ( Englewood Clif fs, N. J. :
Prentice-Hal l, 19 6 5 ) , 87 , 88 .
3 6 Henry L . Kinney, " Pronunciamento, " New York Weekly Post,
September 6, 1855.
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Thi s control of water flow would not only facil�tate navigation over the San Juan River rapids, but would s erve to alle
viate silting conditions in the Bay of San Juan.

Felipe Molina,

the Costa Rican minister to Washington , wrote a letter to the
transit company president and other officers objecting to the
plan, and forwarded a copy to the State Department .

In addition ,

Molina alleged abuses of Co sta Rican sovereignty at Punta Arenas
(acros s the bay from San Juan del Norte ) and at Castillo Viejo.
He contended that the se points were entirely within Costa Rican
territory , and that Costa Rica had granted the canal conces sion
to a competing American firm , the Costa Rican Transit Company.
Molina called on the United States government to guarante� Costa
Rican interests.

The State Department advised him that adhe rence

to his request was impos sible.

The United States , it replied ,

protected American companies and citizens equally , but had no
warrant to protect the territorial integrity of another state ,
that being . the state's own responsibility.

If Costa Rica could

show that the transit company was clearly in the wrong , and could

"legally claim and maintain" its title against the transit com

pany , the United States would not interfere. 3 ?

Under the cir

cumstances , Molina was faced with a fait accompli , at least for
the time being.
Except for the problems associated with the j uridical status
of the British protectorate of the Mos quito littoral and the
Costa Rican claim , the transition to a major transisthmian route
3 7 Molina to Marcy, November 14, 1854, National Archives, M99 , 10/69.
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at San Juan del Norte was made with relative ly few imp ediments.
The story was different on the Pacific side at S an Juan del Sur.
There the transformation from a sleepy fishing vill age to a ma j or
terminal caused serious dislocations , many of the m the results
of interference by local Nicaraguan officials who had no in
structions or con flicting ones from their government.

The Ameri

can consul at San Juan del Sur seemed most distressed at the
workload the confusion gave him , and compl ained to the Department
of State in January , 18 5 2 .
I am now too ol d to endure a l l that I have
here-- and God knows--I have gone thru more
been here than a l l the rest of my life put
For I do not much admire the idea of dying
dog--and I am now rather too poor to leave
thing e lse in view , while I do stay I wil l
do my duty if Providence spares mv life . 3 8

gone thru
since I have
together .
here like a
without so�e
endeavor to

The major early problem at S an Juan d e l Sur , and on the en
tire East Coast-San Francisco transit , was one of numbers .

The

avarice of Vanderbilt combined with the pressure o f masses w ant
ing to make the journey placed an overload on the system.

One of

the p assengers angrily inquired of the State Department if
it is not time that the government should pass an act
of Congress restricting the proprietors of California
steamers from crowding their ve ssels with human souls
without comfort or proper accommodations . . • . A
conunercial agent should be appointed forthwith at San
Juan del Sur to compel Vanderbilt to show mercy and
j ustice to emigrants . 3 9
38w. F . Boone to Danie l Webster ( Secretary o f State) , Janu
ary 13 , 18 5 2 , Nationa l Archives , ' T15 2 , 1/17 , 18 . Boone seemed
to experience difficulties in finding his proper geographical
niche. He was original ly named to Reale j o , but when the transit
company se lected San Juan del Sur as the terminal site , he re
quested _that the Sta te Department station him there , and give

-1 7 9

Meanwhile , according to one authority , Vanderbi�t was pocket
ing a sizab le fortune through manipulation of rate s ; after two
years of transit company operations , nearly two mil lion dol lars
--virtually . the entire earnings of the steamships--had found
their way into the Commodore ' s coffers . 40
On February 14 , 1 8 5 3 , Vanderbilt sold his interes t in the
transisthmian pas sage to the Acces sory Transit Company directors
in preparation for a long-awaited European cruis e.

Unfortunately

for Vanderbilt , his legacy of busine s s acumen and ruthlessnes s
fe l l on two former col leagues :

Charle s Morgan , company manager

in New York , and Cornelius K. Garrison , Morgan ' s counterpart in
San Francis co.

Morgan and Garrison manipulated the company stock

him the re sponsibilities of commercial agent for all of Nica
ragua ' s Pacific coast. I f this could not be arranged , he sug
gested to the Department that it find him another s uitab le port ;
perhaps Antwerp. Boone to Web ster , August 3 1 , 1 8 5 1 , National
Archives , T l 5 2 , 1/2 9 . After his complaint about San Juan del
Sur , he requested trans fer to San Juan del Norte . Sub sequently ,
he changed his mind when he heard that both climate and emolu- ·
ments were worse at the latter place , but unfortunately , the
Department had already is s ued the directive for his trans fer
and for the appointment of Loomis L. White as consul at San Juan
del Sur . Boone to Web ster , April 1 6 , 1 8 5 2 , ibid . , 1/6 7 . White
was not particularly popular among American transients at the
Pacific port. One pas seng er complained to the State Department
that White was buying tickets of dead pas sengers and s el ling
them at doub le the price to live ones. Bernard O. Kane to
ibid . ,
Edward Everett ( Secretary of State ) , January 2 6 , 18 5 3 , -1/ 8 4 .
3 9 Ibi d .

40 Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 54 , 5 5.
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on the New York exchange to gain complete control o f the Board
of Directors .

After Morgan was elected president of the Acces

s ory Transit Company on July 18 , the company charged Vanderbilt
with indebtednes s to the company and suspended further payments

on the purchase contract. 4 1

When Vanderbilt returned · : 'f roni Europe in September and learned

what had transpired , he promised to "ruin " the Morgan and Garrison
fac tion for "cheatin g " him .

His first move was to estab lish a

competing line using the Panama route , and in a short time , both
the Mail S teamship Company and Morgan and Garrison were compel led
to buy him out .

Part o f the agreement was that Vanderbilt pledged

himse l f not to open any more competing lines .

The contract , how

ever , did not provide for the ces sation o f his ef forts to regain
control o f the Accessory Transit Company , which he continued

attempting to do . 4 2

Despite preoccupation with the Vanderbilt challenge , the
company under Morgan and Garrison proceeded apace with improve
ments to the transit route acros s the I s thmus.

Wharves were built

at Virgin Bay , the lake por t , and at San Juan del Sur , along with
a macadamized · carriage road between the two points .

New carriages

arrived in �ebruary , 1 8 5 4 , and the caravan of twenty-five carri

ages painted in the Nicaraguan colors o f b lue and white was an
impres sive sight as wel l as a luxury to the transients.

In addi

tion , by the spring o f 185 5 , new lake s teamers with s leeping quar
ters and dining facilities had been introduced.
41Ibid . , 48.
42 lhid . , 56 ..

By then , the
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pas s age from New York to San Francisco had been reduced to
· twenty-one days, with only twenty-one· and one-half hours of
that time required for transit acro s s the I sthmus.

In 1 8 54

alone, over 1 3,0 0 0 pas sengers made the trip, 4 3 and by early
1 8 5 5, ·the number was stil l rising.

The government of Nicaragua was also aware of the succe s s
o f the enterprise, and began to wonder officially what had
happened to its share of the profits .

The transit company had

unfailingly submitted the $ 1 0, 0 0 0 annual payment, but · had j us t
as unfailingly reneged o n the ten percent o f the profits that
the contract anticipated .

The company claimed that there were

no profits, that al l income from the transisthmian route pad been
reinv�sted in improvements on the line .

The Nicaraguan govern

ment maintained that either there � profits, or the company
had charged low rates through Nicaragua and high rates on the
ocean to keep the profi�s down . 44 At any rate, the government
•

<·

sent two inexperienced agents to New York in June, 1 8 5 5, to nego
tiate with the company regarding the �mount that the company al
legedly owed N icaragua .

I n a tacit admis sion that the percentage

had, in fact, been il legally withhe ld, the company bickered over
the amount, not the question itself.

Eventual ly, the matter was

referred to specially selected commis sioners to arbitrate, a move
which was in accord with the provisions of the contract.

It was

at this point that the filibuster Wil liam Walker arrived on the
43 Ibid . , 5 7- 5 9.
44New York Herald, March 3 1 � 1 8 5 6 .

s cene in Nicaragua , and both the negotiations and the arbitra
tion were subvertea. 4 5
Walker and a number of men he recruited in the San Francisco
area had been hired in June , 1 8 5 4 , as auxiliaries by the liberal
faction in Nicaragua ' s civil war.

His ambitions , however , were

far more grandio se than those · of ··1nere·1y· helping weigh the con
flict toward one of the competing sides.

Though historians are

not in complete agreement about Walker ' s initial intentions , it
appears that he p lanned from the very beginning to parley his
role into mastery of Nicaragua and , subsequently , to establish a
s uper state in Central America and the Caribbean.

The transit

route would necessarily play a maj or role in these plans , and it
would be largely responsib le for . his early succe ss , as well as
ultimately the cause of the demise of his pro j ect.
Walker arranged with the liberal faction to have his Ameri
can filibusters , along with a contingent of native auxiliaries ,
formed into a separate military unit , the American Phalanx.
Rather than continue the liberal army strategy of frontal assaults
on the conservative capital of Granada , Walker made his initial
thrusts at the transit route , some seventy-five miles south of
Granada .

The primary reason for this strategy was that Walker

realized it would be neces sary for him to control the route and
provide for continuing reinforcements from the United States if
his overall plan of conquest was to be succes sful .
duced an unexpected and significant benefit :
45 scioggs , Filibusters , 1 3 6.

The move pro

the conservative
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army moved south ·out of Granada to intercept the anticipated
filib uster march toward the capital .

This manuever left Gra

nada virtual ly undefended, and Walker commandeered a transit
company lake steamer to transport his troops north for an at
tack on the city.

By October 1 3, Walker and his Phalanx were

in control o f the capital, · .and ·the,reafter used the families
o f the con servative leaders as hostages to bring his opponents
to terms .

The res ult was that, for the next year and a half,

Wil liam Walker was the de facto chief of Nicaragua .
In the meantime, although Morgan and Garrison were re
.
peating the Vanderbilt story of manipulating the company for
personal gain, their control appeared to b e s lipping .

Vanderbilt

had obtained an inj unction against the is s uance of more stock
and against further contracts . between the company and Morgan
and Garrison .

This inj unction, plus reports of renewed ho sti

l ities in Nicaragua, caused the company ' s stock to decline
severely .

Vanderbilt and his friends were quietly picking up a

large amount o f the floating s tock, and Morgan and Garrison re
alized that it was j ust a matter of time until the old Commodore
use� this leverage to regain control .

They fel t that some dra

matic move had to be taken in order _ to put the company and its
Nicaraguan contract beyond Vand�rbilt ' s reach . 4 6 This move, they
determined, could best be implemented in con j unction with the new
Nicaraguan chief, William Walker .
46 Folkman, Nicaragua Route, 7 5.
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Soon after Walker's coup in Granada , Morgan and Garrison
dispatched agents to Nicaragua to discus s terms with him .
The first of the agents , Charies J . McDonald , advanced him
$ 20 , 000 in gold bul lion on the· spot .

McDonald took the bul

lion from a shipment in transit from California , and gave
the owners drafts on Morgan - · in " ·lfew York , drafts that were

subsequently honored .

Walker secured the "loan " with the

understanding that it would be deducted from the annual pay
ments made by the company to the Nicaraguan government ac
cording to the franchis e contract. 47

In San Francis co ,

Garrison showed his good faith · by ensuring that every company

steamer that left that port carried a number of filibuster

recruits . 4 8

To capitalize on this larges se, Garrison sent his son ,
along with Edmund Randolph , to explain to Walker how the be
nefactors were to be benefitted .

Randolph , grandson of the

Virginia statesman of the same name, was an old friend of
Walker from their days as struggling young lawyers in New
Orleans before 1 8 5 0 .

The acquaintance had been renewed in

San Francisco , and Randolph helped Walker plan his expedition
and later secured recruits in California to be sent to Nicara
gua . 4 9

Randolph urged Walker to nullify Vanderbilt's contract

4 7 scroggs , Filibusters , 1 2 5 .
4 8 rbid . , 1 3 3 .

4 9 charles Morgan to John P . Heis s , June 2 0 , 1 8 5 6 , Heis s
Papers , Tennessee State His torica l Society , Nashville.
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on the basis o f non-compliance wlth its provisions and to
confiscate the transit company property .

Walker would then

negotiate a new contract with Morgan and Garrison in exchange
for their continued . s upport of his operations . 5 0

While these

negotiations were going on, a Walker agent, Parker H . French,
was in New York enlisting· - Morgan ' s · � �·pp�rt for an arrangement
whereby recruits would be trnasported to Nicaragua by the
company at twenty dol lars a head .

The transportation fees

would then b e deducted from the amount the company al legedly
owed because of its recalcitrance on profit p ercentage remit
tance which its contract with the Nicaraguan government cal led
for .

Not suspecting the preemptory arrangements being prepared

in Nicaragua , Vanderbilt �ct cnly acquiesced in the scheme,
but actively supported it, apparently fee ling that stabiliza
tion along the route could be achieved by Walker and would

eventually redound to the Commodore ' s benefit . 5 1
terms were even more persuasive, however .

Randolph ' s

Not on ly would the

Morgan-Garrison faction provide pas sage at company expen s e
for filibusters, but it would active ly engage in recruiting
efforts for Walker which would include advertising for . " colo
nists " ( the euphemism employed to circumvent United States
neutrality laws ) in New York and New Orleans newspapers . 5 2
S O Wil liam 0 . Scroggs, "William Walker ' s De signs on Cuba , "
Mis sis sippi Valley Historical Review, I ( September, 1 9 1 4 ) , 2 0 2 .
5 1 scroggs, "Wil liam Walker and the Steamship Corporation
in Nicaragua , " Ame�J.can Historical Review, X ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 7 9 2-8 1 1 .
5 2 Scroggs , Filibusters , 1 3 9 .
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With all factions of the transit company at least
temporari ly supporting Walker in his e f forts to introduce
legions of Americans into Central America, hundreds o f re· cruits began pouring into both terminals o f the Nicaraguan
transit route.

This movement aroused the concern of Central

Americans outside of Nicaragua.

Antonio Josl de Irissarri ,

Minister for Guatema la and Sa lvador at Washington , complained
to Secretary Marcy that state authorities and the United
State � government were doing nothing about preventing the
departure o f the filibusters .

Marcy advised Irisarri that

the neutra lity laws of the Un ited States were quite adequate ,
and that they were being enforced in good faith .

Unfortu

nate ly, it was not always pos s ible to identify eitheL the
destination or purposes o f passengers embarking for the tran
sisthmian route , and Marcy disavowed any responsibility of
th� United Sta tes to �o beyond routine enforcement .

The Sec

retary conceded that some o f the miners returning from San
Francisco to their homes in the Atlantic states might have
been converted to filibusterism en route.

Obviously , these

passengers couldn't be distinguished from any others at _the
port of embarkation .

He deplored the civil war in Nicaragua

and opined that peaceful changes in government were much to
be preferred .

Nevertheless , the United States did not feel

constrained to interfere as long as the rights o f its citi53
zens were not af fected .
5

3Marcy to Irisarri , December 6 , · 1855, National Archives , M99,10/96 .
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Apparently . not fully aware o f the extent o f Vander
bilt's cooperation and that Vanderbilt had recently regained
the presidency of the company, Walker went ahead . with the
charter cancellation decree .

The steamer carrying word o f

the confiscation passed en route a s teamer carrying two hun
dred and f ifty Vanderbilt- sponsored recruits.

Many of the se

men were foreigners, particularly Cuban revolutionists,
among them Domingo de G0icouria.

Upon hi s arrival in Granada

on March 9, 1 8 5 6, Go icouria was ama zed at Walker ' s audacity
in hi s challenge to Vanderbilt .

Nevertheles s , the Cuban

s ubs equently se rved Walker in both military and diplomatic
capacities . 54
As soon as Vanderbil t rece ived word o f Walker ' s decree ,
he went into action .

His firs t move--that o f reques ting

Marcy to intervene- -was des ultory .

The irony was that

Jo s�ph L . White, Vand�rbilt ' s as soc iate, had, only a few weeks
earlier when his faction was supporting Walker, arrogantly
disdained to recognize any United S tates ' j urisdiction in the
entire issue .

More appropriate and more e ffective was Van

derbilt's move to withdraw his ocean s teamers and thereby
isolate the transit route entirely .

Unfortunately for Walker,

Morgan and Garrison were not yet ready to take up the s lack.
When thi s news reached the stock exchange, company shares
5 4 scroggs, " Walker and Cuba , 1 1 2 0 3 .
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plummetted precipitously, and Wall Street thought Walker

a fool. � 5

The New York Herald lamented:

The great mass of the American people sympathize
deeply with the present government of Nicaragua
and will regret to find that its gallant head has
perilled its hitherto bright prospects. It will
· be seen that it is in Mr. Vanderbilt's powe r to
kill off the new government by opening another
route and thus cutting off Walker's communication
with San Francisco and New York. 56
Not only did Walker need recruits, but also a massive
infusion of capital in order to stabi�ize his embryonic re
gime.

He dispatched Goicouria to Great Britain to attempt

to obtain a loan.

The agent went by way of New York , and

there initially monitored the activities of Randolph who was
undertaking the same project with Morgan.

Goicouria wrote

to Walker that he didn ' t think the Morgan-Garrison clique
could handle the loan , and offered a counter-proposal.

The

San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua should become international
waterways , Morgan-Garrison should have the franchise over
only the land portion of the route and would pay the Nicara
guan government according to tonnage and passengers, and the

anticipated government income should be used to secure the
loan in the open market.

In the meantime, the peripatetic

Cuban determined on his own to approach Vanderbilt, who agreed

to reopen service.

Still hoping to gain exclusive control ,

the Conunodore promised to advance the Nicaraguan government
55s�roggs, Filibusters, 152-53.

5 6New York Herald , March 15 , 185 6.
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$1 0 0, 0 0 0 on the· day his first s�ip sailed for Nicaragua,
and $1 5 0, 0 0 0 more during the fol lowing ye�r .

Walker' s re

sponse, probably because he found Vanderbilt ' s opportunism
highly suspect, was an outright re j ection of the o f fer.

Up

on the strength o f rumors, Walker also accused Goicouria of
being Vanderbilt's agent .

The . Cu]:)an. , .. :vehemently denie d it,

excoriated Walker's imperious attitude, and resigned .

" The

filibuster leader thus threw away his last change to make
friends with Vanderbilt and redeem the greatest blunder of

his career . 11 5 7

On another front, Vanderbilt took the is sue to the
courts.

In New York, the company steamers were placed in

his hands as trustee, but a number of stockhol ders sued in
order to get a receiver to conc lude the busine s s of the com
papy and distribute its as sets.

Vanderbilt as s erted that the

revocation decrees had no validity as they were not iss ued
by any lawful authority.

The New York Supreme Court found

otherwis e on November 3 , observing that the decrees were
is sued by a de facto government, and that the annulment of
the charter was an historic fact, regardle s s of any consider

ations of j ustice . 5 8

The steamers were therefore placed in

the hands of a receiver and sold.

In December, Vanderbilt

brought s uit in the United States Circuit Court in New York
5 7 scroggs , "Walker and Cuba, " 2 0 5-6.

58New York Herald, November 4, 1 8 5 6.
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in the name of the transit company against Morgan, Garrison,
and · walker for the sum of $1,000,000, alleging trespa s s,
conversion, and disposal of the company's goods, and fraudu
lent conspiracy to .interrupt and molest the corporation in

the discharge of its lawful busine s s . 59

The revocation decree that - caused the legal skirmishing
was is sued by the Nicaraguan provisional government, which
was under Walker's control, on February 1 8, 1 8 5 6, and published
in the New York Time s on March 1 5 .

It pointed out that the

original conces sion of September 2 2, 1 8 4 9 , and subs equent
modifications called for the transit company to build either
a canal, a railroad, or a railroad-carriage road acros s the
I s thmus, ncr1G of which had been done .

In addition ,. the com-

pany had failed to comply with the stipulated payment s of
$ 10,000- per year and ten per cent of the profits .

Finally,

the company had failed to re spond to a request by Nicaragua
on November 1 2, 1 8 5 5, to appoint commis sioners to arbitrate
the differences as provided by the contract.

Therefore, the

privileges granted the company were dis solved and abolished .
Cleta Mayorga, Edwar d J . Kewan, and George F. Alden were
appointed a Board of Commis si·o ners, with ful l powers
to examine, liquidate, and ascertain the amount due
by the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com
pany and Acces sory Transit Company to the State, with
ful l powers . to send for person s and papers, and to
enforce respect and obedience to all their orders
and decrees . 6 0
59rbid . , December 2 2, 1 8 5 6 .

60New York Time s, March 1 5 , 1 8 5 6.
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The commissioners were to not i fy the company's agents in
Nicaragua to appear be fore the board to g�ve evidence and
to de fend the interests of the company.

The company pro

perty in Nicaragua was to be seized and held pending the
determination of its value by board-appointed appraisers.
In a lengthy despatch, •repi:ete w ith d�positions and
letters, the American minister to Nicaragua, John H. Wheel er,
provided the Department o f State with the history of the
con fiscation and the findings of the board. 6 1 Wheeler ' s
report is largely the Nicaraguan government's version of
the affair, as Wheeler had long since become identi fied
with the fortunes of the Wa lker regime.

/

On June 9, 18 5 5, Gabri el Lacayo and Raphael Garcia
Te j ada were appointed by the conservative regime in Gra
nada, at that time nominal ly the government o f ?�icaragua,
as commissioners to arrange the matter in dispute with the
transit company.

The commissioners went to New York but

were unable to reach an agreement with the officers of the
company .

Nonetheless, a proposal ( re j ected by the commis�

sioners) by Joseph L. White on July, .18 5 5, indicated that
the company was aware that it had . not ful fil led the terms
of the contract with respect to both construction and pay
ments .

The news of Walker ' s occupation o f Granada reached

New York on October 2 8, and the company informed the
61Wheeler to Marcy, August 2 , 18 5 6, National Archives,
M219, 11/6 3 .
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commissioners "that a change of Government had made void
[ their] authority and that [their ] powers to act were re
voked unless · renewed by the new gov�rnment. "

Nevertheles s ,

on Noverr�er 1 4 the company sent the commis sioners the names
of proposed arbitrators , among whom wa s Nathaniel H. Wolfe ,
one of the original grantees of the charter !

The commi s

sioners replied that , under the circumstances , they could
have no further relations with the company unless expres s ly
directed by the new government. 6 2 On December 1 4 , Parker H.
French , an agent for the Walker regime , arrived in New York
with ins tructions to arrange with the company for new arb i 
tration commis s ioners to be s ent to Granada.

On advice of

counsel , the company declined , on the bas i s that the matter
was now out of the hands of both the co1npany and the govern
ment as arbitration commi s s ioners had already been appointed ,
and "a change of parties [ did not] invalidate any previous

act of Government. 11 6 3

There the matter stood unti l the de

cree of February 1 8 .
Immediately after the publ ication o f the decree annul
ing the charter , the board advised the pres ident of the com
pany in New York of the ·proceedings they had instituted , and
forwarded a copy of the instrument of authori z ation .

The

same documents were s ent to a ll the agents of the company in
6 2oepos ition of Gabriel Lacayo , July 2 3 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid.
6 3 Joseph L. White { counsel to the Acces sory Trans it
Company ) to Thomas Lord ( company president ) , December 1 ,
1 8 5 5 , ib id.
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Nicaragua, and time wa s given to pre sent any statement or
evidence in de fense of the company'� interests. 64 Although
the government could make the case that it was adhering to
legal procedure s , the lack of re sponse on the part o f the
company could undoubtedly be attributed to its . recognition

that the outcome was a foregone conclusion , and its po sition
that the act o f annul lment and confiscation its e l f was
illegal.
Vanderb i lt ' s response , far from sending representatives
as supplicants be fore the Walker government, was to dispatch
an agent, Hosea Birds all , to San Juan del Norte to take
charge of company property in that port .
instructions read :

Birdsall ' s further

" I f the Walker filibuster s attempt to

employ force to rescue the boat from your pos s es sion, you
are authori zed to ask for the assistance o f the Corrunander
o f any Man of War of her Brittanie Ma j esty ' s Navy in the Port
o f San Juan to prevent such rescue . "

The ostensib le pretext

for the action was to protect Costa Rica , but it was apparent
to all s ides that the rea l reason was to prevent recruits
from reaching Walker :

" Unl ess our Boats ar� s eized by the

Filibusters on the Ori z aba and the Charle s Morgan [ ocean
steamers from New York and New Orleans ] , they cannot get into
the Interior, and without large acce s sions, Walker must fail , ·
65
and Costa Rica be saved . "
64Report of the· board o f commis sioners , ibid .
6 5 r.ord to Birdsall , April 8 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid . This was
not a precedent , as Vanderbilt had resorted to the employment o f

1 94

Although the company agent -refus.ed to s urrender the pro

perty , Birdsall applied to Captain Tarleton , the officer in

command of the British frigate Eurydice , to prevent alleged
filibusters aboard the Orizaba and the Charles Morgan from
going up river. · After conferring with Captain Tinklepaugh
of the Orizaba , Tarleton boarded :trra:t ship to examine the mani
fest and talk with the pas sengers.

He came away unconvinced

of Birds all's charges , and refused to interfere in what ap

peared to be company internecine strife. 66

In the meantime , the wheels of the confiscatory proceed
ings ground on.

The appointed appraisers , Joseph N. Scott ,

Dolores Bermudas , and Byron Cole , obtained from the various
agencies on the Isthmus a schedule or inventory of the real
and personal property on and connected with the line and busi
nes s of the company Q

Omitting the value of the roads and

pier s , the appraisers . submitted
the value at $ 141 , 12 9 . 0 5.

a

report to the board fixing

The job of the board of commis si

oners in trying to determine company profits was a much more
frus trating and diff i cult one.

The corruni s sioners ob served

that "the want of . • . neces sary data has been the fruitful
source of _ afflicting perplexity and emb arras sment. "

The ori

ginal grant had obligated the company to make and present an
force during the previous year. On July 5 , 185 5 , sixty men
and s ix officers , dressed as American soldiers , had been dis 
patched to guard the strategic points · along the San Juan River.
The force was ineffectual , and many ende d up in the Legitimist
army. Marcy to Wheeler , September 1, 18 5 5 , M7 7 , 2 7/ 242.
66vJbeeler to Marcy , August 2 , 1856 , National Archives ,M219 ,ll/63.
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annual report and account to the government, setting forth
its receipts and expenditures.

It �lso conceded to the state

"the right through any commis sioners it may appoint for that
purpose to inspect and examine at any time the books of the
company , to satis fy itself of the correctnes s of said receipts

and expenditures. 11 67

Not only did the company not s ubmit re

turns of the company receipts and expenses to the government ,
but no records were kept by the company on the Isthmus .

The

company agent at San Juan del Norte testified : _
The s uppl ies were chiefly furnished from New York by
Agents o f the company at that point--no invoices or
account of purchases were ever furnished by the New
York Agen t , consequently [ I ] could not , nor could
any other person ever be ab le to estimate the net
profits of the company on the Isthmus without said
invoices. 68
For whatever reason the company neglected to maintain or
deliberately did not maintain records in Nicaragua , the omis
sion did not long deter the commis sioners .

Information was

obtained by interviewing recent agents of the company ; poring
over private notes and memoranda of the employees , and examin
ing a few official records accidental ly preserved .
was the agency at San Juan del Sur.

One source

There the com.p1issioners

found memoranda of freight and pas sengers preserved in the
office , not by authority of the employers , but as a private
record.

The statistics were obtained from waybill s, and

67 Report of the board of commis sioners , ibid.

68oeposition of Jos eph N . Scott , Agent and Receiver for
the Acces sory Transit Company at San Juan del Norte , July 2 4 ,
185 6 , ibid.
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accounts of the contractor who landed and embarked pas seng
ers and freight on the steamers in the port of San Juan del
Sur.

Ano.ther fount was the documentary evidence preserved

by a Mr . Gettel , the tran sportation contractor for the Isth
mus.

Gettel te stified that since 1 8 5 2, the average number

o f pas s en gers per month traversing the Isthmus would not fal l
be low two thous and .

As the charge per person had neve r vari�

ed much from thirty five dol lar s, the monthly receipts for
pas s enger s alone would have amounted to $ 7 0,0 0 0 .

The e sti

mate of receipts from the transportation of specie and freight
was fixed at $ 8 , 0 0 0 per month .

There was a l so the ac cumulation

of receipts from internal travel and transportation of local
freight .

J. A . Ruggle s , the company agent at Castillo from

August, 1 8 5 1, until December , 1 8 5 3 , revealed that the expenses
of that agency were more than defrayed by the sums received
from this branch of the business of the company .

The agent

at Virgin Bay testified that no drafts had eve r been drawn on
New York for expens es. · The receipts were s ufficient to cover
expense s and pay for the improvements that were made there . 69
After col lecting this information, the commis sioners had
to determine the cost of the operation in order to ascertain
the net profit.

Concluding that the complete e stablishment o f

the route by the grantee s out o f their own capita l was con
templated in the charter, disburs ements relating to the con
struction of wharfs and piers , or construction and repair of
6 9 Report of the board of commiss ioners, ibid .
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roads could not be legitimately charged against the net
profit from which the government would draw its percent

age. 7 0

One of the considerations attendant upon this las t

item was that it appeared that the company had written o f f
enormous los s e s for construction and repair due to "ruinous

contracts with favorites . 11 7 1

The company had also paid high

salaries to employees and supernumerary officials , and dimin
ished the ostensible receipts , and [ this ] was to the extent
of the percent.age , a robbery of the government. 11 7 2 With re
spect to the salaries , the commis sioners ob served :
Considering the number o f secretaries , clerks , and
employees to whom also has been paid large s alaries
that have been retained in the employ or service o f
the company , i t cannot but be admitted tha t the re- .
compense to the principal agents has been not only
liberal but characterized by an exhibition of even
munificent prodigality . 7 3
At any rate , the final determination with re spect to
valid expendi tures for the operation of the route was $ 2 1 , 000.
Thi s figure would leave a profit of $ 5 7 , 000 per month or
$696, 000 per year.

The government's share of ten per cent

would then have been $ 5 , 700 per month or an annual sum of
$69 , 600 from August , 1 8 5 1 , until March , 18 56.

Added to this

was a yearly interes t of six per cent , the receipts from spe
cie shipments , and the annual payment of $ 10 , 000 provided in
the charter .
7 0 rbid.

The final sum of company indebtednes s to the

7 1.E!Nicaraguense

7 2 Ibid.

7 3Wheeler

(Granada) , March 12 , 1856.

to .Marcy, August 2 , 1856, National Archives , M219 ,ll/63 .
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government of Nicaragua was determined by the commis sioners
.
to be $ 4 12 , 589 , 9 6. 7 4
The amount due the government , according to the commis
sioners , was probably inordinately high.

This could have

been deliberate , in order to leave a buffer area between that
figure and the estimate of the value of the company property
which was confis cated , or it could have been · a matter of mis
j udgment engendered by the paucity of information with which

the commissioners had to work.

Vande·rbilt himself estimated

the accual value of the company ' s property in Nicaragua to be
between $ 7 00 , 000

and $ 1 , 000 , 000 (though this also could have

been in flated) , so it is unlikely that an investment of even
this amount would have amortized itself yearly , as the com
mis sioners' report would seem to have indicated . 7 5
For the next few months , events seemed to bode wel l for
the Walker regime.

The filibusters turned back in invasion

by the forces of Costa Rican P resident Juan Raphael Mora ,
and service was res umed on the transit route under the auspices
of the Morgan-Garrison faction.

A sham election was held in

which only a portion of the Nicaraguan provinces participated,
and Walker became the nominal president of the country.

On

July 18, 1856 , Randolph met with Morgan and Garrison at Sara
toga Springs , New York , and formally transferred the franchise

74 rbid.
75 scroggs , Filibusters , · 156. The comnissioners set the profits at
$696,000 , close to the lower figure of $ 7 00 ,000
. invesment Vanderbilt
claimed.
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to them for a consideration o f $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .

The confisca ted

Acce s sory Transit Company property in Nacaragua was later
sold to the usurpers for $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 , with the understanding
that every Morgan-Garrison dol l ar would b e coun ted as five
dol lars.

Added to the $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 already assigned were the

$ 2 0 , 0 0 0 in gold bullion which McDonald had given Walker in
October , 1 8 5 5 , and $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 from steamer fares o f recruits
which the company had tran sported to Nicaragua .

With this

total of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the credit assigned to Morgan and Garri
son was $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 .

Deducting the $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 co s t o f the com

pany property , this left a balance of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 which Wa lker
covered by issuing government bonds bearing an interest ra te
o f ten per cent .

Clearly , Walker ' s ma j or interes ts were to

tie the fortunes of the Morgan-Garris on company to those o f
Nicaragua , and to ensure that the company could continue

bri_nging fresh reinforcements for the filibus ter army . 7 6

Faced with this fait acompli , and realizing that neither
the courts nor the State Department were inclined to s alvage
his interests , Vanderbilt electe d to pursue a more direct
course.

His correspondence with the presidents of other

Centra l American s tates urged them to unite against Walker ,
but in view of the haple s s efforts of Cos ta Rica , he de termi
ned that they · would need more than moral support .

By

the fall

of 1 8 5 6 , the Commodore had begun sending bo th soldier and
agents t9 President Mora , and by December , Vanderbil t was so
7 6 Folkrnan , Nicaragua Route , 8 3 . 4.
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sanguine about hi s chance s of overthrowing Walker that he
posted thi s adverti sement in the New . York Herald :
Pres ent appearance s indicate a real i z ation of my
hope s that the company will be speedily re stored
to their rights , franchises , and property upon
the Isthmus of Nicaragua , which has been so unj ustly invaded . 7 7
On November 2 8 , under Vanderbilt's sponsorship , Engl ish
man Wi ll iam Robert

c.

Webster and American Sylvanus H . Spencer

arrived in San Juan , Cos ta Rica, to engage in s ecret talks with
Pres ident Mora and to outl ine for the pre s i dent the method of
bringing about the capitul ation of Walker .

The key , they sa i d ,

was to control the San Juan River ; after that , everything e l se
w�uld fa ll into place .

Spencer had formerly been an engineer

on the transit boats , and knew both the river and the crews ,
so the details of the planning were left to him .

Mora call ed

for Costa Rican volunteers for an expedition down the Serapiqui
River , an obvious ob j ective and one the fil ibusters would have
antic ipated s ince that river was Costa Ric a's maj or outlet to
the San Juan.

Cunningly , Spencer ' s force c l andestine ly uti 

li z ed the San Carlos River, twenty- s even mi l e s north o f the
Serapiqui , floating on ra fts and canoe s into the San Juan on
December 1 6 .

Steathily des cending the San Juan , the Costa

Ricans quickly overpowered the surpri sed f i l ibusters guarding
the mouth of the Serapiqui .
Spencer then took his force down river to San Juan del
Norte and sei zed four river steamers there .
7 7 New York �era ld, De cember 2 5, 1 8 5 6 .

The boats' crews
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joined the Costa Ricans on the promise that their wages
would continue to be paid , and with Costa Rican flags flyi ng at their masts , the boats began chugging upstream.

The

United States conunercial agent at San Juan del Norte , a
Walker partisan , appealed to the conunander of the large Bri
tish squadron in the harbor , but the Briton refused to inter
fere i n what he termed a business dispute.

Spencer's boats

picked up a Costa Rican force of about 80 0 men armed with
Vanderbilt-supplied Minie rifles brought down the San Carlos
by General Josef Joaquin Mora , Commander-in-Chief of the Costa
Rican army and brother to the President.

Mora's army continued

upstream and systematically captured the strategic fortf along
the San Juan River all the way to Lake N icaragua , employing

force and ruse.

Utilizing a lake steamer commandeeered a t

Fort San Carlos , the fortress guarding the outlet of the San
Juan River from Lake �icaragua , General Mora crossed the Lake
and captured Virgin Bay.

Along with another Costa Rican force

that had occupied San Juan del Sur , Mora had now completely
isolated the filibuster president.

With no hopes for supplies

or reinforcements , Walker. capitulated on May 1 , 185 7 , and his
force was evacuated by United States Navy ships at San Juan
78
del Sur.
The rest of the story of the route during the period is
a denouement

as the transit across the Isthmus , for various

reasons , was never reopened.

Nevertheless , without the benefit

78 scroggs , Filibusters , 2 70-85.
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o f hindsight, the traditional competitors, j o ined by others,
continued feverishly contending foi the f�anchise .

The three

maj or rival groups were tbe American Atlantic and Pacific Ship
Canal Company under Jos eph L. White and company president
H. G . Stebbins ; the Acces sory Transit Company of Cornelius
Vanderbilt; and the Mor.gan�Gar-:r-:!,sen .. comb ine.

The latter duo

pas sed virtual ly out of contention as they were di scredited
by having been so closely identified wi th the defeated fi l l i
buster .

Vanderbilt ' s initial efforts were at least imagina

tive : - working through Costa Rican General Jose Maria Canas,
hi s proposal was to establ i sh

a

new state out o f both Costa

Rican and Nicaraguan territory that would encompas s the enti re
area of the trans it route and which would do bus ines s exclu
s ive ly with the Commodore .

White appealed to Antonio Jose de

Iri sarri , who was now the Nicaraguan min i ster in Washington
as well as that o f Co sta Rica.

On June 2 7 , 1 8 5 7, Irisarri

s igned a contract with Stebb in s and White which was subsequ
ently confirmed by the new Nicaraguan government under Pre s i.,
/
dent Tomas Martinez
.
One of the maj or probl ems preventing the reopening of
the route was the revival o f the t�rritorial di spute b etween
Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

The latter had traditionally claimed

the south bank of the San Juan River , and now bol stered its
argument with the as sertion that it- was necessary for defen
s ive purposes .

The Nicaraguans , their neighbors charged ,
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could not defend. that portion of the Isthmus· if the reopening· of the tra nsit under Nicara guan a uspices engendered ano
ther inva sion.

Just such a n invasion seemed imminent when

Walker reappeared a t Greytown in November, 1857, with a new
bra nd of filibusters.

Although the United Sta tes Na�y subse

quently intervened a nd shipped Wa lker a nd his contingent ba ck
to the United Sta tes, both of the Central Anerican countries were
infu�ed with a sense of urgency ;

As a result, Nicara gua

largely ca p i tulated to the Costa Rican demands , a nd a new
bila teral trea ty was signed on April 15, 1858.
In the :rreantilne , Irisarri was negotiating a bilateral treaty with
United Stat.es Secretary of State Lewis Cass ; a treaty which would provide
security for American invest:rrent in Nicaragua and particularly for any
pany which might obtain the transit franchise.

com

In the United States Senate ,

the treaty becarre suspect when the exclusive contract Irisc:rrri had previous. ly signed with Stebbins and White was revealed. An alrrost insurrrountable
impasse for the treaty developei in Nicaragua when it became clear that
President Martinez did not want the route reopened. Although the president sent the docurrent to the Nicaraguan assembly for ratification, he had
ass'Llited that it would

be

rejected. When the a ssembly � much to the

president ' s chagrin , approved the trea ty on March 26, 1858,
Martine z at first refused to sign a nd then resorted to subter
fuge in a n effort to prevent the a c cord from becoming law. 7 9
Some evidence indicates tha t Martine z was more afra id
of American sponsorship of the route tha n the reopening of
7 9 :tbid. , 354-58 .
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the route itself.

Despite his efforts to de feat the b ilat

eral treaty with the United States, . the pres ident seemed at
least reluctantly prepared to go ah�ad with a commercial con
tract.

The Engli shman Webster had entered into a contract,

in the name o f Vanderbilt, with the Nicaraguan foreign mini
stry for the reopening of the route.

Martfnez was hes itant

about confirming the agreement for fear o f retaliation by
Stebbins and White , so the concess ion was made that the latter
would be allowed until June, 185 6, to "have their boats actu
ally on the route, or forfeit their contract; in whi ch event
Webster's contract [wou ld ] be cons i dered as valid. "

Pres ident

Martfnez felt the Vanderbilt contract would be more favorable
to

Nicaragua, and bes ides,

11

Webster [had] boasted that the

old commodore i s determined to have the l ine either by fair
or foul means. "

Regardles s o f the commerc ial imbroglio,

11

The

[Ni: c araguan ] authorities seem resolved that [ the American ] gov
vernment should have .no vo i ce in the matter. 1 1 80
The feuding among the American entrepreneurs was tempo
rarily superceded with the arrival on the s cene of an extra
ordinary . Frenchman, Felix Belly.

Belly landed at San Juan del

Norte on March 3, 1858, and although subsequently revea led to
have been merely the agent of a few obscure Paris ian speculators,
the mysterious aura surrounding the man convinced local news
papers that he was in fact the clandestine r:epresentatfve o f
80 Mirabeau B . Lamar (Mini ster to Central America ) t o Lewi s
Cas s (Secretary o f State) , March 27, 1858, National Archives,
M219, 11/ 6.
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Emperor Napoleon I I I .

When Belly was received by President

Mora in San Jo se his denial s of o fficial capacity sounded as
if they were made for d iplomatic reason s , and Mora was as con
vinced as the pre ss of the legitimacy of Belly ' s mission.
Mora signed a Costa Rican-Nicaraguan c anal treaty which Belly
conveniently had in hand , and then accompanied the Frenchman
to Nicaragua to obtain the signature of P resident Martfn e z .
After Mora and Belly arrived in Rivas on April 2 4 , Mora and
Mart{nez affixed their s i gnatures to an internationa l conven
tion which gave exclusive canal privileges to a company to be
formed by Belly .

In addition , Martfne z and Mora signed a

treaty o f limits making maj or conceision s to Costa Rica , but
committing Costa Rica to aid Nicaragua in any controversy
between that nation and the United States . 8 1
Finally , , at the instigation o f Belly , Martinez and Mora
signed a j oint Declar�tion placing their countries under the
protection of France , England , and Sardinia , without the know
ledge of the European governments concerned . 8 2 I ncluded in the
manifesto was an elaborate complaint against the United States
government which was intended for European consumption .

It

charged the United States with sponsoring the preparation o f
a new invasion of Central America with the intention of annex
ing the I sthmus to the United States by force.

To underscore

8 1 cyril Allen , France in Central America, F�lix Belly and
the Nicaraguan Canal ( New York : Pageant Pres s , 19 6 6 ) , 2 1-14 1 ,
pas sim.
8 2 aritish Fo reig!!_ and State Papers , XLVI I I , 6 9 5 - 6 .
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the irony o f the occasion, all the document s were signed on
May 1, the anniversary of Walker ' s capitulation.

Secretary

of State Cass wa s j ustifiably annoyed · with the mani festo,

a,r1d through hi s representative, Mirabeau B. Lamar, compelled
the two pres idents to dis avow the document . 8 3

After the signing o f the accords, Bel ly j ourneyed to
Aspinwall in Panama, and then to New York, but upon his arrival
at the latter port he was confronted with newspaper headlines
that the French government had denied any as sociation with him .,
He went back to France thoroughly di scredited and leaving $Orne
very embarrassed Central American politic ians in his wake .
His chief accompli shment , i f such it can be termed, wa s to
protect the e f fort s of Am�rican fi nanciers
s it route. 8 4

to reopen the tran-

Meanwhi le, despite the grace period initially extended
to Stebbins and White, · their contract was revoked on January 2 8, 1 8 5 8, and trans ferred to Vanderbi lt on March 8 .

Un

fortunately for Ni caragua, it turned out that the Commodore
did not intend to reopen the route but, on the contrary, to
block its reopening .

Thi s actio� was in cons ideration of a

sum o f $ 5 6 , 0 0 0 a month that the Paci fic Mail Steamship Com
pany was paying him to prevent the renewal of competition with
the Panama route.

In the fall of 1 8 5 9 , however, Vanderbi lt

broke with Paci fic Mai l, and declared his de termination to
8 3 J . L. Cole to John P . Hei ss, June 2 0, 1 8 5 8, Hei s s Papers .
84Al len, Felix Bel ly, 2 1-14 1, · pas s im.
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reopen the N icaragua route.

Wal l Street was startled by

this news , and rumors were rife that the Conunodore might
even employ fi libusters if necessary.

But when one of his

steamers with a cargo of arms was prevented by the authori
�ies ·from leaving the port of New Orleans for Nicaragua ,
Vanderbilt finally and definitively withdrew fran the field.
Stebbins and White were no more successful.

85

Their ac

complice Irisarri was repl aced in Washi ngton i n October ,
1858 , by Maximo Jirez , the most powerfu l of the leaders of
the liberal faction in Nicaragua.

Jtrez had prev iously been

in corresporrlence with Vanderbilt , and appeared to be a Vanderbilt par
tisan , so the degree of influence that the old financier had in bo� Nica

ragua and the Depart:rrent of State can be inferred by Jerez' appointnent
and reception in Washington.

His first rrove was to thwart the continuing

efforts of Stebbins and White. When a Stebbins-White stearrer advertised
a scheduled sailing to Nicaragua , J{rez published a warnir.g that the can
pany had no river or lake steamers and that the journey across the water�
ways of the Isthmus would have to be made in bungos. Although Secretary

·
Cass rebuked the minister for
this untoward affront to cliplanatic behavior ,
the damage· was already done.

Nevertheless, the steamer Wa shington

set sai l on November 7 , 1858 , with three hundred and twenty
passengers.

When it arrived at San Juan del Norte , the N ica

raguan government refused the transients permission to cross
85 scroggs , Fi libusters , 365-67.
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the I s thmus , and the company was forced to trans fer them
to Aspinwal l.

Even though S tebbin s-White were success ful

in procuring another franchise from the Nicaraguan govern
ment on April 12 , 1.8 6 0 , they never succeeded in reopening
the route . 86 America ' s attention was by this time turning
toward a far more serious internal con flict.

Nicaraguan

turbulence , on the other hand , was placated for the next
thirty years , a situation remarkab ly uncharac teris tic for
that u�happy nation.

Civil war. had raged intennittently since

independence , and when William Walk� intervened in 185 5 on the
� �dde of the Liberals , that fac tion c lung to a toe-hold in
nor thwe st Nicaragu� (Figure 7 } .

86 Gordon I reland , Boundarie s , Pos ses sions , and Con
flicts in Central an d North American and the Caribbean
( Cambridge : Harvard Univers ity Pre s s , 1 9 4 1 } , 1 9 1.
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Figure 7 .

Liberal-held Territory in June , 1855 .

CHAPTER VI
NICARAGUAN POL ITIC S , 1821-18 55: FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO INTERVENTION
America i s ungovernabl e . Those who have s erved the
revolution have plowed the �ea. 1
Thi s poignant lament by Sim6n Bolivar shortly before his
death in 1 8 3 0 could have been echoed by those Central Amer i

cans who were attempting to establish a federation of all f ive
states following the ir declaration o f independence from Spain .

Although during the coloni al period the Central American
sta te s had nominally compri s ed the Captaincy General of Guate
mala , an administrative un it of the Viceroyalty of New Spain ,
in reality comr:1c=cial and ecc l e s i a st i c R l t i es

�mong the var ious

c ities were of more irmnediate s igni f icance than of f i ci al admini
strative entitie s .

The question then--and perhap s one that ha s

never been sati sfactori ly resolved--wa s what form o f union (or
disunion) the I sthmu s would take .

When independence was de

cla red in Guatema la C ity on Septemberl S , 182 1 , an i nter im

government for the former ca pta incy genera l was e s ta b l i s hed
cons i sting of Br igad i er Gabino Gain za as Governor General ,
and an advisory counci l to aid in the new federation ' s admini

stration.

However , the federation proved admini stratively im

practicable and , , following the lead of the province of Chiapas ,
1sim6n Bol ivar , quo ted in Hubert Herring , A History of
Latin America , 3 rd ed . (New York: Alfred A. Knoph , 1 9 68 [ 1 9 5 5 ] ) ,
276 .
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2 11
the advisory council voted on January 2 5 , 18 2 2 , for annexation to Mexico under General Jos� de Iturbide ' s Plan of Iguala .
There were a few liberals in Central America who had held
out for independence and a republic ; however , they were round
ly snouted down by two other political factions who agreed on
annexation but for different reasons .

The conservative s in

Guatemala City fe lt that the Mexican connection would protect
their privilege s enj oyed during the colonial era .

The provin

cianos , the land owners from the provi�ces , '' hoped to shake
off the onerous control of Guatemala City on the as sumption
that this would permit them

more s elf-rule .

after all , was farther away . " 2

Mexico City ,

To suppre s s pos s ible dis�en

sion , Iturbide sent General Fili sola to Central America to
consolidate Mexidan control .

The exile of Iturbide inter

rupted F ili sola r s mis sion , and he turned the administrative
reins over to a Nation� ! Constituent A s s embly .

The A s sembly declared independence on June 2 9 , 1 8 2 3 ,

and on November 2 2 , 1 8 24 , adopted a compromis e constitution
which established a F ederal Republic of five Central American
state s , with a provisional executive committee , a pre sident ,
and five chiefs of state .

A rupture between the Con s ervative

force s , composed of the aristocratic element , and the Liberals ,
repre s enting the new merchant clas s e s , was already apparent .
The Liberals controlled the first F ederal Congre s s in 1 8 2 5
2 Rodr!gue z , Central America , 61-62 .
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and elected Manuel Jos� Arce as President of the Republic . ·
Installed in the Federal capital at 9uatemala City , Arce
quarreled with his own party , overthrowing and reorganizing
the state government of Guatemala with the help of the Con
servatives .
The Liberals in Guatemala , Honduras , and El Salvador
.
.
'
joined under Francisco Morazan of Honduras and , after a period
of armed conflict in 18 2 7- 1 8 29 , succeeded in ousting Arce .
Morazan was proclaimed President of the Federation in 1 8 3 0 .
The Conservatives gradually regained control of some of the
state goverlli�ents and the alrea�y traditional conflict between
the Conservatives and the L iberals culminated in the breakup
of the Federation . ·The last Federal Congress in 1 8 3 8 declared
Lh� ti tates free to govern themselves .
In Cen tral America as a whole , lines were drawn with the
clergy , the remnants of the colonial aristocracy , and many of
the great land owners and rich merchants on the Conservative
side , and creole and mestizo professional men and other groups
who had enjoyed a less-privileged position in colonial times

forming the Liberal party .

In Nicaragua , differences of

political policy or principles were lost sight of in what
largely became a regional feud between the cities of Granada
and Le6n .

The Granadinos pursued the C onservative ideal be

cause of their traditional t ies with old Spain and because
of the vested interests of the large landholding and aristo
cratic classes living there.

The Leonese professed the L iberal
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doctrine , be tter· suited · to the economic and commercial am
bitions of their small merchant and agr icultural e lements.
Dur ing the per iod of the Federation , intermittent war occurred between Granada and Le 6n .

When Morazan was President

6f the Federation , he sent Dionosio de Herrera as Chief of
State to restore order in Nicaragua.

Under de Herrera , the

L iberal Party became f irmly entrenched after 1 8 3 0 .

Other

Chiefs of State of the Liberal Party succeeded de Herrera ,
most of them being under the contro l of Casto Fonseca , the
Commander of Arms (Army Commander- in-Chief ) .
The destruct ion of the L iberal governments in other
states made the Liberal government 1 s · posi tion in Nicaragua
precarious , and it was eventual ly overthrown in 1 8 4 5 by a
C onservative uprising aided by armies from Honduras and El
Salvador .

Wishing to punish Le6n for having granted asylum

to the Mora zan fol lowers , the Conservatives deepened the r i f t
by sacking Le6n and slaughter ing many o f the inhabi tants .
The Conservatives then moved the cap i tal to Masaya and later
to Managua in order to af ford better control of the administra
tion by the important families of Granada .

The Conservatives

tried to re s tore order but Tr inidad Muno z , the Commander of
Arms , intrigued to increase his own power and inf luence , and
f inally betrayed the party , re-establishing the capital at
Le 6 n.

A new Conservative upr ising , championed by Honduras

and Costa Rica , overthrew Mufio z in 1 8 5 1 and agairi moved . the
government to Managua .

The Conservatives made an ef for t to
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conciliate their . opponents , this time by giving them minor
posts in the cabinet.

Liberal re j ection of this o live branch

spel led failure for the plan , and a period of attempted force
ful suppre ssion of the Liberals ens ued .
. Continual strife between Liberals and Cons ervatives in
Nicaragua , during the period of the Federation and subsequent
to the establishment of the Republic in 1 8 3 8 , had resulted in
unbounded ruin and de struction.

Although the country was

capable of producing indigo , sugar , rice , coffee , tobacco ,
and virtually every produc � known to a tropical region , agri
culture and commerce had so stagnated that only plantains and
Indian corn were cultivated for bare · subsistence .

Exploitable

deposits of gold and silver in the district of Matagal p a in
the Cordil lera were ignored .

Great tracts of corrunercial timber

stood unused .
Pre sident Fruto Chamorro , a member of one o f the leading
Granadan familie s , re solved to halt Nicaragua ' s pl unge into·
political anarchy and commercial impotence.

His opportunity

came in the election of 185 3 when he secured a second term by

defeating Francisco Castel l 6n from Le6n , a wel l-educated Liberal
and former Nicaraguan minister to England.

Wil liam V. We ll s ,

an as sociate of Wil liam Walker , later contended that neither
candidate could muster the neces sary two-third s .v ote as re
quired in the 1 8 3 8 constitution , and that Chamorro c laimed the
el ection by defau lt.
3

3

wil liam V. Well· s , Walker ' s Expedition to Nicaragua (New
York : Stringer and Town send , 1 8 5 6 ) , 4 6.
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In order to . organize a strong government and ensure
order , Chamorro determined to rescind and replace the Liberal
Party-dictated constitution of 1 8 38 which he regarded as an
archical.

Anticipating the convening of a constituent assem

bly for the purpose of drafting a new constitution , Chamorro
deemed it expedient to eliminate , insofar as possible , the
maj or Liberal opposition.

In November , 1 8 53 , . he charged Cas-

,
tell 6 n , Maximo
Jerez
, Colonel Jose Maria Valle , Francisco Diaz ,
,
f

,

Manuel Cisneros , and Mateo Pineda , all- leading citizens of the
Occidental Department (in which Leon was located ) with conspiracy
against the government .

It is reasonable to assume that some

Liberal agitation probably resulted from dissatisfaction with
Chamorro ' s unprecedented bid for a second term , and from the
questionable circumstances surrounding his re-election .

Yet ,

the tangible evidenc� , which Chamorro purported to have , re
mained in his " secl:et files" and was never sub j ect to public
d isclosure.
.

'4

All but Castellon and Jere z escaped and went into exile
in Honduras .

After a short imprisonment , Castellon and Jere z

were forceably exiled on November 2 8 , 1 8 53 , and j oined their

co-partisans.

Early in 1 854 , Chamorro proceeded to call a

constituent assembly .

A Conservative constitution was drafted

and approved on April 30 , 1 8 54 , vesting more power in the
executive , extending his term from two to four years , and
4 sofonlas Salvatierra , Guillermo , M�ximo Jerez Inmortal
(Managua : Progresso , 1 9 5 0 ) , 4 0.
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providing more latitude for central ly governing the republic.
Chamorro was named Chief Executive by the a s s emb ly for the
first four-year term.

He was thus , in effect , the last Chief

of State under the Central American Federation and the first
Pre s ident of the revis ed Republic of Nicaragua. 5
Aside from the Conservative dominance that the new con
stitution implied , the change from virtual political anarchy
was perhaps too abrupt , causing re stles sne s s among the citizens .
Encouraged by the se disorders and smarting from political sub
j ugation , the Liberal exiles in Honduras began plotting to
return .

They were aided by Liberal . Honduran Pre sident Jo se

Trinidad Cabanas , who furnished them · with arms and money .

On

May 5 , 1 8 54 , the political refugee s sailed from Tigre I s land
on a ve s sel com.mantled by an American , Gilbert Morton .

They

surprised and overwhe lmed a smal l garrison at Reale j o .

Marching

inland through the Occ idental Department , they inves ted the
unre s i sting town of Chinandega , where new supporters adhered
to their cause .

At Chinandega , J�re z is sued a proc lamation

outlining the five-point L iberal program : 6

( ! ) · Dec lare s the principal ob j ect for the army is to
take power from Chamorro and return it to the people .
( 2 ) Promises to re spect and honor property .
( 3) Name s as traitors tho se who give s ervice to the
tyrant , Chamorro .
S Rodrigo Sanche z , Panorama Pol itico de Nicaragua , 1 8 2 11940 (Managua : Perez , 1940 ) , 3. ·
6 sofonias Salva�ierra , M&ximo J�re z , 44 .
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· (4) Does not recognize the poli tical parties that previous
ly exi sted ( constituting a cal l to all citizens ) .
(5) Invites all government employees , even those under
arms _ , to join the crus ade .

'

The Liberal contingent then proceeded to Leon , e s tabl i sh ing
its headquarters there and naming C a ste116n Provi s ional D irector
of the Republ ic.

On May 10 , 18 54 , Chamorro procl a imed a war

to the death for the defense of " l egitimacy, " or legal suc
ces sion to power.

After two inconclus ive battl e s , Chamorro's

force s retired to Granada .

The Liberal force s , or " Democrats"

as they. styled themselve s , swe lled their ranks with sympa
thizers and conscripts , and marched on Granada .
The Democrats laid s iege to the · city , occupying the
suburban part , but were unable to penetrate the fortified
p laza in the center of town.

With standing the s iege , the

Leg itimi sts had approximately one thousand men under arms .
· Guatemal a was all ied with them in their Cons ervative c aus e ,
but was unable to provide s ignificant mater ial a s s istance.
At the height of the s iege , the Democrats were able to muster
one thousand f ive hundred men , including two hundred Hondurans.
In addition , the Democrats recruited a dozen or so Americans
in San Juan de l Sur and Virg in Biy at the rate of $ 10 0 per

month · to pepper the Granada plaza with rifle shot . 7

C. W .

Doubleday , a Cal ifornia pioneer on his way to the east coa st
of the United State s , threw h imself in company with the
7 11 Nicaraguan F il ibusters , " Litte l l's Living Age , V I II
(Apr i l 18 5 6 ) , 129-140 (reprint from Blackwood ' s Magazine ) .
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Democrats at San. Juan del Sur.

He recruited among the

American pas senger s and took thir ty of them to the siege at
The Leone se were we l l-impres s ed with the quality
of American soldiery. 8 The siege proved a s tand-off and after

Granada.

nine months , in February , 1 8 5 5 , the Democrats gave up and re-

'

tired toward Leon.

At Masaya , Chamorro's force s , imbued with
new spirit and encouraged by Conservative pries ts , 9 overtook
the Democrats and three hundred men were kil led in the en
suing battle.

The Legitimis ts then captured San Car los and

refurbished their shot and powder stores with supplie s from
Jamaica .

They regained Managua and Rivas and finally the

'

whole s tate except Leon , Chinandega , · and Reale j o along with
the Bay of Fonseca .

The state was now effectively divided

between two fatigued and dis sipated forces , though intermittent battlescontinued to oc cur .
During the siege of Granada , Chamorro had died from a
liver infection .

The emotional and physical s tr e s s he had

undergone in an effort to maintain his po sition and his party
in power had finally s apped his res i s tance .

The Conservative s ,

fearing that news of the death of the strong leader might dis
hearten their suppor ter s , made an effor t to conceal th1s occur.

'

rence , and quietly name s Jo se Es trada as pre sident . Subs equent ly ,
8 Jame s Jeffrey Roche , By-Ways o f War ( Bo s ton : Smal l , May
nard and Company , 1 9 0 1 ) , 9 1 .
9 wel l s , Walker's Expedition , 4 9 .
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efforts to effect a reconciliation by Salvadoran and Guatemalan
mediators 1n August and by the Presbyterian Remigio Sala z�r in
September were rejected by Estrada , who refused to negotiate
with the Democrats on the grounds that it would compromise
" legitimacy. "
The increasingly untenable posi_tion of the Democrats , and
the inability of Cabanas to continue supplying effective Hondu
ran support for their cause , created a situation conducive to
a search for other outside help.

At this juncture , on August

1 5 , Wel ls and Byron Cole of the San Francisco Mining Company
arrived at San Juan del Sur with the intention of exploring

the possibility of developing mining - resources in Honduras . 10

Cole , formerly a Boston editor , had left his Sacramento paper
under the editorial management of Wil liam Walker , recently
reknowned for his filibustering expedition in Mexico .

He

suggested to Castellon that they should invite Walker to re
cruit and bring to Nicaragua a number of expeditionists to aid
the Democratic cause .

Because of his earlier impressions of

'

American soldiery at the s iege of Granada , Castellon was amenable to the idea of securing a number of American auxiliaries
for his ar.my.

In addition , Walker's exploits in the ill-fated

filibustering expedition to Lower California early in the year

'

were known to Castel lon.
There was ample precedent for the employment of foreign
auxiliaries or legionnaires in the continual civil strife which
Nicaragua had undergone since the initial Central American
l O scroggs , "William Walker · and the Steamship Corporation in
Nicaragua , " American Historical Review , X (June 19 0 5) , 7 9 2.
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declaration of independence in 182 1 .

Both the L iberal and

Conservative causes had been augmented on occa s ion by, among
others, American, French, and German soldiers of fortune.
.
,
In fact, the Leg itimists had recently sent Guadelupe Saenz to
San Franci sco in an ·unsucces sful miss ion to obtain foreign

soldiers. 11

The terms of the first contract which Castel lon offered,
and which Cole took to C al iforni a to present to Walker, cal led
for three hundred Americans at a stated monthly pay and the
d i stribution of 2 1, 000 acres of land at the end of the campa ign.
Thi s contract was rejected in November by Walker as he, ac
cording to his account, regarded it as contrary to the United
States Neutral ity L�w of 1818. 1 2 Wa lker outlined the terms
for a new contract and Cole returned with these to Nicaragua
to renegotiate with Castel l6n, who agreed to the terms and
Cole once more voyaged to C al ifornia, reaching Sacramento in
February, 185 5.

The land grant was increased to 5 2 , 0 00 acres,

the �onthly pay was increased, the expeditioni sts were guaran
teed the privilege of bearing arms even after the war, and-of ma j or importance--they were to be regarded as colonists.
Walker took the contract to S . W . Inge, United States
D i strict Attorney for the Northern D istrict of C aliforni a in
11sofon1as Salvatierra, M!ximo J�rez, 80.

12 wi lliam Walker, The War in Nicaragua ( New York and
Mobile: s. H . Goetze ! and Company, 1860 ) , 2 5.
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San Francisco , for a ruling on the validity vis-a-vis the
neutrality laws .

Inge agreed that no law wou ld be vio lated

by the implementation of the terms of the contract .

Next ,

Walker took the contract to General John E. Wool , United State s
Army Conunander for the Department of the Pacific , who Walker
believed had authority from Secretary of War Jefferson Davis
and from Pre sident Pierce to suppre ss expeditions conflicting
with the 1 8 1 8 law.

Wool not only approved the contract and

the aims of the expedition , but al so wished Walker al l succe s s

in the venture . 1 3

It i s quite likely. that Wool was influenced

by the private views of the Secretary of State , Wil liam L . Mar
cy , who perhaps felt that a succes sful expedition would ma
terial ly contribute to his pre sidential aspirations , and those
of Jefferson Davis , who had an intense intere st in the eventual
annexation of pro-s lavery territories . 14 The stage was now set ,
as Walker be lieved , for the legal recruitment and tran sferral
of the expeditionists/colonists to Nicaragua.

An American pre

sence , quite different from that of Commodore Vanderbilt (Fi

gure 8) wa s about to de scend on that country , one whi ch would
shortly inve st the capital (Figure 9 ) .
1 3 rbid . , 2 1 .

l 4Albert H . Carr , The World and Wil liam Walker (New York :
Harper and Row , 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 1 1.
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Figure 8.

Cornelius Vanderbilt ,
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Figw-e 9 .

Walk.er ' s Granada Attack Route .

CHAPTER VII
WILLIAM WALKER : THE MASTER OF
NICARAGUA
" From such facts I reach the conclus ion : If
[Walker ] doesn ' t drink , smoke , or have any devotion
to Bacchus or Venus , it is clear that the only thing
he desires is the sensuality of power ; and for that
reason a man without other passions , has turned
into a filibuster . Lieutenant Lewis, forgi ve my
frankness , but I have always distrusted men who do
not render some homage to vtce . "
Upon returning to Granada , I told General
Walker what the cra zy Zavala--for that ' s what his
own fri ends ca ll him--had said , and saw a c ertain
ironic smile s ketched on his sphinx-like face . 1
William Walker was born in Nashville , Tennessee , or;i. May
Bi

1824

.

He attended the Univers i ty of Nashville , obtain i n g

a degree i n

1838

and subsequently securing a med ical degree

from the University of Pennsylvania in

1843

.

After l iving

abroad , Walker returned to the United States and went to
New Orleans , where he stud ied law and was admitted to the bar .
While in New Orleans , he experienced his first exposure to
the journalistic trade and after going to Ca lifornia in

1850

continued working in that field , editing a newspaper in San
Francisco and later in Marysville , Yuha County .

I t was there

that he organi zed an expedi tion to sei ze and coloni ze Sonora

1Gustavo Alema�- Bolanos , Centenario de la Guerra Nacional
de Nicaragua Contra Walker (Guatemala : Imprenta Litograf{a ,
19 5 6 ) , 57 .
Frederick Lewis was sent as a Walker emissary to
Felix Zavala , Democratic Army Genral .
2 24
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and Lower Calif6rnia.
By January, 185 4 , Walker had proclaimed Lower Cali
fornia and Sonora and independent republic with himself as
president.

American authorities, concerned about apparent

neutrality in fractions , prevented food and supplies from
reaching Walker ' s band , forcing him and the remaining members
of his expedition to return to the border and surrender to
officers of the San Diego army garrison.

Walker was acquitted

in a F ederal court in May , 185 4 , of violating the neutrality
laws .
It was at this juncture that Byron Cole presented him
with the contract drafted by Francisco Castellon leader of
the Democratic party at Ledn and Walker agre ed to serve in
the Democratic army .

He immediately proceed ed to San

Francisco and s et about recruiting men and seeking financial
support for his expedition.

He received financial as sistance

from Joseph Palmer and Colonel John C . Fre�ont . 2

Walker

rented the brig Vesta , loaded it with men, supplies, and
ammunition , and was ready to sail on April 2 0 , 1 8 55 .

How

ever , the sheriff seized the ship on behalf of a creditor
of the owner , posted a guard, and took the brig ' s sails into
custody.

While Walker was attempting to resolve this problem

2walker , War in Nicaragua , 2 9. Walker himself signifi
cantly - in view of his later repeal of abolition in Nicara
gua--remarked that Palmer and Fremont were not fully aware of
all the views he held on slavery.
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a United States . marshal served a writ for the s ame reason ,
and pos ted a cutter to prevent the sailing of the Vesta.
With the help of a friend , Henry A. Crabb , Walker pers uaded
the creditor to grant easy terms and to let the brig s ail. 3

With the dismi s s a l of the state and federal suits , the
obs tacle remained of .the .sheriff ' s costs _ for maintaining
the guard over the brig , whic h the sheriff ins is ted Walker
mus t pay .

The s heriff , unaware of the dismis s al of the

suit , generous ly agreed to release the s ails when Walker
indic ated he might take this portion of the matter to court.
Walker persuaded the crew of the cutter to re-rig the Vesta
and invited the sheriff ' s deputy , who wa s still posted as
guard , below to his cabin.

The deputy wa s advised by Walker ,

" There , sir , are champagne and c igars . "

From his pocket he

drew a pair of handcuffs which he placed alongside the
bottle.

choice. 1 1 4

"And there are handc uffs and irons .

Pray take your

The deputy remained below par taking of Walker's

hospitality , and after midnight early on May 4 , the steam . tug
Resolute came along side to tow the Vesta . out into the harbor.

3 Ibid . , 29- 3 1. Walker observed in hi� narrative that
he had pointed out to the creditor - that he might find him
s elf in an . uncomfortable pos ition s hould the troops aboard
be forced to dehark and abandon the mis sion , knowing that
the creditor �a s responsible for its failure. ·
4New York Times , June 2 , 1 8 5 5.
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The deputy returned ashore aboard the tug.

A voyage followed

which was laden with enthusiasm but · otherw�se uneventful.

A

pilot was taken aboard at Tigre Island and the Vesta reached
shore in the Bay of Fonsec a near Realej o on June 1 6.
When the Vesta arrived , the Ledn provisional govern
ment (Democrats) was · . G!Dn.£.i.ned-v to ,...·the· -O cc idental Department .

The L egitimists he l d a l l o f the Oriental and Meridiona l depart

ments , and the departments of Matagalpa and Segovia , though

not occupied by Granadan troops , were under Legitimist sway.
In addition , the position of Cabanas , the Democratic ally ,
was weakening in Honduras.

'

A force under General Lopez ,

aided by Guatemala , had invaded the Department of Gra cias in
the northern part o f Honduras.

Honduran General S antos

Guardiol a (known to Central Americans as "The Butc her ") had
sailed from I ztapa for San Juan del Sur aboard the Costa
Rican schooner , San Jos l, to help the Legitimist.

He had

arrived with his forces in Granada a few days before Walker
landed in Fonseca.

Genera l Mufio z , the old Nicaraguan war

horse , had come out o f retirement in Honduras and had replaced

'

Jerrez as Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic forces .

It was

rumored that Muno z wanted to c ompr�mise with the Legitimists
in order to perpetuate himsel f . in a nationa l government.
Castellon received the news of the arrival o f the Amerc ans in Chinandega with relief and optimism.

He sent a

'

personal emissary to escort Walker to the capital at Leon and ,

in a burst of exuberance , named the contingent o f fiftyeight bearded , barefooted , robust yankees ,
Phalanx " (Falange Americana) .

11
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the American

His enthusiasm appeared to

be unmixed with concern or suspicion over po s sible ulterior
motives that Walker might entertain concerning the mis sion.
With apparent justification he was imperceptive to the
pos sibility that Walker ' s forces might develop into some
thing more than mere auxiliaries serving in the ranks o f
the Democratic army.
Subsequent chroniclers have severely criticized Castellon
for the Walker invitation.

One obs ered :

It i s somewhat difficult to understand , on the suppo si
tion that Cas tello'n was a man of intelligence , why he
should have cons ented to take such a s tep . He ought
to hRVP �nnwn that i t wa s the �os t fata l po l i cy he
could pursue. He ought to have known that by calling
in th�se men , who could not pos s ibly come to fight hi s
battles merely for the purpose o f helping him or his
cause and who could not pos sibly be satis fied with olay
ing any mere subordinate part in the public affairs
of the state , he wa s introducing an enemy incalculably
more dangerous · than any native antagonis t. 5
However , the les s ons to be learned from Walker ' s previous
ef forts in the fi libustering field were not lost on General
Munoz.

With ambitions of achieving national pow�r himsel f ,

he readily recognized the threat that this "Grey-Eyed Man of
Destiny " represented.

5Theodore H. Hi ttell , " History o f ·the F ilibus ter ,
William Walker , " unpublished ms·. ·, . 1 9 15 , Sutro· Library , San
Francisco.
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The initial meeting of Walker with Munoz resulted in
mutually penetrating and chilly apptaisal.

At the first

'

opportunity afterward, Walker made it clear to Castellon that
neither he nor his troops would serve under Munoz' command,

'

to· which Castellon agreed.

Walker probably determined this

course both from his _.ini_tial .. ,personal ·. dis like · o f Munoz and

because of his immediate recognition that the general migh t
thwart him in his ambition.

There seams little doubt, in

view of Walker ' s subsequent actions and testimony, that his
intended service on behal f of the Democratic forces was to
be but a stepping stone to greater political rewards .

He

was little concerned about the relative merits o f the Liberal
and Cons ervative causes, nor did he feel that the financial
and territorial awards agreed upon under the contrac t were
suf ficient inducement for such a bold and dangerous undertak
ing.

It is unlikely that Walker had a concise and prede

termined plan for the political reorganization of Nicaragua ;
however, his flexibility on this question did accomodate the
pos sibility that he would eventually become Chief of State .
Walker had seen enough of his new friends to convince
himself that his ambition had nothing to fear fran such
rivals. Castellon was an amiable and irresolute gentle
man ; Munoz was ambitious and vain, but incapable . The
native soldierv were ill-trained and feeble-minded .
Faction had sti fled any faint sparks of patriotism in
their breasts .
6James Jef frey Roche, By-Ways of War, The Story of the
Filibusters (Boston : Small, Maynard and Company, 1 9 01 ) . 9 7 .
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Some write�s have obliquely alluded to the possibility
N

that Munoz' real quarrel was his je�lousy of and his antagonism for Castellon. Though this remains conjecture, certain
it is that Munoz had always been opposed to American aid on
the grounds that it would lead to foreign domination.
Walker, who aimed at such domination , instinctively knew that

Mu6oz would try to block him. 7

Although Walker himself left

no written record of his grand design for reorganization of
Nicaragua and adjacent territories, there are indications
that the design extended east to Cuba, and C. W. Doubleday ,
one of the Americans who participated in the siege at Granada,
said that Walker planned to make himself emperor of a mighty
slave-holding empire stretching from Texas to the Isthmus
of Panama. 8

A lthough Castellon was primarily concerned about the
security of the Democratic position at Leon an 0. "1arned
Walker to keep his troops as a defensive force, this strategy
did not coincide with Walker's plans.

He convinced Castello�

that the . war stalemate had to be broken and the quickes t, most

assured way of achieving these ends was to occupy Rivas and
the transit road.

This move would provide, he contended,

revenue for the Democratic cause , lighten the tax burden of
the citizens in the Democratic area, and add new spark to the
7 Merri tt Parmalee Alle·n, William Walker,· Filibuster (New
York : Harper and Bros. , 1 9 3 2 ) , 60.
8 rbid. , 5 9
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now feeble tore � of resistance against Granadan domination .
,
His private design, which he did not. divulge to Castellon,

was to occupy the transit route and thereby be in a position
to recruit more American adventurers who would be traveling
between the coastal · area s of the United States.
The plan was authorized by Minister of War Buenaventura
Selva , who also appointed Walker

a

colonel in the Democratic

army on June 2 0 , and offered commis sions to other Americans
whom the latter chose to recommend .

Under the Cons titution

of 18 3 a , a simple declaration by a person born in one of the
American republic s was sufficient to establish citizenship
and most of the Phalanx immediately became naturalized

citizens of Nicaragua. 9

For his part Castellcin provided for a civil governmental

organization in the event the expedition wa s a su c ces s and
gained a foothold in the Meridional Department.

Maximo

Espinosa , owner of a cacao plantation near Rivas and a Demo

cratic sympathizer , wa s to be Minister of Government while
F ranciso Vaca would be appointed Prefect of the Department
and Commissioner of Revenue.
While General Munoz remained with the major part of hi s
force to guard Leon , Walker's forces , along with 2 0 0 native

'·

troops under General Ramirez , embarked on the Vesta and s ailed
down the coast .

Mu;oz now turned his open re sistance to

9walker , War in Nicara gua , 4 1 .
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Walker into treachery, and sent word t o General Guardiola,
commanding the Legitimist garrison at �ivas, that Walker
intended to attck .

In addi tion , it is · highly probable ,

judging from Ra mirez' subsequent action , that he had been
influenced by Munoz' determination to see the Walker forces
destroyed.
On June 2 0, Walker landed at Agua Callito (above San
Juan del Sur) and the next morning marched toward Rivas.
His forces encounted General Bo sch.a , commanding 4 8 0 men , on
the pl�in outside of Rivas .

The native troops , who had been

continually lagging behind on the march , deserted en masse
at the first sound of gun fire.

Walker ' s band was forced to

take refuge in and made a ci tadel o f a nerby house .

Though

Boscha'a troops could not carry the stronghold during the day ,
they succeeded in setting f ire to the house under cover o f
darkness , and Walker's men were forced to fight their way out.
Ten o f the Walker band were killed in the battle, but the
skilled American ri flemen accounted for 1 8 0 Leg i timist
casualties.
The · Walker contingent was not pursued and arrived at San
Juan del Sur , hoping to find the Vesta wai ting.

When Walker

found that the Vesta had not arrived , he dec ided to commandeer
the San Jose , a sloop commanded by Captain Alvarado.

When

Alvarado pleaded neutrality , Walker pointed out that the sloop
which had brought Guardiola from Guatemala to Nicaragua , was

233
· alr�ady deeply involved in the cort flict .

A . short way up the

coast , the San Jose fortuitously rendezvoused with the Vesta ,
to which the _ f i libusters trans ferred .
The Vesta arrived at the Bay of Fonseca on July 6 , and
the Walker contingerit rema ined aboard .

Walker sent a

message to Castello� , charg ing that the desertion of Ramfrez
was ordered by Munoz , and threatened to leave Nicaragua i f
retribution were not directed .

I

Castellon , desperately try-

ing to hold hi s forces together , urged Walker to overlook
this poss ible malfeas a n ce , Walker rej ected C a stellon ' s
entreaties and remained aboard the Vesta .

Actually , Wa l ker

later confessed that hi s refusal to debark was partly strat
egy to ga in more leverage in the use of hi s men and partly
In the mean-

to give his wounded an opportunity to recover .
I

time , Mariano Salazar , a brother-in-law of Castello'n , came
I

aboard and urged Walker to return to Leon because of an
imminent attack by Granadan General Ponci ano Corral .
I

I

Finally , Ca stellon came to Realej o with Salazar and persuaded Wa lker to return to Ledn .

The .next meeting among Walker , �astellon , and Munoz saw

no discu ssion of Walker ' s charges ; however , future utili
zation of the American Phalanx

wa s the subj ect of heated

di s agreement between Walker and Munoz .

The latter wanted the

Phalanx divided into squads and scatter�d among the various
units of the army .

Walker ins i sted on keeping hi s command
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intact and launching another attack against the transit road.
Further to confuse the conference, ·cabanas was now in deep

trouble against his conserva tive foes and calling for help
from his Democratic allies.

The negotiations in relation to

the eisposition of Walker ' s troops spanned the period from
July 6 to August 2 3.

Munoz , trying to arrange an armistic e ,

sent Dr . Roasa.lio Cortez to Granada , pleading· that there
was still time to derail Walker before he beat Guardiola
and marched on Granada .

the communication. 1 0

General Corral made no reoly to

On July 19 , news of the battle of

Saouci in Segovia tran sformed the situation.

Though the

forces led by General Munoz had routed those of Guardiola ,

Muno z had been killed in battle. 11

Walker almost un ilaterally commissioned himself for a
second attempt at the transit road.

An Indian named Jose

I

Mar!a Valle , Subprefect of Chinandega and a warm friend of
the Arnericans1 agreed to help .

Castellon wrote Valle , asking

him and then ordering him , not to j oin the exped ition , point
i ng out that the Democratic capital was sti l l threatened .
Valle forced his faltering chief to withdraw the order when
he indicated that he would alternatively ignore it. 12
Walker's band , with Colonel Mendez and 13 6 native sollO salvatierra , Maximo Jerez , 8 2.
11wheeler to Marcy , September 2 1 , 18 5 5 , National Archives ,
M2 1 9 , 1 0/23.
1 2 walker , War in Nicaragua. 8 0 .

diers , set sail . on the Vesta and the schooner Esperanz a .
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Arriving i n San Juan del Sur on August 2 8 , they made
preparations until September , when they began marching for
Virgin Bay.

Shortly after arriving at an unoccupied Virgin

Bay , . the Democratic forces heard fir�ng about one mile from
town .

54 0 Leg itimi st troops under Guardiola swarmed across

the plains .

With the native contingent of the Democratic

forces performing as brilliantly as the Americans , Guardiola ' s
forces wer� routed.

The Democrats , while suffering only

fourteen wounded , inflicted about a hundred casualties on
the Leg itimists and captured a rms , ' armnunition , baggage and
the papers of Guard iola himself.

W�lker ' s forces then re

turned to San Juan del Sur where many Leg itimist deserters
joined them , indicating that the opposition armies were either
becoming demorali zed or scattered .
Guardiola , with 6 0 0

However , Corral and

troops , fell back on Riv �s on Sept-

ember 12 .
From September 13 until October 3 , Walker remained in
San Juan del Sur , receiving new recruits from S an Franc isco.
During this time over six hundred Nicaraguans died of cholera .
The epidemic had begun in Granada during the siege and had
inexorably spread north .

Among the victims was Castellon ,

who was replaced by Na zario Escoto .

In addition to this news ,

Walker learned that Corral and Guardiola _ had quarreled and
that Guardiola had returned to gonduras.

Adding to his
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American reinforcements, Walker recruited native troops and
attended to further financing.

He ievied "contributions" of

$ 10 0-$ 150 on res i dent Americans and other foreigners in San
Juan del Sur.

United States Consul John Priest was forced

to pay when Walker ' s troops seized his hou se a�d took him
prisoner .

In reply. :to ·Priest ' s protest, Walker said he

neither recognized Pries�, who was accredited to the Legiti
mist government,

or his protest. 13

On September 10, Walker took his ·reorganiz ed and rein
forced troops again to Virgin Bay, presumably to con solidate
control of the transit route.

H9wever , upon reaching there

he intercepted despatche s and letters to Corral from Co�ral ' s
adjutant general, Fernando C hamorro.

The interceptions

di sclosed a rather destitute condition of the government at
Granada and its inability to assist its commander-in-chief
at Rivas with more men.

In addition, they indicated that

Granada was almost entirely undefended, that the spirit of
the people was drooping, and that the chief s of the party had
begun to despair of maintaining the war much longer if
vigorously pressed by the Democratic forces.
Walker ' s first reaction to this intelligence was to
. advise Corral of the interception and to intimate that an
armistice would be good for both.

Corral merely acknowledged .

receipt of the message and rather mysterious ly included some
l3 pries t to Marcy, September 11, 18 55, National Archives,
Tl52, 1/6.
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some penned sign·s .

According to Walker's advisors , the signs

were Masonic and indicated that Corral was willing to nego
tiate with another Mason.

dence ceased . 14

At this point , the correspon

· It is possible that Walker actually had no intention of
negotiating with Corral.: then , ..because it would have been
impossible to n egotiate from a position of suf ficient strength
to have obtained his desired goa ls.

It is likely that he

merely wished to confirm the validity o f the intercepted
reports- by determining whether or not Corral would be willing
to negotiate an armistic e .

Although the transit road had

been Walker's number one obj ective , its oc cupation was merely
a means to an end , the end being the subj ugation of the
Legitimist forces .

With the knowledge of the weakened condi

tion of Granada , he probably perc eived a shortcut to this
goal .

Therefore , when the Ac c essory Transit Company ' s

steamer Virgin anchored close to the Virgin Bay pier on Octo
ber 11 , Walker took a party and boarded it .

For three hours

on the afternoon of October 12 , he embarked his men for
Granada . ·
It is possible that Walker had earlier anticipated
utilizing in some fashion the servic es of the transit company
to supply his troops and conduct his campaign .
14walker , War in Nicaraqua ; 1 0 4 .

Before leaving
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Leon on the second expedition �o occupy the transit route,

Walker had unrealistically been authorized. by the government
at Leon to settle the differences between the Nicaraguan
government and the transit company.

On October 3, while

Walker was still at San Juan del Sur , the steamer Cortez
arrived from S an Francisco .• . . . Aboard . the steamer · was C. J.
McDonald , a confidential agent of Corn�lius K. Garrison ,
the San Francisco manager of the transit company.

McDonald

appar ently proposed a scheme to Walker whereby control of the
transit company would be wrested by Garrison from Vanderbilt.
Garrison would see that men and supplies were shipped to
Walker aboard the company ' s ships arid that the lake steamers
were made available for Walker's campaigns in Nicaragua.
Walker , in turn , upon assuming ascendancy in the republic ,
would revoke the company ' s present charter , presumably on

grounds of failure to . pay the contractual profit percentage ,
and then re-award the charter and the nationalized capital
equipment to Garrison . 15

It is in this light that Walker's

commandeering of the Virgin for an attack on Granada must
be viewed.
Actually the transit company was already involved in
transporting mercenaries , but hot to fight for Walker .

On

July 5 , 18 5 5 , a9out fifty men had left New York bound for
Nicaragu a aboard the company's ste.amship Star of the West .
15 scroggs , "Walker and the Steamshi:P Corporation" , 792-811
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They had been hired as soldiers b y White, company counsel in
New York, and by Jose de Marcoleta, ·the Nicaraguan Minister

to the United States , with the transit company paying the
expenses.

The band had been organized in . a military company

to protect the interests o f the transit company.

Minister

Wheeler added that it was " for the furth�r purpose of aiding
the present government of Nicaragua , as- will appear by a
letter from the command ing general of the Nicaraguan army
[ presumably Corral] to Colonel Gazynski" .

Shortly after

their arrival , according to Wheeler , - the group disbanded .
Some (with Gazynski ) returned to the United States , some
stayed on as laborers working for the transit company , some
joined a colonizing expedition on the Caribbean side , and
others enlisted as soldiers in the Nicaraguan army. 1 6

Despite the reference in Corral ' s letter to Gazynski
concerning services in the Nicaraguan army , White , surpris
ingly enough , seemed to be unaware o f the entire nature of
the expedition.

Writing to Colonel Gazynski on August 6 ,

he reminded Gazynski that he had been sent to Nicaragua in
the services of the transit company and for no other reason �
"Your place is on the river , " he pointed out and threat�ned
to replace· Gazynski . 1 7

l 6 whee'ler to Marcy , September 2 1 , 1 8 5 5 , National
Archives , M 2 1 9 , 1 0/2 3
1 7 Joseph L. White to Colonel Titus Felix Gazynski ,
August 6 , 1 8 5 5 , Ibid :
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Wheeler's reference to a letter from Corral to Gazyns ki
is confusing.

In a letter written August 28 by Corral to

Gazynski , Corral turned down Gazynski's offer of services ,
protesting that Gazynski ' � price was too high. 18 It appears
that Gazynski had an agreement with Marcoleta about which
White was not aware.

Either .the terms under which Gazynski ' s

troops would serve the Legitimist banner were not firm , or
he raised the price upon arrival.

It is also pos sible that

Corral knew nothing of the deal before the Star of the
West docked at San Juan del Norte.

In any event , when

Gazynski encountered the rebuff , he packed up and returned
to the United States , leaving his er·stwhile companions on
their own.

A significant res u lt of this episode was that

Walker later used Gazynski ' s offer as part of his pretext
for fulfilling his part of the bargain with Garrison .
At 12 : 0 0 midnight on October 12 , Walker , with 2 0 0
Americans and 2 5 0-3 0 0 native troops under General Valle ,
disembarked two miles northeast of Granada.

After a short

battle early the follc:wing day , the city fell and the President fled. 1 9

Walker calmed the citizen s by issuing a pro-

clarnation for the protection of persons and property , and
18 corral to Gazynski , August _28 , 18 5 5 , Ibid.

19wheeler .- s account listed the American troops as ninety
two and estlmated battle time as fifteen minutes . Wheeler
to Marcy , October 14 , 18 5 5 , Ibid . , 10/25.
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kept strict discipline , in contrast to traditional ravages
by · conquerors in the long civil war .

According to the

account of t�e battle in the first edition of El Nicara
guense , Walker's fledgling newspaper , the Walker forces
released eighty prisoners--men , women , and children--chained

in the San Francisco Church. 2 0

Walker , in turn , imprisoned

the maj or leaders of the Legitimi st party who had not escaped
during the confu sion and the initial occupation.

The next day , October 14 , was a Sunday , a traditional
day in �Granada for political activity.

The day opened with

a sermon in the main cathedral by Padre Vij il which exerted
the citizens to peace , modera tion , and the putting away of
revolutionary passions.

According to William V . Wells an

early chronicler of Walker's adventures , . efforts were made
by prominent Granadinos to persuade Walker to acc ept the
presidency �

A resolution to this effect was signed by

Rosario Viva , Sebastia'n Maranco , Pedro Quadra , the Lacayos ,
and others.

"A Proposition of peace has been made by which

Walker . is appointed provi s ional ?res ident for one month and
an election to be ordered by the people , and the President

elect to take office at .the end of one month. " 2 1

Walker

declined the office in favor of Legitirnist General Corral ,

22

2 0El Nicaraguense , October 2 0 , 1 8 5 5.
.
21
Wheeler to Marcy , October 1 4 , 1 8 5 5 , National Archives ,
M219 , 10/2 5
2 2 wells , Walker ' s Exped ition , 66.
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but it appears that Walker's rejection of the offer was not
as magnanimous as it was pragmatic. · Rather than become a
temporary figurehead , Walker perceptively surmised that his
best course was to obtain control of the armed forces and
this· wield the ultimate weapon in the jockeying for power.
At this point , John H. Wheeler , the United States Minister
resident in Nicaragua , was persuaded by the Gran �dinos to
offer Walker ' s peace terms to General Corral at Rivas.
Wheeler had been commissioned by · the Dep�rtment of
State to secure the adherence of Nicaragua t6 the interna
tional neutrality laws then being sponsored by the United
States 2 3 and to re-negotiate a treaty of peace , amity ,
corrunerce , naviagtion , and protection which in its initial

form had been unacceptable to the United States Senate. 2 4
After arriving in Nicaragua on December

22

, 1 8 5 4 , and after

an interlude at San Juan del Sur , Wheeler left for Granada
from Virgin Bay on January

26

, 1 8 5 5.

Because of internal

strife he regarded the trip by steamer as too dangerous and
arrived at Granada via horseback on January

2 9.

Upon his request , the besieging Democrats allowed him
twenty-four hours to enter the city and retrieve the American
23

Marcy to Wheeler , October 1 8 , 1 8 5 4 , National Archives ,
M77 , 27/2
24

rbid � , October 2 3 , 1 8 5 4 , , M77 ,

2 7/ 3 .
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Ministry's archives.

While in the city, Wheeler promised
.
Chamorro neutrality on the part of the United States and said
that he would dissuade any Americans from taking part in the
war.

He indicated that he would retrieve the archives and

return to Virgin Bay until the war had ended and new orders
were received from the DP.partment of State.
that this was the proper course. 2 5

Chamorro agreed

When the Democratic siege was lifted and the Legitimists
were advancing on Ledn , it appeared to Wheeler that the war
was drawing to a close .

He therefore advised the State

Department that he would go to Granada on March 2 6 and added ,
"If justified by circumstances , I shal l present my creden

tials to the President ( Estrado [ sic ] ) " 2 6

On March 3 1 , Wheeler

arrived in Granada and on April 7 , he presented his creden
tials to the Legitimist government , congratulating the govern
ment that the war was about to ena. 2 7

Wheeler never seemed to take the Democratic threat
seriously until the surprising fall of Granada, and he carried
on normal , diplomatic intercourse with the Legitimist govern
ment up ·until that time.

However , he was well aware of the

devastation and anarchy resulting from the war , and the
2 Swheeler to Marcy, February 3 , 18 5 5 , M2 19, 10/ 6

2 6 rbid. , March 2 0 , 18 5 5 , M 2 1 9 , 10/9

2 7 Ibid , April 11 , 18 5 5 , M 2 1 9 , 10/10 .
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pos sibility of peace at last arrived like a millennium.

In

addition , though there is no writte� indication of it , he
was undoubtedly influenced in his later support of the fili
buster government by the strong and determined will of
Walker.

Therefore , he accepted the commis sion to carry

Walker ' s offer of peac e negotiations to Corral at Rivas.
Wheeler , accompanied by his private secretary , Thomas
F. Van Dyke, and by Juan Rui'z , Minister of War under Es trada
(who had given his "parole of honor" that he would return),
left af midnight on October 1 5.

They reached Rivas about

2: 0 0 p . m. on October 1 5 and found that Corral was not there .
Wheeler waited a few hours and when he announced that h�
int�nded to return to Granada he was placed under house
arrest by the Legitimists.

After two days , the steamer

Virgin forced his release at cannon point and Wheeler returned
to Virgin Bay to await Corral ' s response.
Corral ' s mes sage of October 1 7 accused Wheeler of inter
ference , advised him that he intend�d to inform the Secretary

of State and the newspapers in New Yor k , and disclaimed any
respons ibility for the American minister ' s future safety.

Wheeler rejected the accu sation in his October 1 8 reply and
informed Corral that he would wait two more days for the
Legitimist chief ' s response to Walker ' s offer .

After the two

days were up , Wheeler returned from his unsuccessful mis sion
to Granada .
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The reverberations from Wheeler's trip were felt in
Washington , and he was reprimanded for interference by

Secretary of State Wi l liam L. Marcy . 2 8 . Wheeler attempted to

explain the situation and the reason for his action :

"No

other course could be taken than that which was pursued by
me • • . •

I feel a,s sured , therefore , that the Presi dent

and you , on a ful l knowledge of the facts and . history of the

case , wil l j ustify and approve · of my course . " 2 9

Later ,

Nicaraguan historians berated Whee ler • s action , ca l l ing him

"the fi l ibuster minister . 3 0
11

An event again involving the transit company assumed
significant stature in the developments .

On October 15 ,

the stramer Corte z arrived at San Juan del Sur from San
Francisco with Colonel Birkett D . Fry ' s Nicaraguan battalion
of sixty men , recruited and accompanied by Parker H . French .
The band was under the misapprehension that a s,1ift and
unexpected blow might topple Legitimist resist�nce , and
believed that consolidation of command of the transit route
was still of maj or importa nce .

On October 1 8 , they boarded

the Virgin at Virgin Bay , along with other passengers and
cargo , with the intention of forcing the surrender of Fort
San Carlos at the eastern entrance to the lake.

Their

28Marcy to Wheeler , November 8 , 18 5 5 , M 7 7 , 2 7/13
2 9wheeler to Marcy , December 15 , 18 5 5, M2 1 9 , 10/ 3 2

30 s alvatierra , Maximo Jere z , 8 5 .
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demand for surrender was rej ected ; the Virg in f ired upon , and
an attempted landing by riflemen repulsed.

The other pas sen

gers now had . to content themselves with returning to Virgin
Bay.
An hour after the attack , the transit steamer San Carlos
arrived at Fort San Carlos from the Toro Rapids with pas sen
gers from New York .

The fort fired on the steamer , damaging

the engines and killing a woman and her child.

After the

misunderstanding was cleared up , the steamer was allowed to
proceed to Virgin Bay .

The next day , Fry's troops entered

Virgin Bay , attacking and killing some of the detained
pas sengers .

When no Walker troops were found , the remaining

pas sengers were allowed to go to Granada to be put under the
protection of Wheeler . 3 1

Mateo Mayorga , a Legitimist cabinet

minister who had been in asylum in Wheeler ' s house , was
delivered up by Wheeler to Walker , who arranged for his exe
cution under the pretext of reprisal against the attacks on
American citizens .

Walker determined on this course because

the Legitimist threatened to throttle the transit road , and
Walker could abandon Granada to prevent it.

He felt he had

to aid the transit company to assure its support , and he
31Affidavits of George B . Slocum , Captain of the steamer
San Carlos , and others , given to Wheeler , October 2 3 , 185 5 ,
Wheeler to Marcy , December 15 , 1 855 , National Archives , M2 1 9 ,
1 0/ 3 2.
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could not punish French and Fry without risking encouraging

the enemy. 3 2

The Legitimist threat to isolate Walker in Granada
neces sitated a dramatic move.

This move was the execution of

Mayorga and a mes sage to Corral that the remaining prisoners
would be executed if Corral continued to refuse to negoti
ate.

The Legitimists then · faced 'the '· pos s ibility that Walker

might effectively dec imate the ranks of the leaders of the
Legitimist party and might even execute members of the
families of the Legitimist leaders outside of Granada .

In

addition , Corral probably expected the peace terms to name
him chief executive in a provisiona � government .

He per

suaded Estrada to authorize negotiations by pointing out that
the release would mean that Walker wo ul� henceforth col laborate with the Legitimists .
Corral arrived to negotiate on October 23 and agreed on
some general terms with Walker .

Hostilities would be sus

pended and the two governments which had existed since the
beginning of the revolution would dis appear .

Selected pro

visions of the Constitution of 18 38 would be respected .

The

governmental seat would be in Granada , with Patricio Riva s ,
customers officer in San Carlos, who was

Legitimi st

but actually almost a political , as provisional president for
fourteen months .

Four ministers of state would be appointed

32Allen, William Walker , 84 .
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by the President , with Corral serving as Minister of . . War.
A general amnesty was proclaimed and plans were made for the
reduction and disarmament of both armies.
Walker actually allowed Corral to take the initiative
in the negotiations· and virtually dictate the terms of the
treaty ; thus , "nearly a ll clauses were of Corral's author
ship. "

Walker then trapped Corral by qu1 etly insisting on

being named Commander-in-Chief of Arms . 3 3 · From t.his T?Oint on ,

Walker as he had anticipated , was virtual master of the
situation .

The treaty was formally signed by Walker and

Corra l on October 2 3 and consecrated in a solemn Te Deum in
the cathedral in Granada a week later .
Walker represented himself as acting on behalf of the
Democrats , and declared he would subdue them if they did not
agree to the convenant .

When the news of the settlement

reached Leon , there was surprise and consternation .

A meet-

ing was cailed among the . Democratic leader� to determine
what attitude should be assumed in the face of these events.
Many wanted . to disavow Wa lker , but Norberto Ramfrez , a

former chief-of-state , declared that the choice was two abysses,

one soon and the other later.

Therefore , the Democrats

a pproved the provisional government and sent a delegation to
Granada which arrived on October 3 1 .
3 3 Laurence Greene , The Filibuster {New York :
Merrill , 1 9 3 7 ) , 12 3 .

Bobbs
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Corral, who had expected a unilateral cabinet, was
angui shed at the introduction by Rivas (at Walker's behest )
of the Democrats into the ministries . 34

Minis ter of Public Credit.

Jerez was named

Ferrer was a wealthy Granadino

who, · like Rivas had taken no part in the revolution .
Even before the new government could be established,
an unsettling event occured .

Corral, brooding over what he

regarded as a betrayal by Walker, wrote letters to Legitimis t
General Pedro Xatruch and to General Guardiola, both at
Tegucigalpa.

The letters obliquely requested intervention

by these generals with troops before Walker's control could
be solidi fied.

They were intercepted, and General Vall�

delivered them to Walker .
Walker immediately had Corral arrested and, at his s ubse
quent court martial, Corral admitted authorship.

The court

sentenced Corral to execution, but recommended that the
Commander of Arms {not the President ) 9rant mercy.

Even

Corrall ' s wife and daughters formally called on Walker and
begged reprieve in tearful wails.

"But upon the countenance

of Walker, there was not visible a particle of emotion.

His

features were calm and placid, and his cold, pas sionles s gray
eyes relaxed nothing of its [ sic ] ordinary frigidity . 11 35
34salvatierra, Maximo J;rez, 91 -94.

1855.

35J. C . Kewen in the San Franci sco Herald, December 14,
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According to Walker ' s own testimony , he felt c ompelled to
sustain the sentence to avoid further conspiracies by either
Corral or other Legitimist leaders .

Corral was executed at

2: 00 p. m . on November 8 , 1 8 5 5 , in the main plaza .
. walker's action wa s exceedingly �npopular , and cost him
much of the support he had enjoyed from his initia l moder
ation .

11

Whichever way he turned , immediately there aros e a

cry from the Legitimists or the Democrats , the transit
company or its rivals , the northern s tate s or the southern
state s ,* the Central Americ an republic s or England , that he

s hould have turned some other way . n· 3 6

Buenaventura S elva

was named to replace Corral a s Minister of War .
With his apparent imperturbability and his single
mindedne s s of purpo s e , Walker rode out the storm of protest .
He perhaps felt that respec t for his new government wa s f ar more
important than ephemeral popularity and the good will of the
rank- and-file Granadinos .
two major ta sks at hand :

He now turned his attention to
the organization of the government

and the recognition of its leg itimacy .

In add ition , Walker

had to addre s s hims elf to organizing the politi cal divisions
of the state (Figure 10) .

3 6 Allen , William Walker , 9 3 .
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Nic.araguan Politi.

CHAPTER VI I I
WALKER'S FILIBUSTER GOVERNMENT
Perhaps American influence w i l l tend to pur i fy Nica
raguan bus inessmen's principles and elevate their ·
conduct . With thi s idea it w i l l prove a b lessing
if the whole of Central America becomes Americanized
by the industrious and-··enterprizing from the North. 1
On October 2 3 ,

1855

, Wheeler informed Secretary Marcy

of the peace treaty between Walker and Corral which had j ust

been signed and said that he would await · instructions from
the Department regarding recognition.

The observation , how�

ever , that this was the first apparent peace in thirty �ears ,
and that El Salvador , Honduras , and Nicaragua would for� a
federal republic, indi cated something of his feelings vi s-a-vi s

the new g�vernment. 2

On November 6 , Wheeler advised the De

partment of the constitution of the new government and the
execution of Corral • . Quoting from Wheaton ' s Elements of Inter
national Law concerning de facto recognition , he observed , " I .
shall feel authorized to present myself to the Pres i dent of the
provisional government , bel ieving that this course wi l l meet
your entire approbation. 11 3

Two days later , he presented his

credential s to the new government and, according to an account
!wheeler to Marcy , June
M219 , 1 0/57.
2 Ibid. , October 2 3 ,

3 Ibid. , November 8 ,

15

,

1 8 56 ,

National Archives ,

1855

, · ibid. ,

1 0/2 7.

1855

, ibid. ,

1 0/2 8.
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in Walker's ne�spaper , "acknowledged on the part of the
government he so ably represents , the independence and sovereign

ty of the government established by the treaty o f 2 3d ultimo. 11 4
Shortly afterward , Wheeler told the Department that the new
government would be permanent , and that El Salvador and Hon
duras sent their congratulations.
Costa Rica must fall in. Guatemala , the determined foe
of Nicaragua , will seek and find ready cause of Quarrel
and will attack her--in which aided by San Salvador and
Honduras and the adventurous spirits from the United
States and elsewhere , Guatemala wil l be badly whipped.
Then wil l come a confederated union of the five repub
lics and with it , I trust Peac� , Science and Civilization . 5
The Department's reply was delayed in arrival , and demon
s trated a major difference in as ses sments of the situation :
It has more the appearance of a s ucce s s ful marauding
expedition than a change of government or rulers .
Should the mas s of people of Nicaragua be unwilling
or unable to repel this inroad or shake off this usur
pation , and ultimately submit to its rule , then it
will become de facto a government and res ponsible
for the outrages which have been committed upon the
rights and persons of American citizens. Then this
· ·government wil l demand and exact , ample indemnity
and satis faction from it. 6
This exchange brings dramatically into focus the cros s
purpose s between Wheeler and Marcy.

Wheeler had experienced

the trial s of the s avage civil war and had seen the devas4El Nicaraguense , November 1 0 , 1 8 5 5.

5wheeler to Marcy , November 1 2 , 1 855 , National Archives ,
M2 1 9 , 1 0/29 •
. 6Marcy to Wheeler , November 8 , 1 855 , ibid. , M7 7 , 27/13.
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tation it was causing . . He was caught up i n the prevail ing
spirit of optimism that , hopefully , a final settlement had
been found .

To this end , he wanted to lend the prestige o f

h i s o f fice to the consolidation o f the armis ti ce .

Marcy was

concerned about neutrality and about identi fying a legal
government on which damages could be as ses sed .

Nonetheless ,

Wheeler acceded to the ins truc tions from h i s superior :
"S ince the reception o f thi s despatch . • • I have abs tained
from all o fficial intercourse w ith the persons now exerci s ing
�ontrql over this republic and wi l l not es tabl ish diplomatic
intercourse until ins tructed. 1 1 7

In addition to addres s ing himsel f to the routine problems
of organizing a revolutionary government , Walker turned hi s
a ttention toward two other ef fort s :
tion .

co�onization and recogni

In· order to s timulate colon i zation , he i s sued decree s

guaranteeing li fe and property , and attempted to attrac t Ameri
can scienti fic and indus trial talent .

J • . W . Fabens was appointed.

D irector o f Co loni zation , and on November 2 8 he i s sued a home
s teading decree which provided two hundred and fi fty acres for
a s ingle person , wi th an additional one hundred for each person
with a fami ly .

A non-trans ferable title would be granted af ter

s ix months ' occupancy ; the coloni zers would be free from import

duties , taxes , or public service except in emergencies . 8

As a

result of thi s decree , American coloni sts began arriving in
7wheeler to Marcy , December 24 , 1 8 5 5 , ib id . , M2 1 9 , 1 0 / 3 5 .

8wel ls , Walker ' s Expedi tion , 9 8 .
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in Nicaragua on· both sides of the republic.
As important as recognition by" the other Central American
nations was recognition by the United States.

French resigned

as Minister of H acienda ( finance) and was appointed minister to
the · united States.

He left San Juan . del Norte on December 3

for New York, carrying a letter of introduction from Wheeler
and the trea.ty ¼1heeler had negoti ated, for the purpose of ex

changing rati f ications. 9

From New York French went directly to Washington and sent
a note- to Marcy on December 12.

The note s a id French was the

accredited Nicaraguan representative to Wa shington and requested
an early interview before presenting his credentials.

Marcy ' s
I

note of December 2 1 said that the Pres ident "has not yet seen
rea sons for establishing dip lomatic intercourse w ith the per
sons who now claim to exercise pol itical power in the state of
Nicaragua. "

Marcy a l �o charged that those who �verthrew the

former government were not citi zens and that citi zens had not
had an opportunity to expres s their will.

Unti l such time, the

Pres ident would not receive French or anyone else from that

governm�nt. 10

As a result of American non-recognition, Guatema la, Hon
duras, and Costa Rica refused even to correspond with the new
government o

Friendly efforts to establ i sh conunerce with other

9 Wheeler to Marcy, November 3 0, 18 5 5 , National Archives,
M2 19, 10/ 3 1 .
l O Wells, Walker's Expedition, 9 9.
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Central American states were rebuffed with unequivocal in
dications of hostility. 11

In the meantime , Walker was stil l receiving support
from the Garrison faction of the transit company.

McDonald ,

the company representative , had taken $ 2 0 , 000 in gold bullion
from a shipment crossing the Isthmus and had given the owner
drafts on Charles Morgan , Garrison" s accomplice and company
manager in New York.

The bul lion found its way into the cof

fers of the new government , and the government , in turn , agreed

to dequct the amount from the transit company's annual payment. 12
In addition , French , wit� Morgan's support , proposed in
New York that the transit company transport inunigrants to
Nicaragua and deduct twenty dol lars a person from the debt.

Nei ther Vanderb i lt nor White suspected the ulterior motives of
the Garrison-Morgan faction , despite Wheeler's caution to Marcy
concerning the situation:

"The Government wi l l early institute

an inquiry by what warrant the transit company owns their char
ter , and the inquiry may result in it b eing declared forfeited
so far as the transit over the is thmus is concerned. "13

It

is l ikely that Vanderbi lt suspected nothing concerning the con
spiracy.

At · any rate , from December , 185 5 , to Februa.ry , 185 6 ,

about one thousand immigrants . were transported by the transit
company. 1 4
ll i b id. , 147.

12 scroggs , "Walker and th3 Steamship Corporation , " 7 9 5.

13Wheeler to Marcy , December 1 5 , 185 5 , National Archive s ,
M2 19 , 10/32 .
14scroggs , "Walker and the Steamship Corporation , " 7 9 6.
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On December 3 , General Cabanas arrived from Costa Rica
where he had been in exi le s ince being deposed in Honduras.
He now requested . a return on his investment in helping the
Liberals mount the May , 1854 , revolution. There sti l l re
mained two months 'in Cabanas r pres idential tenure in Honduras ,
and he wanted help to overthrow Guardiola , now in power , in
order to as sure Legitimi st succes s ion.

Wal��r refused the

aid because he regarded Cabanas as old and useles s :
The very obstinacy with which he asked to be restored
before the expiration of his time was proof of the
tendency of his mind to dwell on unimportant points .
Incapable of looking at the affairs of Central America
with general views , he seemed a Mora zAn Federal ist ,
dwindled by age to a Honduras officia1. l S
Walker also claimed that he did not help Caba�as because he
�anted more time to prcp�re £0� the inevitabl e blow tha t the
other state s would strike.

It was later al leged that Walker

actually refused because he saw he could not manage the old

warrior. 16

,

.

Both Jerez and Buenaventura res i gned from the

.-v

cabinet in di sgl;lst when Walker refused to cooperate with Cabanas .
Wheeler's view of Caba�as was more sympathetic than that

of Walker .

He referred to the old Honduran as being "esteemed

as one of the most l iberal and honorable men in Central America ."
Probably . for that reason , and because i t bef itted his role as

a " diplomat � " he was more patient with Cabanas.
15walker , War in Nicaragua , 162.

The latter

16 Ricardo Duefias Van Severen , La Invas i�n Fil ibustera
(El Salvador: Director General of Publ ications , 19 6 2 ) , 84.
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wanted to know . whether the United States approved o f its
citizens coming to Central America, or whether it would pre
vent the attempt to " destroy the nationality of Central Ameri
ca? " - Wheeler replied that American po licy since President
Washington had bee·n non-interference in dome stic difficulties
of other nations .

He pointed out that . the United States had

stopped Co lonel Kinney , and had indicted _ _ o f f icial s o f the
British government for recruiting for the Crimean War .

But

if American citizens left that country and enlisted in a foreign
s ervice, the United State s was no longer re sponsib le--either
to restrain or protect them .
Wheeler as sured Caba�as that the United S tate s would no t
intervene to aid Walker if Guatemala--j oined by other states- 
made war o n him .

Cabanas then obs erved that if Walker did not

get reinforcements, Guatemala led by Carrera, and Honduras,
with Guardio la at the helm ( " both uns crupulous and unprinci
pled, desperate and bloody " ) would run the filibuster out or
kil l him .

This was ominous--and eerily pres cient--but Wheeler

remained sanguine .

He asserted that they would get whipped if

they tried, for every steamer brought more people--farmers ,
merchants, miners--but mostly soldiers .

The American · govern

ment was not involved , he continued , but the spirit of enter
prise and adventure
was strong i.n . the American character .
.
Then Cabanas changed the s ub j ect s lightly, expre s sing ad
miration for the Monro e Doctrine and saying that he hoped the
United States would ·force out o f Central America the Briti sh,
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whom he styled as "oppre s s ive , arrogant , and in sulting . " ·
He observed that the Briti sh had tust taken Roatan I s land ,
which commands the Honduran coast , and were extending the ir
control in other parts of Central America . 1 7

Cabanas ' feelings about Great Britain were agreeab le to
both Wheeler and Walker .

Wheeler said that the United States

was aware of British activities , and would e ither make Britain
conform to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty or uni late rally ab rogate

the agreement . 1 8

A recent article in El N icaraguense had said :

England , the ever grasping and never satis fied , has
iong looked with lustful eyes on our repub l ic , and
the co llection of States which formed the Central
American Confederation ; and has more than once un
blushingly asserted her de s ire to promote Briti sh
interests at the expense of North America . 1 9
Even if this were--as the Wa lker apologi sts s eemed to
contend--the official po licy o f the British government , there
were sti l l some thoughtful men in England .

The . Times of London

propo sed that Great Britain give up its c laims to Bel i ze ,
Mo squito , and Roatan , if the United States would fo rce the
fil ibusters out o f Ni caragua .

The arti cle referred to Wa lker

and his col leagues as " murderers , robbers ; and pirate s . "

It

fur ther contended that European--e specia l ly Engli sh--enmity
and interference had pr emature ly forced the United S tate s to
1 7 wheeler to Marcy , Dec ember 2 4 , 1 8 5 5 , National Archive s ,
M21 9 , 1 0/ 3 5 .
1 8 rbi·a .

1 9 El Nicaraguense , Noverobe r 1 7 , 18 5 5.
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action , for example in · the cas es of Califbrnia and Texas.
Europe , it said , should we l come a strong Central American
Confederation as a counter-balance to United States expansion.
Nonethe les s , it mourned , all e f forts by Nicaraguan l eaders
to estab lish relations had been rebuf fed , and the consequences
would surely be that " General Walke r wil l build up a strong
American auxiliary to the United Stat'e s on the I sthmus . 11 2 0

Unfortunately for Walker , the reality seemed otherwis e ,
and with the rebuff of his minister to Washington , he was
tentatively looking elsewhere for financia l and perhap s moral
s uppo rt.

El Nicaraguense , Walker ' s paper , editorialized that

Nicaragua had two traditional courses , American and European ,
and as the United States had virtual ly shut the door on one
of them , the only al ternative was Englan d and Europe . The prob
lem had always been that English capital us ua l ly took over once
invited in.

The editorial cited as an example Mexico , "which

is in debt slavery , [and ] can ' t make a move without cons ulting
England . "

Nicaragua , however , was now strong enough to have

no fear , and it needed European capital .

The s tate was too poor

to build the things it needed : a ship canal , railroads , quartz
machines , and saw mills .

Why shouldn ' t Nicarag ua trade directly

with the manufacturing source , Liverpool rather than Boston ?
Nicaragua ' s coffee , sugar , cotton , cocoa , indigo , and rice
didn't need transshipment .

The merchants o f Hamburg , LiverJ:X)Ol ,

2 0 Q uoted in ibid . , March 1 5 , 1 8 5 6 .
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Antwerp , and Bordeaux would buy as readily f rom Nicaragua
as the merchants o f New York , and the cost � and commis sion s
to New York agents woul d be saved.

Perhaps as a result , the

tide of industrious European immigrants might be diverted from
the United States ·to Nicaragua , as the latter would offer more
promi sing inducements o f resources to . be developed and forttm.es
to be made .

Finally , Nicaragua was not bound by the Clayton

Bulwer Treaty , and that should prove to be a maj or advantage . 21

But there was stil l the Mo squito problem with the British
government .

On February 8 , 1 8 5 6 , Walke r ' s government had i s

sued a proclamation af firming· that the Mo squito Coast was an

integral part o f Nicaragua.

This was p re s umably to nul l i fy

the formal renunc iation forced
in 1 8 4 8 .

upon Nicaragua by the B ritish

The decree was largely ignored by the British , so

Walker sought other mea sures to gain Briti sh acceptance .

In

June , General Domingo de Goicouria was dis patched to England
as Nicaraguan minister with full powers to settle the Mosquito

question , in addition to negotiating treaties and loan s. 2 2
Un fortunately , his mi ss ion came to l ittl e .

It was not until

18 6 0- - long after Walker ceas ed to play a role in Ni caraguan
af fairs--that a treaty was signed with Great Britain · which pro•
vided for nominal incorpo ration of the eastern coast with the
nation , under the form of an autonomous re servation .
2 1 Ibid . , March 2 2 , 1 8 5 6.

And it

2 2 wheeler to Marcy , June 2 2 , 1 8 5 6, National Archives ,·
M2 1 9 , 1 0 /5 8 .
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was not until the end of the century that full Nicaraguan
j urisdiction over the Mosquitos was · e s tab�ished .
Inve s tment , however , was not the mos t immediate of
Walker's foreign problems .

His firs t priority was securing

men , and the authoritie s in the United State s were impeding
his efforts in this . respect. - The Mew . York "Herald reporte d
that on Chris tmas Eve , 1 8 5 5 , Captain Faunce o f the revenue
cutter Washington had received orders from the New York Dis 
trict Attorney to fore s tall the sailing o f the Acce s sory
Transit Company ' s Northern Light .

At the Battery , Captain

Faunce took off two hundred men from s teerage who had no
tickets ; these were apparently bound for Nicaragua to help
Walker , and were characterized as "stowaway s . "

( I t appear s

that the company initial ly disavowed them , de spite the earlier
agreement . )

The men c laimed to be colonist s who had been

promised two hundred �i fty acre s for cultivation upon their
arrival in Nicaragua .

About twenty-five in cabin cla s s did

not have tickets either , but Jo seph N. Scott , the company
agent at Greytown , explained that the se men were being trans
ported down to work on pro j ects o f the company , � . , build
fence s , make s tone wal l s , work the _ s tone quarrie s , build .a

coal depot , and build a wharf on the Pacific side .

He opined

that the native s would not work , and that al l the "white s "
were either. wi th Walker or headed · for California a s soon as
they got the money .

As a re s ul t , the company cons tantly
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needed resupply.

The men wou ld be given tickets as soon as

the ship c leared the bay.
But Joseph L. White, the attorney and one o f the direc
tor s of the company , was still fighting Walker's battle s.
In a letter to District Attorney John McKean at New York , he
declared that the company .�did .not' wittingly carry mercenaries

to Central America , but anununition and other supplie s as paid
freight to a duly-constituted government was another que stion .
In response to McKeon ' s assertion that the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty forbade colonists , White denied it.

The treaty said

that the United State s and Great Britain as " corporate enti
ties " could not colonize , but it did not re fer to individual s.
This , he continued , was up to rhe N i �a raguan gove r��ent , �nder
whose laws the company was incorporated.

The company would

continue to operate in this fashion no matter what the posi
tion o f the United States might be with respect to recognition.
He did concede that the company had made a deal with the
non-accredited Nicaraguan ministe r , Parker H . French , for de
livering co lonists at nominal rate s .

But McKeon ' s as sertion

that French ' s _activitie s were i l legal on the grounds t�at the
United Staies did not recognize the Nicaraguan government was
rebuffed.
It wil l be new to them--it is · to me--that the United
States held any s upervisory or other control over
their political action. Whenever a government may be
established in Nicaragua , and of whatever kind , and
however the same may be changed or modi fied , are ques
tions which af fect only that state , and which are to
be decided by them alone. 2 3
23 New York Herald , December' 2 6 , 1 8 5 5 .
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Besides , White continued , the _ company had no choice.
It was not a government it had helped e stablish , but no oth
er was in prospect , and the company could not operate in a
state with no government to recognize rights and protect
conce s sions.

Finally , he dis sembled , the company did refuse

transit to Colonel Kinney when he s e emed to be mounting an
invasion , and would do the same to prevent others going to

Nicaragua for " soldiery , " but not for colonization . 2 4

About two week s later on January 5 , according to E l
Nicara�uense , French had a confrontation with McKeon .

The

District Attorney went to French ' s quarters at the St.
Nicholas Hotel in New York.

He accused French of violating

American neutrality laws , a s serting that he had proof of
French's " criminality. "

The latter steadfastly maintained

he was only the Minister from Nicaragua , his country had ad
vertised for colonist� , and the transit company had agreed
to transport the prospects for twenty dol lars a head.
yond that , he had done nothing.

Be

He dared McKean to arre st

him , and then showed him the door . 25

After the frantic exchanges of lette rs and words over
the larger is sue of Amer1can re sponsibility versus the p re
rogatives of its citizen s , the actual trial of the Northern
Light " stowaways " was somewhat of a denouement .

It was first

heard on February 7, but was continued until the first Monday
2 4Ibid .

2 5 El Nicaraguens e , January 12 , 18 5 6.
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in April .

E l Nicaraguens e c laimed that nearly a l l those ar

rested had given up prominent po sitions to go to Nicaragua,
and that most were heroe s of the Mexican War .

For example,

"Colonel Hall was a captain in the New York Volunteers--who
on his return was breveted Ma j or by the Legis lature for his
bravery, and s ince then has served as Colonel of the Brooklyn

Militia . 11 2 6

Having cut themselves off from their former oc

cupations, and being lightly overseen, many simply preceded
to Nicaragua.

The more prominent ones a s s ured the American

Minister in Nicaragua that they would request furlough to
return for the trial, but the case was e f fectively c losed,
and the District Attorney ' s e fforts to stop Walker reinforce
ments were even less ef fective than his moves against Kinney.
Nonetheles s, the action--or inacticin--of the United
States government made itsel f felt in another fashion .

It

is . unquestionab le that in Central America, recognition of a

government which claims de facto existence is o f ma j or signi
ficance.

I t was perhaps even more crucial to Walker ' s regime,

given its precarious political balance and the predilection
o f other Central American states for intervention .

In this

respect, the new government was in immediate trouble, as
evidenced by Marcy ' s re spons e to Wheeler ' s announcement of
its formation.

The Secretary directed his minister to have

2 6 rbid., March 1 5, 1 8 5 6 .
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to have no intercourse with the new government_, as the De
partment did not regard it as legal .
It appears to be no more than a violent usurpation
of power, brought about by an irregular self-organi
zed mil itary force , as yet unsanctioned by i�e wil l
. or acquiescence of the people of Nicaragua .
If those holding power should establish themselves as a de
facto government, Marcy advised, the United States govern
ment could then hold them accountable for claims the Ameri
can government might make on behal f of its citizens. 2 8
Marcy wanted . a government to berate, whi le Wheeler wanted

one to support, believing--as did most Americans in Nicaragua-
that the Walker adyenture was, in the long run, in the best
interest of the United States.

Marcy did later concede that

Wheeler ' s . role in maintaining some sort o f informal contact
with the government in Granada was o f vita l impo rtance .

The

United States government needed "the most accura te information
in regard to the actual political condition o f the State of
Nicaragua . "

Marcy acknowledged that the repo rts which had

been received at the State Department were o f a confl icting
nature : · "Whi le some o f them repres ent that the pres ent pol iti
cal organi zation is sati sfactory to the people • • . other s
[ say ] it has no foundation in the hearts of the people . 11 29
2 7Marcy to Wheeler, November 8, 1 8 5 5, National Archives,
M7 7, 2 7/1 3.
2 8 Ibid.
29 Ibid . , January 8, 1 8 5 6.
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The maj or popular support in the United States for
Walker's efforts ( among those Americans wno were aware o f
the filibuster's activities ) came primarily from the South
and the West.

Southerners continued to harbor intere st in

the extension of the slave-holding areas , and We sterners
particularly were sti ll ·caught up ..,in - t�e 'impetus from Mani
fest Destiny .

An example o f thi s latter feeling was an

Oakland ( California) Leader editorial :
Walker is the Government of N icaragua • • • hi s i s
not the vain ambition o f lording i t ove r the narrow
terri tory and native population of Nicaragua . Cen
tral America may limit his aspirations--a federal
government composed of independent , sovereign states ,
with a sy stem of laws s imilar to our own , and a popu
lation invited from all quarters of the world , to
give force , dignity , and character to hi s government ,
and infus e somewh2.t of enterpri s e intc the pres ent
ef feminate native population must be hi s ultimate
hope . 3 0
The Briti sh di d not s eem as reluctant to recogn i ze the
government at Granada · a.s was the Department o f State .

Thomas

Manning , the Briti sh vice-consul at Leon and a res ident of
Nicaragua for thirty years , dis cus sed the s ituation with Whe
eler in Granada .

He assured Wheeler that "the present condi

tion of political affairs in this Republic meets their. hearty

approval and acqui escence . " 3 1

Manning sub sequently conceded

recognition in an official note to the N icaraguan government . 3 2
He may , however , have been acting on his own j udgment , as
3 0 Reprinted in El Nicaraguense , January 2 5 , 1 8 5 6 .
31Wheeler to Marcy , January 15 , 1856 , H219 , 10/40 .
3 2�. , January 22 , 1856 .
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Wheeler had done previous ly.

Or it may have been that the

British were accustomed to Central American governments with
foreign advisors who were, in reality, the powers behind the
throne .

At any ra�e, it was at mo st a recognition o f the

government o f Pre sident Rivas, and did not commit the British
to recognition of the later government unde r Wa lker without
the pressure of a native chief executive .
Nevertheless, the main prob lem remained with Washington �
E l Nicaraguens e, sarcastica lly commenting on the American re
fusal to accredit French , observed that the same standards
would have l e ft the United State s a part of Great Britain ,
" after the filibusters Dekalb, Lafayette , . von Steub en , et al
had come over . "

Instead ! Great Britain immed ia te l y :rect=d.vAci

John Adams as minister . 3 3

In a different tone, El Nicaraguense

cal led Marcy ' s note to Whee ler " a model o f ministerial ignor
ance, official rudenes s , and reckle s s viol ation of public law
and international usages . "

Accordingly , Pre sident Rivas direc

ted �inister General Ferm{n Ferrer to c ancel French ' s commis
The government
also suspended o fficia l intercours e with Wheeler . 3 4
sion and order him to Nicaragua " to report . "

In a note to the Department, Wheeler complaine d that self
respect would normally have made him demand his passport , b ut
his explicit instructions from the P resident were to " stay and
3 3 El Nicaraguense , January 1 2 , 1 8 5 6 .

3 4 rbid . , January 2 6 , 1 8 5 6 .
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report . "

In the · same communication, he subtly raised the

specter of a Nicaraguan-British "understanding " (perhaps
seeing Nicaragua in the role o f another Mexico ) .

Finally ,

he c losed the despatch by berating the B ritish for thei r
35
opportunistic diplomacy.
One more prob lem was the continued recognition by Wa sh
ington of Marco leta as Nicaraguan Minister.
paper again resorted to sarcasm :

�-

Walker's news

to whom did he send hi s
...

despat�hes , or from whom did he get his �instruments ?

Mar-

coleta , the organ ass erted , had "invented " a government ,
cabinet, and army at the ancient city o f S egovia .

It would

be embarra s s ing for the United States government if the
Unifed s�ates-Nicaraguan treaty pending be fore the Senate
were sent to this imaginary government to exchange
ratifications. 3 6
The impas s e ·was temporarily broken when the Walker
Rivas government replaced French with a native Nicaraguan .
Wheeler broke the news by announcing that he had l earned
"incidentally " that the government was sending Padre August{n
Vi jil as Envoy Extraordinary and Mini ster Plenipotentiary ,
and that the friar would leave in a few days.

Wheeler called

Vij il a n distinguished ornament of the Church , " and assured
3 5 wheeler to Marcy , January 2 2 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,
M2 1 9, 1 0/4 1 .
3 6 E l Nicaraguens e, January 2 6, 1 8 5 6 .

. 2 10

the Department that he would fa� thfully represent Nicaragua

and would be acceptable to the d iplomatic corps. 3 7

The ap

pointment was apparently enough to as suage the sensitivi tie s
o f of ficials in Washington , and Marcy noti fied Wheeler that
the Presi dent had decided to recogni z e the Nicaraguan govern

ment and to receive Vij il. 3 8

In

addi tion , . it appear s that

pres sure may have been brought upon the government from o ther
sources.

Sympathy in the Senate had apparently been aroused

by the.. letter K.J.ker wrote Senator John B. Weller of c ali fa.,rnia ,
appr i s ing him o f the s ituation. 3 9
Finally , from Marcy ' s note i t appeared that Commodore
Vanderbilt had been urging Pre s ident Pierce directly to recog
ni ze the government in order to have leverage with re spect to
the trans it problems.

Marcy advi sed Wheeler :

The intere s t of the Uni ted States as well as tha t of
many individuals has been inj uriously a f fected b y the
interruption of the tran s i t through Ni caragua acro s s
the I s thmus . It .i s alleged that the proceedings by
whi ch thi s result was brought about a re in di sregard
of the rights granted by Nicaragua to the Acces sory
Tran sit Company in which the c i ti zens o f the Uni ted
States had made large inves tments . This government
has been cal led on by i ts c iti zens who have been in
j ured by these proceedings to make reclamations for
[ Report on
the los s es they have sus tained . •
this . ] 4 0
3 7 Wheeler to Marcy , April 1 7 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,
M2 1 9 , 1 0/4 8 .
3 8 Marcy to Wheeler , June 3 , 1 8 5 6 , ibi d. , M7 7 , 2 7/1 8.
3 9 El Nicaraguens e , June 14 , 1 8 5 6 .
4 0 Marcy to Wheeler , June 3 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,

M7 7, 2 7/1 8 .
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. These happier circumstances were short- l ived , however ,
as events in Nicaragua were outrunn.i ng the capac ity of Wash
ington to respond to them.

By the time Wheeler acknowledged

Marcy's communication on July 7 , a political trans formation
had taken place.

As Provis ional President , Rivas had ordered

national �lections to .be he.Ld.,..' ;but ·:·owing partly to the de
fection of viab le candidates , only Walker was a realistic
choice.

When Walker consequently won the post of chief execu

tive , Rivas refused to acquiesce in the results.

He , in turn ,
defected to an invading coalition army on June 17 . 4 1 In ad
dition , on ..Tune 2 3 , Padre Vi j it-- after only s ix weeks in
Washington-- noti fied Marcy that he would be absent from the
country , and that John P . Hei s s , another American , would be
Charge d ' Affaires. 4 2 These two events were more than the
State Department could countenance , and recognition until the
end of the Wa lker interlude became a moot i s sue.
Of more immediate concern to Walker wa s the pro spect of
a Central American coa lition putting an army i nto the field
against him .

After Walker had re fused to aid Cabanas in re

gaining power in Hondura s , the latter went directly to El
Salvador to inc ite the government o f that country against the
Americans.

Cabanas was reported to have proc laimed a fierce

war of extermination against the army of Walker , and to have
4 1Wheel er to Marcy , August 2 5 , 1 8 5 6 , ibid. , M2 1 9 , 1 0 / 6 7 .
4 2 vi l j il to Marcy , June 2 3 , 1 8 5 6 , John P. Hei s s Papers ,
Tennes see State Historical Society , Nashvi lle.
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expressed the belief that in its destruction lay the only
safety for Central Americ a . 43 In addition ,· it appeared
that the other Central American states were preparing to
j oin in an alliance to make general war against the Ameri
c ans .

Walker ' s paper, E l Nicaraguense, feigned perplexity

at these developmsitts. · I t -notea· ' t.hat . a · 1eague had been
formed among Guatema la, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador,
and that--contrary to custom--Nicaragua had not been inc luded.
Al l the people o f Nicaragua, the editoria l intoned, were of
fended by this and felt " their government is required to have
the incivility rectified or apologized for . "

Nicaragua had

always tried to maintain a correct posture toward these states
· . 44
an d cotL1 n. . . not h
... ut :r.ega ro.. t:h 1· s a s an un frien
· dl y action
Then the newspaper went on to treat separately the ad
herence of each of the countries to the " i l l- advised league. "
E l Salvador, it asserted, had hitherto been considered the
inveterate foe o f the Conservative Party, and at the same time
a staunch friend of democratic principles.

Its position had

been so well understood that contemporary writers ( cal led it)
the " Switzerland of Americ a, " because it was hemmed in with
rocky mountains, "in whose fastnesses were firmly protected

the liberal ideal of its people . "

Moreover, El Salvador had

previous ly expressed a sympathy for the existing government
4 3 El Nicaraguense, February 1 6, 1 8 5 6.

44 rbid .
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i n Nicaragua , and had made offers of peace and friendship.
How strange that it woul d then lend its name and influence
to an alliance against a government which was "founded on

the theory her people have sustained with so much fidel ity. 1 1 4 5
Neither Honduras nor Guatemala had responded to the

formal proposition submitted. · by ·· Nicaragua ·. to the other four

powers for a convention of al l the states to adopt measures

to provide for the general good and to guarantee the independ
ence of the contracting parties.

It was perhaps hoped that

this proposal {and the subsequent convention ) might allay
the fears of the other states of an .expanding Americanization

of the entire Isthmus .

They were aware , of course , that
dH U

cun-

tractual arrangements , therefore , always seemed to redound
to his benefit.

But it was Costa Rica--the most immediate

and most formidable threat--for which E l N icaraguense reserved
its most potent invective.

The loss of Costa Rica's friend

ship was " a doubtful inj ury. "

That state had allowed to con

gregate on its borders Nicaraguan pol itical refugees who
continual ly attempted to foment discord w ithin their native
country.

· The Costa Rican gove�nment had never made any effort

toward establ ishing friendly relations with the current gov
ernment in Nicara gua.
45 Ibid.
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All these faults , heretofore di sregarded , w ill
ri se up to condemn her present suic idal poli cy;
and when the long account i s settled , i f they
force us to hosti l ities , all these defalcations
must be answered for . We have toad to the faith
of nations ; we have acted honorably and with a
most conciliatory spirit to all the republics
of Central America , and will still pursue the
same unequivocal policy ; but yet we are prepared
for the desperate alternative ; and should di s
contented politicians inflame against us the ig
norant people of adj oining states , we can only
adj udge them , as it has been done s ince the be
ginning , " thos i who draw the sword , shall peri sh
by the sword . 11 � 6
Unfortunately , threats , caj olery , and appeals avai led
the Americans nothing .

On March 1 , Costa Rican Pres i dent

Juan Rafael Mora declared war , tak ing e_s pec ial pains to make
it clear to native Nicaraguans that thi s action was aimed at
the American contingent only ..

And it wa s to h�

(1

w.=i r.

tn t h�

death , as Mora decreed that " all prisoners taken w ith arms
in their hands were to be shot . 11 4 7

When the news reached Nica.;..

ragua on March 11 , Walker announced plan s for an immediate i n
vas ion of Costa Rica--perhaps an almost instinctive ef fort to
avoid f i ghting a two-front war .

He acknowledged that his coa

liti on effort had failed , and that the " Servile " parties all
over Central America were declaring the ir enmity .

As the Legi

timis ts in Nicaragua seemed to be joining the allied cause ,
Walker ordered that hi s troops should thenceforward wear the
Red Ribbon , emblematic of the Democratic (or Liberal) Party in
Nicaragua .
4 6 rbid .

An

editorial in E l N icaraguense as sured the Costa

4 7walker , War in Nicaragua , 17 5 .

275
Rican people that the Nicaraguan army was com�ng " to regen
erate rather than destroy " ( perhaps hoping for a repetition
o f the Nicaragua story ) . 4 8
With arrival of 2 5 0 more men on March 9 , Walker's- army
rose to 8 5 0 , with about 5 0 0 more Americans " capabl e o f bear
ing arms engaged in civil busine s s either at Granada or along

the line of the Transit . 11 4 9 Wheeler put the total figure at
50
1 , 300 .
In contrast , Mora had put out a cal l for 9 , 0 0 0
men , 5 1 though his active force was probab ly far below that .
Mora ' s real strength came from oth�r quarters ac cording to
Walker .

He maintained that hi s rival's audacity was re sult

of encouragement by the policies of both the United States

and- Great Bri t.a in p 5 2

WhPP. ] 8 :r:- p�. rt .i � l ly ("!0nfi rrned thi s ,.1ie�,._7

in a report to Marcy that a Nicaraguan b lockade o f Costa Rica
had resulted in the seizure o f British mail .

" I beg your

patient attention to all these letters , " he said , " they are
genuine , and compl etely unmask the j esuitical policy of Great
4 8 E l Nicaraguense , March 1 5 , 1 8 5 6 .

49walker , War in Nicaragua , 1 7 5 .

S Owhee ler to Marcy , March 1 7 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,
M2 1 9 , 10/4 4 . Wheeler indicates that he is including · " capi
talists , merchants , farmers , mechanic s , laborers , [and
mil lers ] . "
51Folkman , Nicaragua Route , 8 1 .
5 2 walker , War in Nicaragua , 1 6 5-7 6 .

2 76
Britain. 11

53

The "mail " included Costa Rican diplomatic des

patches from the ir consul general in Great Britain, E. Wal ler
stein, to the Costa Rican foreign minister, Joaquin Beru de
Calvo.

A letter of February 16, 1856, from Wal lerstein to

British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon acknowledged a pre
vious note from tae,\B�itish· ministry tel l ing Wal lerstein (on
C larendon's direction) that the British Admiralty on the Pac i
fic station would send cruisers to protest British interests.
Wal lerstein's letter requested that the British navy also pro
test Costa Rica's interests as the fi libusters were threaten
ing that country .

He pointed out that the United States had

stationed a warship at Greytown , and therefore must be con
spi ring in the action with the intention of annexinq Central
America and introducing s lavery.
A note from the Forei gn Office to Wal lerstein dated Feb
ruary 9 advised that the War Department had approved the sale
of two thousand muskets to Costa Rica .

A letter from the

consul general to President Mora asked for instructions regard
ing this purchase .

He indicated that he had already asked

permi ssion to examine some of the weapons.

Wal lerstei n also

said that_ when he mentioned to Clarendon that Costa Rica had
e ight hundred troops on the Nicaraguan frontier, Clarendon had
repl i ed that " that was the right step . "

Wal l erstein j udged

that Clarendon had approved the small arms sale because Costa
wheel er to Marcy, March
M2 19, 10/46.
53

31,

1856 , National Archives,

2 77
Rica was doing something about Walker.

He al so expres sed

the opinion that there would be no war between the United
States and Great Britain because the United States recog
ni zed that Britai n was "determined to puni sh the Yankees
very severely for the lea st insult to the national honor. "
He added, however, that such a war would be in Costa Rica ' s
best interests.
Also bol s tering Costa Rican courage was a February 2 4
despatch from their mini ster in Washington, Luis Mol ina, to
Calvo.

He said that news from Paris indicated that there

was interest there in helping Central America maintain its
independence, but no action would be taken unti l those coun
tries affected did something to help themsel ves.

Referring

to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Molina s aid that Britain had
told the United States that it had given a l l the expl ana
tions and apologies it planned to with respect to the acti
vities of its consuls in Central America.

The Briti sh would

be wi lling to s ubmit the question of treaty interpretation
to arbitration, but apparently the United States did not want
54
th l.. S •
The Costa Rican mobilization and declaration of war was
only partly due to the support and encouragement of foreign
governments.

Mora and his government probably genuinely

54Molina to Calvo , February 2 4, 18 5 6 , ib id.
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feared that Costa Ri ca , lying hard by the heartland o f
Nicaragua , would be the next target for the northern fili
busters .

Perhaps it would be more prudent to move now ,

before the Americans could become firmly entrenched and or
ganized , than to wait to be plucked at a later date .

Per

haps Mora wished to:-·· c.reate ·: confusion in . Nicaragua , and under
this vei l , seize more territory along the San Juan River in
an e ffort to control the transit route .

At any rate , war

had been declared , and Wa lker had to addres s himself to it .
Walker himself appears in Figure 1 1 and the maj or battle
sites of 1 8 5 7 - 1 8 6 0 are shown in F igure 1 2 .
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Figure 11.

William Walker.
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Figure 12. Major Battle Sites, 1857-1860.

CHAPTER IX
WALKER ' S DREAMS OF EMPIRE CRUMBLE
The course of Genera1 · walker in rererence to Costa
Rica and his honest , frank , and manly mani festo
seems to have been general ly received with favor
throughout the state , and I understand it has drawn
to his standard many wavering adherents of other
and hostile facti.o:ns • .. -When wi·11 they _ peg in to learn
that he is the chosen instrument of - a manifest des
tiny , and that though by their puny efforts they
may for a moment stem the current , it wi l l eventual ly
but render the torrent more dread ful in its ravages
and engulf th e m in its onward course . !
Wa lker wasted no ti me in ordering his army to march
south in an invasion of Costa R ica .

By the midd le of March ,

a battalion of three hundred and fi fty men under the command
o f a Germa n Jew , Colonel Louis Schlessinger , marched out of
Virgin Bay with banners streaming , intent upon the first ob
jective , the capture of Guanacaste.

The force included two

companies of Americans and one each of French and German
mercenaries .

Some of the French were old Chasseurs de Vin

cennes , " bronzed with the sun of Africa , and famil i ar with
the use of that mo st dead ly of weapons , the Minnie Ri f le ;
these bringing with them musicians

• and the a ir was

soon resounding with songs of home and fatherland . 11 2

El

Nicaraguense reported that no problem wa s anticipated in
the capture of Guanacaste.
" f ine , - captured horses ,

11

The sp ir ited army , mounted on

was moving so rapidly , Costa Rica

l " corporal Pipeclay , " in E l Nicaraguense , March 22 , 18 5 6 .

2 El Nicarag uense ; March 15 , 18 5 6 .
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[wouldn't ] even ,have time to muster the militia. "

The govern

ment organ conf idently speculated on which direction the army
would move a fter the conclusion of the initi al stage of the
campaign. 3

Unfortunately , Colonel Schlessinger had been selected

more for his linguistic ability than for . . his knowledge of
military science.

On March 2 0 , he called a halt in the march

at the plantation of Santa Ros a , about e ighteen miles north
of the capital of Guanacaste.

Schlessinger failed to post sen

tries , and when an alarm announced a surprise Costa Rican at
tack , general confusion reigned.

The C osta R icans poured in

a murderous volley of fire ; one witness testified that they

fought "like tiger�. 11 4

The German and French companies were

told to fall back to better positions , but they apparently
misinterpreted the command as an order to retre at.

Colonel

Schlessinger followed the withdrawal , as he later characterized
it , "to rally the fugitives. "
fifteen minutes.

The engagement was over in about

The retreat became a general rout , and for

days stragg lers struggled back to V irg in Bay in on�s and twos. 5
Schlessinger was subse quently court-martialed for his role in

the fiasco , but the damage was already done and the myth of
the invincibility of the Yankee long-ri fles had been shattered.
3 rbid. , March 2 2 , 185 6.

4Philippe Egan Toohey , an Irishman , who was pardoned by
Mora after be ing captured in the battle when he got written
confirmation from the New Orleans Delta that he was a corres
pondent and not a filibuster. Wheeler to Marcy , April 17 ,
185 6 , National Archives , M 2 1 9 , 10/48.
5 lbid. , April 14 , 1856 , 10/47 , and New York Tirres , April 21, 1856.
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One of the most untoward events of the war fol lowed
on the hee l s of the Costa Rican victory.

Mora moved north

and entered undefended Virgin Bay on April 7 ,

His troops

surrounded the office of the Acce s sory Transit Company and
fired a vol l ey of about one hundred rounds , kil ling nine
Americans , most of them employee s of the company.

A witnes s

reported that the Costa Ricans " systematica l ly bayoneted and
stabbed with swords the wounded on the ground , robbed the
dead , and broke in and robbed the Transit Company office , then
burned -the wharf . " 6

Wheeler irorrtediately s ent a letter to Pre sident Mora
prote sting this " s laughter of unarmed and inoffensive" American
citizens.

Whe eler pointed out that this atrocity wa s an im

plementation of Mora's twin proclamations of death to filibus 
ters and elimination of a l l Americans from Nicaragua and Costa
Rica.

He reminded Mora of Molina's December l e tter to Marcy

giving a s surance that Costa Rican laws would grant land and
protection to American immigrants.

He a l so pointed out that

Artic le X I I of the 1 8 5 1 Un ited States-Costa Rican tre aty
guaranteed protection of persons and property of American
citizen s in Co sta Rica . 7 Satisfaction , however , was not
forthcoming , and claims for indemnity and restoration- 
proce s s ed through the Department of State--dragged on for years .
6Deposition of Charl e s Mahoney , engineer for the Transit
Company , taken by Wheeler. His statement wa s corrobated by
other survivors. Wheeler to Marcy , National Archive s , April
17 , 185 6 , M219 , 10/4 $ .
7 Ibid .
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Along with .information from Le6n that a coalition army

from Honduras-El Salvador-Guatemala ·Was poised on the northern

border and that invasion was inuninent , Walker's intelligence
reported that Mora's army numbered eight thousand.

This dire

news . made Walker decide to barricade himself in Granada.

How

ever , neither of the reports proved to be well-founded (Mora ' s
army was probably somewhere between two and four thousand) ,
so Walker decided to attack Rivas , which had been occupied by
Mora upon the withdrawal of the filibusters.

On April 11 ,

Walker �ed this assault himself , and his troops--some five
hundred strong--attacked with fervor , catching the enemy o f f
guard.

The plaza was taken in five minutes , but the Costa

Ricans had to be rooted out of barricades and fortified
houses .

As the day-long battle raged , it became clear to

Walker that he occupied an untenable . position.

As a result ,

he was compelled to order his troops to slip out under cover
of darkness , conceding a somewhat pyrrhic victory to the Costa
8
Ricans (considering their losses and the subsequent events} .
The Costa Ricans retained the town , but they were also lef t
with a severe . epidemic o f cholera .

Within a few days , the

remaining f ive hundred Costa Ricans were forced to withdraw ,
and the war temporarily went into a state of suspended ani
rnation . 9
8El Nicaraguense , April 14 ; 185 6.
9 Allen , Will iam Walker , 114 �
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Taking advantage of the lul l in the fighting--due as much
to the rainy season setting i n as to Costa R ican exhaustion
and the d ilatoriness of the other governments--Walker · aeter
mined to put the government on a more permanent footing.
Provisional Pre s ident Rivas , along with his cabinet , had been
in Le6n since March 1 , but be fore leaving he had entrusted the
southern and eastern departments to the care of Walker under
a kind ot martial law .

A decree had been issued over the

Preside�t ' s wr i t cal ling for nati onal e lections on May 1.
Del egates would be elected from each of the departments , and
they . in turn would elect a president , . senators , and represen
tatives.

The two cand idates for president were R ivas himsel f ,

and Mariano Sala z ar , both [...: ont wha L was fcrrr�er ly the L iberal

or Democratic Party. 10

The forty-one de legates assembled in

Managua on May 2 5 , and began their bal loting.

With the city

locited in one of the departments under Wa�ker ' s j urisdiction ,
and the oral voting conducted in front of the assembled de l e
gates and observers , there was some basis for concern about
coercion.

At any rate , Walk_er was nominated from the f loor

for president , and it appeared that he might be "swept" into

off ice.

To forestall any charges of coercion or collusion , the
balloting was temporarily suspended , and Walker made a "courtesy
l O wheeler to Ma rcy ,. May 3 , 18 56 , National Archives ,
M21 9 , 10/51 .
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call" on Rivas in Leon.

There Walker apparently advised

Rivas that he would be willing to accept the presidency only
on the basis of a direct popular election.

On June 1 1, Rivas

is sued a proclamation cancelling the previous elections and
calling for a new one on the basis of Walker ' s recommenda
tion .

Feeling that the situation was well in hand , Walker

rode south, only to be startled the next day by news that
Rivas and his cabinet had abandoned Leon for Chinandega.

In

addition , Secretary of War Maximo Jere z had ordered the forti
fications at both Realej o and Le6n di smantled , and the small
American contingent at Ledn to abandon the city.

When word

reached Walker of this turn of events , he ordered his tro'o p s
,

. I

'

'

1.n Leon to oLey because he "was net di sposed to have the coming
struggle occuron any such is sue [ i. e . , disobedience to lawful
authority ] . "

He determined to have the contest conducted on
11
more formal grounds .
In addition , he wa s concerned about

having his forces strung out--in increasingly hostile terri/

tory--from Leon to Fort Castillo, and felt it more prudent
to congregate them in the vicinity of Granada and perhap s in
12
the immediate area of the transit route.
Upon the American
withdrawal, Rivas returned to Letn and apparently invited in
the troops from the northern states which had been poised on

the frontier. 13

11walker , War in Nicaragua , 22 6.

12 Ibid .

13Whee ler to Marcy , June 30 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives ,
M21 9 , 10/5 9 .
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Although Walker's visit probably had caught Rivas by
surprise, and merely precipitated a course which the presi
dent · had already decided to pursue , El Nicaraguense explained
i t in a more exotic fashion .

It had been tradition in N ica

r agua, the paper averred, for defeated candidates either to
flee or to be summarily executed .

The impending election had

undoubtedly aroused an atavistic dread in the former president.
This circumstance convinces us that the approach of
an election , and an invading army at the same time
so frightened President Rivas that he hardly k new what
he was doing ; and in a moment of partial insanity and
chronic deceitfulness , he lef t the Presidency and thus
lost all hope for the future . 4
Despite this turn of events , Wal�er proceeded with the
elections on thefollowing bases :

( 1 ) the elections had been

leg ally c alled by the provi s ional pre sident, even though that
gentleman had subsequently forfe ited his r ig ht to govern ; { 2 )
the October 2 3 agreement between Walker and Cabanas , which
Walker regarded as the ·foundation of all su�sequent N icaraguan
government, ceded the right to the commander-in-chie f (Walker )
to org anize a new government upon the dissolution of the existing
one; ( 3 ) the departments which would be subject to the elections

were also legally under Walker ' s authority through the marti al
,
law concession made by Rivas upon his departure for Leon on
March 1 .

In the interim , Walker appointed as provisional presi �

dent former Mini ster of Hacienda Fermin Ferrer , the only member

of Rivas • cabinet who had remained loyal to the f ilibuster .
government . 1 5

14El Nicara9U;ense, June 21 , 1856.
15 Ibid.
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The candidates for the new e lection were stil l Rivas and
S a lazar, as well as Ferrer and Wa lker .

Not surprisingly, Wal

ker swept all five provinces which participated in the voting,
16
getting three times the vote of Ferrer, his nearest rival .
If the e lection wa s arranged, probably no candidate could
have been honestly elected.

The ��gitimists did not vote

and the natives in the outlying district� did not even know
about it or feared to · go to the polls . 17

Provisional President

F errer issued a decree declaring Walker president, and the lat
ter was duly inaugurated on July 12. 1�

Ferrer was named Secre

tary of State in the new government.
As reported by El Nicaraguense, the toasts at the inaugura l
dinner presaged an auspicious £uture for the infant reg ime .
A Mr . Deshields waxed eloquent with:

" General Wil liam Walker,

President of the Republ i c of Nicaragua--the scholar, gentl eman,
and soldi er, responding to the cal l of down-trodden and op
pressed humanity, entered Nicaragua at the head of his invin
cible fifty-six, and establ i shed the nuc leus of a great Repub
l ic ! "

Not to be outdone, Ferrer responded after the band

played " See the Conquering Hero Comes" with :

" Our Brethren

from the United States who come here to teach the art o·f selfl6rbid . , Ju ly 12, 18 56.

l7 Al len, Wi l liam Walker, 118 .

18 El Nicaraguense, July 12, 18 56.
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government, in company with William Wnlker, our champion
in war and protector in peace. 11 1 9

Perhaps to reassure itself of the legality of the elec
tion, El Nicaraguense editor ialized that there was no sove
reign law in the country except the treaty of October, 1855 .
The ul tra-democratic··· constitution of 18 3 8 had been wiped out

by the revolution of 1854, and the ultra-conservative consti
tution of 1854 was never implemented.

In addition , the treaty

specifically had lifted only certain articles from the 18 3 8
constitution , thereby indicating that the whole constitution
was not intended .

In essence , the paper ma intained , the law

was William Walker, elected under the provisions of 1 8 55.

The

ed itor ial also emphasized the duty and responsibility--not to
mention the necessity--of foreign nations ' recognizing de facto

governments for legal and practical reasons . 2 0

Perhaps unfortunately for Walker, h i s sense of urgency
to achieve reforms and to put things in order impelled him
toward acting like� a monarch.

He overhauled the constitution ,

rev ised the tar iff laws , annulled inoperative statutes , and

changed the flag design among other things , �11 by executi ve
fiat .

He seemed to sow confusion in the r a nks of his supporters :

he appeared to be for and against slavery, Nicaraguan i ndepen
dence , annexation to the North Amer ican union , and conquest of
19 1bid � , July 19 , 185 6.
2 0 rbid .
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Perhaps there was method to his madness ,

and all the feverish activi ty was either a �fog or smokescreen
• for his true purposes" which may never have real ly come
to light.

At any rate , he created suspi cion and a l ienated his
.
f rien
. ds at an inoppor
. 21
. tune time
·
Wa lker ' s enemies ·w.er.e.'.:.c\,gain '. �ass ing.

/

At occupied Leon

hundreds of troops from Guatemala and El Salvador j oined a
large contingent of Necaraguan Legi timists.

The fi l ibuster

forces held a line from Managua to the transi t route , and
from San Juan del Sur to Fort Casti llo down the San Juan River .
Only sixty mi les separated the poised , contending armies in
the north .

Of some concern to Walker was the arriva l of a

British nava l squadron at San Juan del Norte.

The f leet

con s i s ted of thirteen ships of war , al l steamships except one ;

among them was the Orion . of ninety-six guns , making the total
force two hundred and sixty eight guns and two thousand five
hundred rnen v 2 2 Further , Ameri can · fears of Bri tish interven
tion were exacerbated by a rather peculiar stroke of fortune .

Walker had issued a decree on August 4 dec l aring al l Cen

tral Amer ican Atlantic and Pac i fic ports blockaded (except the
2 1Al len , Will iam Walker , i'l 9 , 1 2 0 . One of Walker ' s projects
that exci ted both approbation and resentment was the Confis
cation Decree of July 1 6 , 1 85 6 , which provided that all persons
who had "as s isted the known enemies of the state" since Oc tober
23 , 1 8 5 5 , or who had been . decl ared trai tors since April 2 2 ,
1 8 5 6 , should have their property confisc ated and inheri tances
forfeited. Within ten days of confiscation , an a ccount of the
confisca ted proper ty would be publ ished ; . thirty days a fter
that--save the pos s ib i l i ty of a successful contest of the action-
the property would be sold , with the proceeds going to the
Ministry of Hac ienda . E l Nicaraguense , July 1 9 , 1 856 .
22wheeler to Marcy , August 16 , 1856 , M219 , 10/66.

Nicaraguan trans it route) .· 23

291
Thi s wa s a paper blockade ,

s ince the Nicaraguan navy cons isted of one outfitted schooner.
Good use wa s made of this craft , however , when it captured a
Salvadoran launch carrying General Salazar , who was credited
with having persuaded Riva s and hi s cabinet to defect.

The

general carried a letter from Thomas Manning , long-time Br iti sh

vice-consul in Le�n , to a Salvadoran busines s acquaintance. 24
The letter left no question about the way Manning must have
been advi s i ng hi s government about affairs in Nicaragua.
The vice-consul expressed the fear that Walker had a

persona l vendetta against him , and that all Leonese were appre
hens ive that the filibuster might attack the city .

Walker

would be very difficult to drive out of Ni caragua , Manning . said ,
if he received money and reinforcements.

Cons idering the way

troops were dribbling in from the other Central American states ,
the al lies might be delaying too long , "and the · expenses and
sacrifices are made in va in. "
I am much afflicted to think that , under these circum
_stances no more activity is used in so serious an af
fair. A t the present there are 5 0 0 men from Salvador ,
5 0 0 from Guatemala , and 8 0 0 belonging to thi s place ,
and according to my judgment double that number i s
required. 2 5
Although there wa s initial consternation in Granada over
the juxtapos ition of these. events , cooler heads pointed out
23El Nicaraguense , August 1 , 1856.
2 4 Ibid .

25Mann ing to F lorintine Souci , San Miguel , E l Salvador ,
July 2 8 , 1 8 56 , ib id.

. 29 2
the unlikelihood of Great Britain � s risking war with the United
States over an internal conflict in Nicarag�a .

El Nicaraguense

observed that Great Britain could not be he ld responsible for
the aberrations of one obscure representative whose actions
were contrary to the laws of both nations.

In addition , Lord

Clarendon had as sur.ed .,FJ�xre.r .,J:?y. ·. ietter/"'that :Great Britain would
not intervene in Central America. 26 So Walker turned his at
tent ion to the more immediate concern :

the al lied army in the

north.
By October , a splinter group of �egitimists had set up
fortifications at San Jacinto , near Tipitapa , and threatened
to cut the Managua-Granada line .

Successive fi libuster attacks

final ly forced them away , but American losses included Byron
Cole , who had been involved in the engagement almost by accident.
At the same time , a Leonese party advanced south to Managua ,
and almost to Masaya.

These forces were turned back by Gra
27
nadan troops reinforced with fresh recruits from New York .
Walker spent most of the remainder of October dashing back
and forth trying to hold this line , which he was forced to

reduce to Masaya-Granada , and finally just Granada , with the
enemy encamped only twelve miles aw � y. 2 8

On one occasion , October 1 3 , Walker was forced to counter26El Nicaraguense , August 9 , · 18 56 .

2 7 wheeler to Marcy , October 7 , 1 8 56 , National Archives ,
M219 , 1 0/7 3.
2 8 rbid. , November 1 , 18 56 , ibid . , 10/76�
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march quickly from Masaya to drive out an arlied force which
had actually occupied Granada.

He was suc ces sful , with deva

stating los ses to the enemy compared with slight casualties

among his own force , 29 but not before the allies had committed
a number of " outrage s " against the persons and property of

Americans . 3 0

Again Wheeler prepared his claims , and again he

called for American warships to be posted to San Juan del Sur
and San Juan del Norte .

He warned the State Department that

if this were not done , every American settler would have to
leave or be in great danger from the " natives . "

He assured

the Department that " unles s a force of our government is

placed at San Juan del Sur , murder and rapine will ensue . 11 3 1
2 9The a l l ie s lo s t four hundred men and l e f t a number to
be taken prisoner . Walker ' s casualties were calculated at 2 l
killed and 5 5 wounded , ibid . , or 2 5 killed and 7 5 wounded .
Allen , William Walker , 12 3 .
30 oepositions furnished by Wheeler to the Department of
State showed that among the Americans murdered were John B.
Lawless , a merchant , the Reverend William j . Ferguson of
Louisiana , David L . Wheeler , agent of the American Bible
Society for Nicaragua , and Henry C . Carstein . The allies
apparently intended · to take Minis ter Wheeler himself ( he was
in bed with fever ) , but American troops arrived in the nick
of time . The victims had been marched first to the church ,
apparently shot on orders , and the bodies were then clubbed
and beaten . The lives of others were threatened in demands
for arms , ammunition , money , and , j ewelry . Wheeler to Marcy ,
November 1 , 1 8 5 6 , National Archives , M2 19 , 1 0/7 6 .
3 1 rbid.
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Unfortunate ly , Wheeler's bargaining position with the Depart
ment was eroded , �s he had already been recalled , probably due
to his second uni lateral recognition of a
With as many as three thousand opponents now congregated
i n Mas aya , Walker aga in had to address himself to probl�ms - on

his southern flank.

A new Costa Rican force under General

Canas had occupied San Juan del Sur on November 7 , and Walker-
needing to keep the transit route open at all costs i n order to
rece ive re inforcements--took the major . portion of his army

there t9 dislodge them. 3 3

The garrison of two hundred and

fifty men he left in Granada then underwent the cruelest si ege
of the whole war.

The defenders , forced back to the ma in

plaza , were compel led to turn the cathedral i nto a citadel.
When they hact ctrunk and eaten all their provisions , they were
reduced to consuming mule meat--four inches square for every
twenty-four hours .

They died at the rate of three per day ,

and were buried only three ya�ds away.

Many of thos e marooned

in the edifice were American civilians , and they labored i n
the same j obs as the soldiers.

Survivors were final ly picked

up by Wa lker in a lake steamer , but the seventeen-day siege
had taken a dreadful toll :

One hundred and twenty died of

di sease , forty deserted , and only one hundred . thirty-five made
it to the steamer , many of these succumbing later to disease
34
o r wounds.
3 2 Marcy to Whee ler , September 2 3 , 185 6 , ibid. , M77 , 27/2 5.

33Allen , William Walker , 12 4-1 2 6.

34 scroggs , "Walker-He iss Papers ," 3 19 .
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The city Walker was finally forced to abandon on December
14 was but a shell , hav ing been virtu·ally destroyed during the
protracted battle.

He proceeded to concentrate his forces at

R ivas--a smaller , cleaner , more defensible town.
the tide had def initely begun to ebb.

At thi s point ,

The land had been wa sted

by war , and the few hundred remaining Americans were exposed
to cholera , dysentery , typhoid , and yellow fever .

They were

being attacked by troops from four nations , and most Americans
in the United States had lost intere st because of di straction
by the fa ll pre s idential carnpaign . 35
The succeeding theatre of war was the transit path on the
Car ibbean s ide .

Vanderb ilt , who was �till determined to rid

himself of his pretentiou s adversary and regain control of the
rout_e and the company , resolved to cut off Walker by sei z ing
this portion of the cross ing.

Hi s instrument wa s Sylvanus H.

Spencer , another bold American soldier of fortune , 36 who led

a Costa Rican force ( armed by Vanderbilt with the latest wea
ponry) against the filibuster garrisons along the San Juan
River , and by dec i s ive strokes , not only captured them but the
river and lake steamers as well.

This campaign cut Walker off

from the Car ibbean and gave the allie s communication between

their norther n forces at Granada and their southern troops at

Virgin Bay and southward .

In Walker's subsequent account of

35Allen , Willi am Walker , 126- 12 7 .

36 Ibid . , 1 4 3 •

2 96

the action , he al luded only to the Vanderbi�t involvement ,
without mentioning the Commodore by name; however , he did

fulminate against Marcy (and President Pierce , by implication )
for not asserting the United States prerogative a nd responsi
bility for protecting American property (i. e. , the transit ·

steamers ) .

Walker employed the somewhat specious argument

that had the vessels been Nicaraguan , the state of war between
the two countries would have conceded the legality of the
Costa Rican action.

As they were neutral ships , operating in

Nicaraguan territorial waters where they were not masters o f
their own fates rather than o n the high seas , they should not

have been subj ect to belligerent seizure. 37

This assertion

was in the face o f the compell i ng fact that this waterway was
t�c only route by which the Walker force could b e resuppl ied
and reinforced from the Atlantic ports of the United States.
The beginning o f the end f or the filibuster effort came
when the al lies moved in and occupied S an �orge , a town vir
tua l ly within sight of Rivas , on January 28.

For more than

three months , skirmishes and assaults occupied the opposing
forces.

Walker held on to his position , continually hoping

that a contingent he had sent to try to reopen the route to
San Juan del Norte would be successful .

Eventual ly , as the

forces of the enemy increased and their partial encirclement
37 walker , War in Nicaragua , 350 -351.
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of Rivas became more effective , the rations of the fi libuster
· forces became--if not reduced--at least less palatable , as
mule meat rep laced beef.

But the major blow was the increasing

desertion rate , now no longer confined to European mercenaries
President

but including long-time American comraqes-in-arms.

Mora had reversed his psychological tactics ( from his former
proclamation of complete extermination of the Americans ) , and
now made it clear that the war was against one man:

Wi lli am

Walker.

Mora ' s new proclamation assured amnesty to al l deser
ters , and this promise was scrupulously observed . 38 Apparently
the seeming hopelessness of the American position was sapping
the men under Walker ' s command , and although replacements con
tinued to trickle in from Cali fornia , the morale factor of the
de sertions . could not be ignored.
Meanwhi le , in San Juan del Sur , an uneasy truce continued
up unti l early April .

The Costa Ricans had not i nvested the

city , probably because it was under the guns of the Nicaraguan
"navy"--the sloop Granada continued in port .

In addition ,

United States Navy Commander Charles H. Davis had brought his
sloop-of-war St. Mary's into the port in late January "with
orders to do what he could for the Americans. 11 39

As a result ,

Walker was able to keep the wires and routes open to the port
town , and to continue receiving news , men , and suppl ies.
38Al len , Wi l liam Walker , 154·.

39 rbid. , 1 56.

Davis

29 8
himself undertook to enforce a truce while , under agreement
with both sides , he evacuated the Am�rican women and children
from the besieged Rivas .

Eventually , however , the allies

erected fortifications along the transit route. 40

On April 30 , Walker emissaries met with Davis at Costa
Rican headquarters in San Jorge at the commander ' s invitation
in order to receive a proposition for evacuation .

Davis pointed

out that Walker ' s position had become entirely untenable :

the

contingent on the San Juan River had embarked for the United
States , so no help could be expected from that quarter ; the
Garrison and Morgan faction of the transit company had deter
mined to send no more steamers from California , so there would
be no more recruits arriving ; Davis did not intend to al low
the Granaa� to leave port , and would be sei zing i t shortly ,
so i t - would be of no help to Walker ; and fina lly , Walker ' s pro
visions were running out , so he could not hold on much longer
under any circumstance s . 41

With this discouraging news , Walker was compelled to
sign an agreement with Commander Davis .

Walker and sixteen

of his top staff would surrender themselves to Davis , and
would be transported from San Juan del Sur to Panama .

The

remainder of the force , along with American civilians in the
government , would be moved under the protection of Davis to
40walker , War in Nicaragua ,. 41 4 -42 9 passim .

4l rbid . , 42 1 .
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San Juan del Nort� to embark for Colon .

Guarantees for

the lives and property of Nicaraguans in Rivas and still
loyal to the filibuster government would be the responsibility
of Davis.

The accord was signed on May 1 , 185 7.

Walker re

mained convinced that Davis was acting on direct orders from
Secretary Marcy , not to remain neutral and merly sa feguard
lives and property of American non-combatants , but rather to
be instrumental in the capitulation of Walker. 42

Of the immediate impact of the filibuster foray , person
nel figures tell part of the story :

of the 2 , 5 18 Americans

who "enlisted 11 4 3 under Walker , about one thousand were killec
or died of disease , 2 5 0 were discharged , 80 were captured , and
the rest either survived at Rivas or were unaccounted for.
The allied force--counting the entire war--numbered seventeen
thousand eight hundred .

O f these , 5 , 080 were battle casualties ,

while uncounted thousands died of disease.

In other terms ,

the transit route was never ef fectively reopened , and the " breach
of ill- feeling between Central America and the United States

had been widened . 11 4 4

The Legitimist General Toma s Martinez as s umed the reins
42 rbid. , 414-4 2 9 pas sim .
43An Irishman captured at the Battle of Santa Rosa , before
he was executed , wrote to his cousin to discourage any other im
migrants : "You don ' t even get the 2 5 0 acres but are forced into
the army . " Cos ta Rican Army Bulletin , March 2 7 , 18 5 6 .
44Allen , William Walker , 1 5 8.
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of the pre s idency upon Walker's departure, but the s ituation
remained unstable .

By July, the filibuster was already thinking

in terms of another expedition and had written to fri ends in
Washington to intercede with the Buchanan admini stration, assuring the government that he woul d s crupulously _ avoid violating
the neutrality laws . 4 5 In September, he wrote the same corre s
pondent again about reas suring the admini stration, and referred
to the efforts of the Costa Rican, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran
repre sentative s to per suade Secretary of State Lewis Cas s to
use United State s naval force s to prevent Walker ' s landing in
Central America in the event his depar ture from the United
46
State s could not be forestalled .
In the meantime, former
filibus ters and new adherents were bus ily recruiting and
rai sing money in eastern s eaboard and Gulf Coast citie s for
a s econd as sault on the little C entral American country.
Walker ' s s�cond effort was a landing at Greytown on
November 2 3 , 1 8 57, . under the guns of the United State s sloop-_
of-war Saratoga.

Commander Chatard of the Saratoga was later

criticized for allowing it, but the officer wa s somewhat con
fused with re spect to his re spons ibiliti es in the matter .
Chatard wrote his commanding officer, Commodore Hiram Pauld ing,
whos e ve s s el wa s standing off Aspinwall .

Paulding irrunediately

full-steamed north with hi s flagship Wabash, followed by the
45walker to John P . He i s s , July 2 5, 185 7 , He i s s Papers .
46 Ibid . , September 2 4 , 1 8 57.
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The American and British navie s were riow unwilling to risk
letting the situation get out of hand again .
By the time Paulding arrived , Walker and his band of
270 had already attacked .

A contingent under the corrunand of

"the gallant Colonel Frank Ander son" had taken pos ses sion of
Fort Castillo , which commanded a strateg ic spot on the San Juan
River , along with the river and lake steamers that had previous
ly fallen into the hands of the Costa Ricans . 48 As Walker pre
pared to move inland , Paulding ' s marine s stormcid a shore and
interpos ed thems elve s be tween the filibuster s and their de s 
tiny .

Paulding took Walker into custody , and subsequently

deposited him back at Mobile .

For th is action , which enraged

some of the congre s s ional expans ion i s t s , the Commodor e had . to

justify hims e l f before a congres sional inve stigating cornmittee . 49
Walker ' s third try was even more ill-fated .

On December 4 ,

18 5 8 , one hundred twenty men under Colonel Anderson , a soldier
of fortune who had been with Walker since the ea rlie st days ,
s ailed from Mobile without a clearance in the schooner Sus an .
Walker was to meet them later , but the band never arrived .
D ecember 16 , the ve s se l struck a coral reef about 60 miles
from Bel i z e , and left the men stranded on a small island .

On

They

4 7 Allen ,· William Walker , . 163-165 .

48 scrogg s , "Reminiscence s of Ratterman , " 326 .

4 9 James Rood Doolittle , Justification of Camodore Paulding's
.Arre st of Walker ( Boston : Buell & Blanchard , 1858) , passim. Paul. ding' s attitude toward Walker's efforts had altered sanewhat since
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were subsequently rescued by the British sloop-of-war
Basilisk , and transported back to Mobile. 50

The fourth

effort was even more embarrassing, as the company Walker
had organized in Mobile was stopped by the authorities be
fore it left the harbor. 51
Walker ' s fi fth and final opportunity to reestablish him
self in Central America came as a result of a dispute over
the ownership of RoatAn Island , off the Caribbean coast of
Honduras , among Great Britain , the United States ,

and Hon

duras . � rt was re solved in favor of Honduras , but the citizens-
be ing principally British--decided to seek extra-legal avenues
for redress :

early in the spring of · l 8 60 they looked to Wal

ker for deliverance .

Walker was delighted , and on April 20

began sending a few men at a time down to reunite on Conzumel
Island , west of Yucatan .

After Walker joined them , they took

the old Spanis� fortress of Trujillo on Cape Honduras {the
traditional northernmost point of the Mosqu ito Territory) .
After Walker had declared Trujillo a free port , the British
ship Icarus arrived , and its captain , Newell Salmon , s ent a
the previous year . On January 4 , 1856 , he had written . to
Wheeler co�plimenting Walker ' s character and closing with :
" Be pleased to express to the General , my profound acknow
ledgments , and my best wishes for his success i n . giving . to
C entral America secur ity and repose . " Wheeler to Marcy,
January . 15 , 1856 , National Archive � , M219 , 10/40 .
50 scroggs , "Reminiscences of . Ratterman," 32 9 .
51Allen , Willj.am Walker , 17 1.
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message of prote �t to Walker , pointing out �hat the customs
of the port had been mortgaged to Great Britain for a Honduran
debt 1 2 and that Walker had acted il legally in taking it , along
with $3 , 0 0 0 from customs fees .

Salmon further advised Walker

that he should retu�n the money , surrender his force , and accept
the protection of the British flag . 53
Walker was astounded by this turn of events .

He apologiz ed

for taking the customs house , but protested ignoranc e with respect to the missing sum .

(Later writers have speculated that

the money may have been taken by native officials . )

With his

small band of seventy men , Walker tacitly declined the offer of
protection and stole out of the town - under cover of darkness ,
intent upon making his way south along the coast .

His rear was

beset by Honduran troops , and he was forced to carry on a run
ning fight · to the banks of the Rio Negro .

At this point , Walker

could not cross and could not retreat , and Salmon appeared on
the river.

The British captain took Walker and his men priso

ners , and turned them over to Honduran officials .

President

Guard iola , a man who perhaps felt j usti f ied in his vindic tiveness ,
was in charge .

·
The curtain rang down on the Walker saga
and

the decade of interventiqn when the filibuster fell before a
54
Honduran firing squad on September 12 , 1860 .
5 2chatfield (Figure 13) had long held this over the Hondurans.

53

54

Ibid • , 17 2 •

Ibid. , 1 7 3 - 1 7 4 .
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Figure 13.

Frederick Chatfield.

CHAPTER X
THE LEGACY OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION
The principle men of the Republic • • • including
the Cabinet Ministers • • • have frankly stated to
me that if they hereafter find that they cannot
sustain themselves as an independent Republic ,
that they will ask formally to be annexed to the
United States . 1

w.

F. Boone , United States Consul at
San Juan del Sur , March , 185 2

There is in a l l this country a deep-seated terror
that , when the Americans are admitted into it the
natives will be thrust aside--their nationality lost-
their religion destroyed--and the common classes be
converted into hewers of wood and drawers of water . 2
Mirabeau B . Lamar , United . States Minister
to Nicaragua , February , 1858
These representatives of the American people may have
overstated their cases , but a dramatic change occurred in
Nicaragua during the 18 5 0 ' s not only in the life of the
state but also in the attitude of the natives toward the
United States.

At the beginning of the era , due partially

to erratic and inept American diplomacy , but more to Ameri
can inattention , the Central Americans viewed the United

States a� a possible benevolent mentor who would reinforce
Isthmian e fforts to avoid . the grasping paws of the British
lion .

By the end of the decade , the impression was that of

an adolescent giant , stumbling about somewhat , unable to
control its own citizens and without any definite. foreign
!Boone to Webster , March 16 , 185 2 , National Archives ,
T- 152 , 1/61.

2 Lamar to Cass , February 2 6 , 1858 , ibid. , M2 19 , 11/4.
30 5
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policy , and withal the major threat to Central American security.
One devotee of Clio has observed that history is not what
happened , but rather what people think happened.

Whether or

not a catastrophe befell Nicaragua during this period is un
provable , but it is certain that the Nicaraguans themselves
felt that it had.

The historian's mission is to make past events

intelligible , to find--or create--the patterns that can show us
where we have been , and help us understand what we are.

Unfor

tunately , he does not enjoy the luxury afforded the pure scien
.
tist who can operate with a controlled experiment. The his
torian can speculate and hypothesize ad infinitum , but he cannot
recreate the event nor change the outcome.

Without these tools ,

he is handicapped in determining the long-term impact of an
historical phenomenon.
of the 1850's.

So it is with Nicaragua in the decade

One can deal only with what happened , what

those involved planned and ultimately realized , and what the
subsequent life of the nation--in this case , Nicaragua--was
like , with an occasional side trip into speculation.

T�mas Mart1nez remained in the presidency until 1867 , and

the Conservatives in control of the government at Managua

until 1893.

The period was characterized by relative peace ,

compared with the unsettled era from which Nicaragua had

just emerged , but one of little democracy.

The situation

grew even worse , however , for a Liberal revolt introduced
,
. to the chief executive chair one Jose Santos Zelaya. Zelaya
was uniformly despicable and unpopular at home and abroad ,
and the American Secretary of State had publicly labeled

3 07
him a " blot on the history of his country. "

Z elaya's rule,

which ended in 19 0 9 , left the country in dire financial
straits , with European creditors threatening diplomatic or
military action .

To forestall this eventuality, the United

States intervened in 19 12 with a contingent of marines and .

bankers .

The approximately one hundred marines of the lega

tion guard helped maintain peace for the next two decades ,
and the bankers managed Nicaraguan customs collections , the
national bank , and the national railway.

A brief re spite in

American intervention in 19 2 5 resulted in internecine strife ,
and the marines stormed back , two thousand strong , in 19 27.
From then until 19 3 3 , the marines concentrated on establishing
a dependable local security force , the National Guard , whi'ch
would be apol itical and would maintain public order after
the departure of the American military .

With the advent of

the Good Neighbor Policy , American military and financial
representatives were withdrawn , and the leader of the National
Guard , General Anastasio Somoza Garcia , used the leverage of
the force at hie disposal to catapult himself into executive
power.

In a very real sense , the Somoza dynasty still con•

trols the fortunes of that Isthmian country.
United States diplomatic relations with Nicaragua ,
distracted during the decade of the Civil War, recovered
with the ratification of a bilateral treaty in 1867.
However, the accord did not construct a canal , and
that issue remained to be revived sporadically during
the next half of the century.

In 187 0 ,
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a United States Congres sional appropriations bill provided
money for canal surveys of Nicaragua and the Tehauntepec isthmus
This was not the last appropriation for this purpose , but
until the end of the century , the amounts were so minimal that
the !esulting activity had little impact.

The Clayton-Bulwer

Treaty remained an impediment to official patronage or private
financiers in undertaking such a momentous task.

By 1880 ,

even United States officialdom began to chafe under the res
trictive provisions of the British accord. President Rutherford
B. Hay�s publicly declared:
The policy of this country is a canal under American
control • . • . If existing treaties between the
United States and other nations or if the rights of
sovereignty or property of other nations stand in
the way of this policy--a contingency which is not
apprehended--suitable s teps should be taken by j ust
and liberal negotiations to promote and establish
the American policy on this subj ect consistently
with the rights of the nations to be affected by it . 3
Nonetheles s, the British refused to dis cus s modifications
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty , and a bilateral accord with
Nicaragua submitted to -the Senate by President Chester A.
Arthur in 18 8 4 was not a cted upon.

Toward the end of the century , the British attitude began

to change.

The Boer War and events in Europe and the world

left Great Britain with few friends on the European continent
and fostered a desire for Anglo-American accord .
3 1reland, Boundaries , 19 5 .

Also, the
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British generally approved the action of the United S tates in
wres ting the las t of the Spanish-American colonies from their
mother country , thereby creating new market s for British trade.
At the same time , the Spanish-American War underscored the
American desire for a shorter route by which to move its fleet
from ocean to ocean than by Cape Horn .

Finally , a bil l in the

United States Congress pointing toward a bilateral solution with
the s tates of Nicaragua and Costa Rica promised to embarras s
both the State Department and Whitehal"l .

It was an admirable

moment ror the British to accommodate the United States on the
canal is sue .

Accordingly , on February 5 , 1 9 0 0 , British Ambas sa

dor Lord Julian Pauncefote signed an agreement with Secretary
of State John Hay whereby the United States could construc t ,
regulate , and manage an Is tmian canal .

Although the treaty

paid lip service to the principle of the neutrality of such
a canal , the right to obtain an exc lusive American franchise
was unques tionably conceded .
Because of the French precedent in Panama , American atten
tion by then was directed more toward that portion of the
Isthmus as a pos sible route than acros s Nicaragua .

Neverthe

les s , an act of Congres s in 1 9 0 2 authorized Theodore Roosevelt ,
in the event he should be unable to obtain satisfactory control
of the neces sary territory from Colombia , to deal with Nicaragua
and Cos ta Rica .

The adminis tration's efforts to secure Colanbia' s

ratification of a canal treaty failed , but the Panamanian
revolt of 1 9 0 3 opened the door to negotiations with that new
nation .

Even after the completion of the Panama Canal in 1 9 14 ,
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the United States had not lost interest in an alternate water
way acros s Nicaragua.

Secretary of · -State Wil liam Jennings

Bryan reached an agreement with Nicaraguan Minister ( and next
president ) Emiliano Chamorro Vargas , providing that the United
States would grant Nicaragua a payment of $ 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 in ex
change for an exclusive canal .. franchi se through that country
plus naval bases in the Gul f o f Fonseca and on Corn I s land.
Though the outcry in Central America again st the Bryan-Chamorr.o
Treaty was long and loud , the United State s Senate routinely
approved in 1 9 1 6.

The conces sion was never acted upon , but more

recently , the Nicaraguan route - has been re-examined as one o f
the poss ib le alternatives t o the existing Panama Canal .

The

latter is too small to accommodate many modern ships , and the
190 3 treaty which provided for virtual sovereignty in perpe
tuity has come under increasing attack by the Panamanian govern
ment .
M1ether or not the canal would have b een built or the tran
sit road would have achieved more importance had it not been
for American intervention is speculative .

The battles on

Nicaraguan soil among the American filibusters and financiers ,
Walker , Kinney , Vander�ilt , White , Morgan , Garrison , et . al . ,
in which the Nicaraguans themselves seem to have been mere spec
tators , did +eave the route and t�e is sue in s hambles .

But the

destruction to Nicaragua may have been more physical than
ideological .

A crucial issue at the beginning of the era was

the question of Central American union .

Mario Rodriguez has
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demonstrated in· his comprehensive book on Briti sh agent

Frederick Chatfield that it was Great Britain, to a large
degree, which was respons ible for the dis solution of the
Central American Republ ic long before Americans became actively
interested in the Isthmus.

And it was Chatfield who continued

to play the ·advocate of disunion in what might be called the
first American Period .

With thi s type of British presence,

it may have ultimately been in the best interests of Central
America that individual American citi zens forced the i s sue
to the· attention of the United States government, and caused
the spasmodic attempts to en force the Monroe Doctrine.

If

the American government had not been compelled to act t�
check Br itish encroachment on the Isthmus in the fifties,
it might have been too late after the Civi l War .

British

dominance in the region, and Briti sh colonies in addition
to British Honduras, �ight have been firmly establi shed.
The cataloguing of Walker ' s trespas ses against both the
United States and Nicaragua � s almo�t endles s:

injuring pri

vate capital in the United States, creating enormous destruc
tion of life and property in Nicaragua, caus ing suspicion
in Central America against the American people, adversely af
fecting relations between the United States and Great Britain,
and destroying interoceanic communication via the San Juan
River.

In one sense, however, his activities may not have

had a deleterious effect on Central American union.

He cer

tainly proved , by compelling the states to band together in
order to expel him, that in cases of extreme and imminent
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danger the I sthmian republ ics �ould work together.

Unfortu

nately, as events showed, cooperation ceased and internal
strife resumed when the threat had pas sed.

Martinez and Mora

did make a post- intervention gesture to�ard union, but they
received little encouragement in Guatemala City, and the

effort was terminated . when . Mora - was overthrown and k i l led in
a counter-revolutionary attempt in 1 8 6 1 .

Subsequent faltering

steps were taken toward union in the I sthmus, notably the
establishment of the Central American Court of Justice in
Unfortunately, thi s h. igh-minded endeavor met an early

19 0 8 .

demi se in 1 9 1 8 when Nica ragua·, at the instigation of the United
States, defied the court I s injunct1on against the Bryan-Chamorro
Treaty.

The irony was that not only had the United States

been instrumental in the creation of the court, but also
was largely respons ible for its dis solution.
Walker ' s own campaign wa s aimed at creating union in
Central America, though hardly the democratic federa tion en
vi saged by its chief supporters.

Thi s i s another irony and

one that brings into sharp focus the nature of the era :

the

union was attempted by a foreigner, Walker, a nd largely des
troyed by a foreigner, Cornelius Vanderbi l t.

Nevertheles s,

as the United States government was continual ly urging re
union among . the I sthmian states that they might better res i st
Briti sh domination, in thi s rather perverse sense Walker was
an ideological agent of hi s home government. ·

If Walker did

not achieve his goal of union for all five state�, it i s
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nonetheless probable that he contributed to union within
N icaragua itself .

The pre-Walker split in N icaragua between

the Democrats (liberals) at Le6n and the Legitimists (con
servatives) at Granada was not only ideolo g ical b ut also com
mercial.

Granada · was oriented toward the Atlantic b ecause

of its trade via Lake Nicaragua al?:� the .,San Juan River, while
Le6n's maj or port was Realej o on the Paci f ic.

Perhaps the

commercial question o f free trade, which the liberals espoused ,
and high tari ffs, which was a conservative tenet , was not
resolved by the post-Walker transfer o f the capital to the
mid-point o f Managua .

But the move did tend to uni fy commer

cial views by making the economic concerns more national
than regional .

The transfer o f the capital was o stensibly
for ideological purpo ses , in order to . avoid having to make

a j udgment between the competing claimants, but . it was also
partially caused by the fact that Walker had left the tradi
tional capital, Granada , an empty shell.
There remains the recurring question o f the f ilibusters '
aims vis � vis the United States .

Doubtless many of their

supporters in the United States were so inclined because they
looked upon the efforts as preliminaries to annexation o f
N icaragua and perhaps all o f Central America to the United
States o f America.

The example o f Texas was still fresh in

the minds of many , but there was little substance in these
hopes o f a renascence o f what had been a unique situation.
The fact that an identical event such as the annexation o f
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Texas would never again occur was unknown to the fil ibusters
of the 1 8 5 0 ' s.

At least one of them , Colonel Kinney , seemed

to have had in mind the recreation of the role he played in
Texas , only this time he would be brought to center stage.
In a l etter written to a fr iend in Texa s in Apri l , 1 8 5 5 ,
be fore he encountered di fficulties with the United States at
torney and the port authorities in New York , the colonel in
timated his intentions :

" It requires but a few hundred Americat:i

and particularly Texans , to take control o f all that country.
I have grants o f land , and enough to make a start upon safely
and legal ly.

I intend to make a suitab le government , and the
rest will follow . 11 4 Unfortunately - for the colonel , his high

hopes were dashed almost be fore he left the United States
through the surreptitious intervention of Joseph L . White
of the Accessory Transit Company.
Conversely , Walker eventually made it c lear that his plans
included no such contingency as annexation .

In fact , one of

the maj or reasons for his repudiation o f Nicaragua's anti
s lavery statute , according to his own account , was to rule
out--in the minds of Americans and Europeans alike--the po ssi
bility o f annexation .

Slavery was neces sary , he reasoned ,

becaus e the only way the regenerative Americans could hold
Nicaragua after initial mil itary conque st was to take control
of the land ; otherwise , the American contingent would be re
duced to the status of " j ani za·r ies " or a " praetorian guard. "
4 Brownsville ( Texas } Flag , May 5 , 1 8 5 5.
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However , "white s " ( as Walker called the North Americans )
could exploit s ucess fully only with the use o f African labor.
It should have been obvious , the filibuster felt , that the
reintroduction o f s lavery would prec lude the chance o t annexa
tion , as the American Constitution forbade the importation of
s laves from outs ide the Union .

Thi s would have meant having

to drain the Southern state s of s lave labor , a commodity in
which they were already in short s upply.

To the contrary ,

a dynamic , s laveholding , independent nation nearby would have
provided employment for the South ' s " superabundance of intellect
and capital . "

Balance would have been restored to Southern

industry by having its unemployed " inte llect " go ing to, an area
where no pol itical obs tac les would prevent it from getting
the required labor .

Walker even ventured that such an ar

rangement would have provided a safety valve for the United
State s and made it pos s ible to avoid the coming " irrepres
sible conflict 1 11 5

It is probab le that the s lavery decree

caused Walker to lose more s upport than he gained , as after
wards the voices north of the Potomac e spous ing his cause
were lonely and forlorn.

But it was Walker ' s de feat by the

Costa Ricans at the instigation o f Vanderbilt which created
the most despair among his adherents in the United States .
If nothing succeeds like s ucce s s , then nothing fails l ike
failure , and the filibuster ' s expul sion from Central America
5walker , War in Nicaragua , 2 5 1- 2 8 0 pas s im .
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appeared to write finis to his grandiose scheme.

Cuba was

al so one of Walker ' s ob j ectives, �nd thqse in the United
States--including mo st o f Washington of ficialdom during the
decade of the 1 8 5 0 ' s--who felt that Cuba should natural ly
be incorporated into the federa l union could never forgive
Walker for ,>a 1etter � . wro te. to: Goicouria which was pub l ished
in the New York Herald on Novenber 2 4 , 1 8 5 6 :
shall be free, but no t for the Yankees.

"Cuba must and

Oh, no !

country is not fit for tho se barbarous Yankees .

That fine
What would

s uch a p salm- singing s et do in the is land? "

The official attitude o·f the United States government with

respect to annexation o f Nicaragua probably never deviated
very much from the po sition expres sed by an American Secretary
o f State to the British charge in- Wa shington when the latter
diplomat expres sed some apprehension about United States '
interest in the I sthmian country.

The Secretary said that it

was United States ' policy to annex only empty s paces and un
populated areas, 6 thereby making a distinction between North
American · rndians on the one hand and Central American Indians
on the other.

In truth, the maj or discrepancy between the

anticipated course of the American government and that of the
filibusters may have been in the direction that the extension
6 Marcy to John F . Crampton, quoted in Marcy to Borland,
June 17, 1 8 5 3, M7 7 , 2 7/ 1 7 7 . ·Buchanan made a similar obser
vation to Lord Napier , the British minister, in 1 8 5 9 : " We
can only annex vacant ter�itory. " British Foreign and State
Papers, XLVI I I, 7 5 4.
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o f the Union would take.

The filibuster s . were committed

to b eginning with Central America · and subsequently incor
porating Cuba and perhaps other Middle American territories.
Although the premature publication of the Ostend Manifesto
embarrassed American o f ficialdom , the consensus in
Washington was that Cuba would come first. 7 Then the ques
tion o f Central America could be addressed .

Most rational

American diplomats recognized that annexation of Nicaragua ,
deep in the heart of an alien culture , would have been an
untenable gesture.

That nation did not possess the virtue

of being contiguous to the United States , or at least
mere ly separated by narrow straits from mainland America .
The same forces which ob j ected to the incorporation o f any
or all of Mexico south o f the Rio Grande on the assumption
that the problems introduced by such an action would far
�utweigh the benefits , he ld steady with respect to Nicaragua .
Nonethe less , if either Walker or Kinney had succeeded in
his p lan to first Ame ricaniz e Nicaragua , some o f the more
obvious problems would have been removed.

If this had oc

curred· , the Nicaraguan's spec tre of losing his nationality
and religion , and becoming a hewer of wood and a drawer of
water could have been eerily prophetic.
7 Frankl in Pierce , in his inaugural address , implied
that the goal of Cuban annexation was to be given first
priority in foreign affairs. New York Evening Mirror ,
March 5 , 1 8 5 3. Letters from current and former o f f icials
and congressmen applauding this j udgment crowded Secretary
of State Marcy ' s desk. Marcy Papers , Library of Congre ss .
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Perhaps the kindest thing that can be said about Walker
was his regard for Nicaragu.a itsel f in comparison with
the attitudes o f other American individual s and institutions .
Walker , who died a naturalized citizen of that country,
and Kinney thought o f Nicaragua as a place to live, to
cultivate, and to develop, albeit that development had
overtones of exploitation .

Vanderbilt and the financiers

looked upon it as a narrow area o f the Isthmus, therefore
a site ideally suited for cro s sing and moving on.

Wealth

should be derived from an honest enterprise, and even more
wealth from a fraudulent one.

The United States govern-

ment occasionally viewed the emerging nation as a pos sible
commercial partner, but more often as a persistent and
nagging problem .

Faced with this mas s o f contradictions

and the manifestations o f the contradictions, the Nicaraguans
themselves were in turn baf fled, xenophobic, desperate,
occasionally hopeful, but almost never sanguine or sel f-con
fident.

The real bruise inflicted by the "filibusters and

financiers " may have been to the spirit o f the people of the
country .

They emerged from the era perhaps more united ,

but s urely less certain o f their destiny and les s secure
in themselves. 8 Their ambivalent attitude about Central
8An example of this was Nicaragua's reluctance to nor
mali ze relations with the United States for a ful l decade
after Walker ' s intervention, and its deliberate procras
tination about signing a satis factory transit contract
with American capitali sts during the same period . Both
cases o f inaction seemed to stem from a deep- seated fear
of opening the door to any opportunity for Ameri can inter
vention or exploitation .
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American union , and later about wardship o f the United·
States , was possibly a persistence of the shock of American
intervention in the 1 8 S O ' s .

Withal , the focus o f American

interest in Nicaragua in mid-century made that country a
mic rocosm of United States-Central American relations during
the last hal f of the nineteenth century.
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